Consolidating Security and Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama

Colombia's increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social, and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, a large-scale narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-populated areas. Important differences exist, however in the nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the government response to them and the nature of government and society that affects the applicability of Colombia's experience to Peru. The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and Colombian insurgents --often a linked phenomenon-- are in many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the government -- as the case of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and Peru. The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or small towns where state presence is minimal. The central lesson learned from Colombia is the need to define and then address the key problem of a "sovereignity gap," lack of legitimate state presence in many part of the country. Colombia's success in broadening the presence of the national government between 2002 and the presence is owed to many factors, including an effective national strategy, improvements in the armed forces and police, political will on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buy-in to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in conflicted areas. Control of territory and effective state presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs. Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority, improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens, and furthering development to wean communities away from drugs. State coordinated "integration" efforts in Peru as practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru's traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be overcome if this effort is to be successful.

The effect of a breakfast program on nutritional status, quality of life, and health care use among frail homebound older adults

The population of older adults is rapidly increasing, creating a need for community services that assist vulnerable older adults in maintaining independence and quality of life. Recent evidence confirms the importance of food and nutrition in reaching this objective. The Elderly Nutrition Program (ENP) is part of a system of federally funded community based programs, authorized through the Older Americans Act. ENP services include the home-delivered meals program, which targets frail homebound older adults at nutritional risk. Traditionally, ENP services provide a noon meal 5 days/week. This study evaluated the impact of expanding the home-delivered meals service to include breakfast + lunch, on the nutritional status, quality of life and health care utilization of program participants. ^ This cross-sectional study compared 2 groups. The Breakfast group (n = 167) received a home-delivered breakfast + lunch, 5 days/week. The Comparison group (n = 214) received lunch 5 days/week. Participants, recruited from 5 ENP programs, formed a geographically, racially/ethnically diverse sample. Participants ranged in age from 60–100 years, they were functionally limited, at high nutritional risk, low income, and they lived alone and had difficulty shopping or preparing food. Participant data were collected through in-home interviews and program records. A 24-hour food recall and information on participant demographics, malnutrition risk, functional status, health care use, and applicable quality of life factors were obtained. Service and cost data were collected from program administrators. ^ Breakfast group participants had greater energy/nutrient intakes (p < .05), fewer health care contacts (p < .05), and greater quality of life measured as food security (p < .05) and fewer depressive symptoms (p < .05), than comparison group participants. These benefits were achieved for $1.30/person/day. ^ The study identified links from improvements in nutritional status to enhanced quality of life to diminished health care utilization and expenditures. A model of health, loneliness, food enjoyment, food insecurity, and depression as factors contributing to quality of life for this population, was proposed and tested (p < .01). ^ The breakfast service is an inexpensive addition to traditional home-delivered meals services and can improve the lives of frail homebound older adults. Agencies should be encouraged to expand meals programs to include a breakfast service. ^

Conceptualizing American power and security in a post -9/11 security context: Conflict, resistance, and global security, 2001–present

In a post-Cold War, post-9/11 world, the advent of US global supremacy resulted in the installation, perpetuation, and dissemination of an Absolutist Security Agenda (hereinafter, ASA). The US ASA explicitly and aggressively articulates and equates US national security interests with the security of all states in the international system, and replaced the bipolar, Cold War framework that defined international affairs from 1945-1992. Since the collapse of the USSR and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the US has unilaterally defined, implemented, and managed systemic security policy. The US ASA is indicative of a systemic category of knowledge (security) anchored in variegated conceptual and material components, such as morality, philosophy, and political rubrics. The US ASA is based on a logic that involves the following security components: (1) hyper militarization, (2) intimidation,(3) coercion, (4) criminalization, (5) panoptic surveillance, (6) plenary security measures, and (7) unabashed US interference in the domestic affairs of select states. Such interference has produced destabilizing tensions and conflicts that have, in turn, produced resistance, revolutions, proliferation, cults of personality, and militarization. This is the case because the US ASA rests on the notion that the international system of states is an extension, instrument of US power, rather than a system and/or society of states comprised of functionally sovereign entities. To analyze the US ASA, this study utilizes: (1) official government statements, legal doctrines, treaties, and policies pertaining to US foreign policy; (2) militarization rationales, budgets, and expenditures; and (3) case studies of rogue states. The data used in this study are drawn from information that is publicly available (academic journals, think-tank publications, government publications, and information provided by international organizations). The data supports the contention that global security is effectuated via a discrete set of hegemonic/imperialistic US values and interests, finding empirical expression in legal acts (USA Patriot ACT 2001) and the concept of rogue states. Rogue states, therefore, provide test cases to clarify the breadth, depth, and consequentialness of the US ASA in world affairs vis-à-vis the relationship between US security and global security.

Conceptualizing American power and security in a post-9/11 security context : conflict, resistance, and global security, 2001-present

In a post-Cold War, post-9/11 world, the advent of US global supremacy resulted in the installation, perpetuation, and dissemination of an Absolutist Security Agenda (hereinafter, ASA). The US ASA explicitly and aggressively articulates and equates US national security interests with the security of all states in the international system, and replaced the bipolar, Cold War framework that defined international affairs from 1945-1992. Since the collapse of the USSR and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the US has unilaterally defined, implemented, and managed systemic security policy. The US ASA is indicative of a systemic category of knowledge (security) anchored in variegated conceptual and material components, such as morality, philosophy, and political rubrics. The US ASA is based on a logic that involves the following security components: 1., hyper militarization, 2., intimidation, 3., coercion, 4., criminalization, 5., panoptic surveillance, 6., plenary security measures, and 7., unabashed US interference in the domestic affairs of select states. Such interference has produced destabilizing tensions and conflicts that have, in turn, produced resistance, revolutions, proliferation, cults of personality, and militarization. This is the case because the US ASA rests on the notion that the international system of states is an extension, instrument of US power, rather than a system and/or society of states comprised of functionally sovereign entities. To analyze the US ASA, this study utilizes: 1., official government statements, legal doctrines, treaties, and policies pertaining to US foreign policy; 2., militarization rationales, budgets, and expenditures; and 3., case studies of rogue states. The data used in this study are drawn from information that is publicly available (academic journals, think-tank publications, government publications, and information provided by international organizations). The data supports the contention that global security is effectuated via a discrete set of hegemonic/imperialistic US values and interests, finding empirical expression in legal acts (USA Patriot ACT 2001) and the concept of rogue states. Rogue states, therefore, provide test cases to clarify the breadth, depth, and consequentialness of the US ASA in world affairs vis-a-vis the relationship between US security and global security.

Islamist Cyber Networks in Spanish-Speaking Latin America

Despite significant concern among policy, law enforcement and intelligence communities in the United States (U.S.) over the possible spread of radical Islamist thought throughout the world as part of a global jihad movement, there has been little investigation into the growing cyber networks in Latin America that promote strong anti-Semitic and anti-U.S. messages. This paper offers an overview of that network, focusing on the structure of Shi’ite websites that promote not only religious conversion but are also supportive of Iran -- a designated State-sponsor of terrorism – its nuclear program. Hezbollah, and the “Bolivarian revolution” led by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and his allies in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. There is also a smaller group of Sunni Muslim websites, mostly tied to the legacy organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of the Shi’ite websites are linked to each other consistently portray Israel as a Nazi State, and the United States as an imperialist war monger. The Palestinian issue is frequently juxtaposed with the anti-imperialist struggle that those states supporting Chávez’ Bolivarian revolution claim to wage against the United States. Some of the Islamist websites claim thousands of new convert, but such claims are difficult to verify. Most of the websites visited touted the conversion of one or two individuals as significant victories and signs of progress, implying that there are few, if any, mass conversions. While conducting this research, no websites directly claiming to be linked to Hezbollah were found, although there numerous sites hosted by that group that were active until around 2006. Several of the inactive links are supportive of Hezbollah as a political party. No websites linked to al Qaeda were found. Yet a substantial Internet network remains operational. Much of the outreach for Shi’ite Muslims, closely tied to Iran, is sponsored on numerous websites across the region, including El Salvador, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia. Numerous Facebook forums for discussion are also hosted around Latin America. These links must be viewed in the context of the rapidly expanding diplomatic, intelligence, political and economic ties of Iran in recent years with the self-proclaimed Bolivarian states. Given the sparse literature available and the rich vein of un-mined information on the sites cited as well as others that one could find with additional research, the cyber network of Islamist groups remains one of the least understood or studied facets of their presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. It merits significantly more investigation.

Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America

In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.

Relevance of the community college curriculum to the international student

The purpose of this study was to ascertain the perception of the level of satisfaction that international students have regarding the services and the relevance of the curriculum offered at Miami-Dade Community College. Trends and issues at universities and community colleges in providing services and an international curriculum for foreign students are outlined. Focus is on characteristics, personal and career needs as well as needs of national development for the students' countries. A sample of students from four developing nations was selected to qualitatively and quantitatively determine their level of satisfaction. The nations are the Bahamas, Colombia, Haiti and Pakistan. Students responses were recorded through group interviews, four personal interviews, an open ended questionnaire and a Likert scaled survey questionnaire. Matrix charts, mean calculations and one way analysis of variance were used to analyze data collected. Country of origin and major program of study were the variables used for statistical analysis. Information gathered through qualitative research presented a variety of perspectives and responses, both positive and negative. Students supplied specific examples of experiences and insights to help explain their various perceptions. Statistically, there were no significant differences between the variables of country of origin and major program of study regarding program services and relevance of the curriculum. Implications and recommendations for community college programs were outlined.

The impact of CEO compensation and CEO horizon on a firm's discretionary research and development expenditures

Agency costs are said to arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control inherent in the corporate form of ownership. One such agency problem concerns the potential variance between the time horizons of principal shareholders and agent managers. Agency theory suggests that these costs can be alleviated or controlled through performance-based Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contracting. However, components of a CEO's compensation contract can exacerbate or mitigate agency-related problems (Antle and Smith, 1985). According to the horizon hypothesis, a self-serving CEO reduces discretionary research and development (R&D) expenditures to increase earnings and earnings-based bonus compensation. Agency theorists contend that a CEO's market-based compensation component can mitigate horizon problems. This study seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between CEO earnings- and market-based compensation components and R&D expenditures in the largest United States industrial firms from 1987 to 1993.^ Consistent with the horizon hypothesis, results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary and bonus) and the firm's R&D expenditures. Consistent with the expectations of agency theory, results provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between market-based CEO compensation and R&D.^ Further results of this study provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between CEO tenure and the firm's R&D expenditures. Although there is a negative relationship between CEO age and the firm's R&D, it was not statistically significant at the 0.5 level. ^

World coffee markets and national coffee parastatals since 1989: A comparative study of Colombia and Cote d'Ivoire

The International Coffee Agreements (ICA) involved the majority of nations producing and consuming coffee and provided relative economic stability to the coffee sectors of the exporting Third World countries. This study focuses on the serious impact of the 1989 collapse of the ICA on the domestic coffee sectors of Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire. In particular, the dissertation examines the role of the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee parastatals, the Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia and the Caisse de Stabilisation et Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles, during the crisis and their transformation by it. ^ The theoretical framework employed in this study is borrowed from the literature on state-society relations. The methodology includes: in-depth analysis of the historical roles of the parastatal agencies in coffee production, state-society relations and economic development in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire; interviews with parastatal administrators, producers and other knowledgeable informants in both countries; and a comprehensive review of newspaper articles and official statements of coffee policy published in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire. prior to, during, and after the crisis. ^ The Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors and their producers faced serious economic and social problems following the drop in coffee prices. The coffee parastatals in Colombia and Côte d'lvoire first lost some of their responsibilities following the world coffee crisis. The Caisse was in the end eliminated while FEDECAFE struggled to remain in existence. Along the way, both entities faced protests from disgruntled coffee producers, who organized politically for the first time in their nations' histories. I argue that the outcome for the parastatals depended in part on the conditions of their formation, particularly the level of societal involvement in their creation. I also posit that the country's dependence on foreign aid played a key role in the fate of the parastatals. ^ This dissertation concludes that developments in the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors have significantly contributed to the creation of the difficult political and economic conditions of both countries today. ^

Soil carbon dynamics in primary and secondary tropical forests in Colombia

Soils play a central role in the dynamics of biospheric carbon and in climate change. They contain the largest carbon stock of terrestrial ecosystems and return to the atmosphere a significant proportion of carbon fixed by photosynthesis. Soils of tropical forests are tremendously important in the carbon cycle because they receive the largest organic matter inputs, they have the largest respiration rates, and they are among the largest carbon reservoirs among world soils. This research assesses the main components of the soil carbon dynamics in primary (PF) and secondary (SF) tropical forests in Colombia. I evaluated the production, stocks, and decomposition rates of aboveground detritus as well as the stocks, growth, mortality, and decomposition of fine roots in these two forest types. Soil carbon outputs were evaluated as total soil, heterotrophic, and root respiration. The stocks of soil organic carbon down to 4 m deep in these two cover types and in degraded pastures (PAS) were also evaluated. ^ Soil inputs of organic carbon from above and belowground sources were lower in SF than in PF. Litterfall in SF was 58% and production of fine root detritus was 60% of that in PF. When production of woody detritus and palm fronds was considered, the difference between these forest types was even larger. However, outputs of mineral carbon through heterotrophic soil respiration were similar; in SF they equaled 97% of those in PF. As a result, soil carbon balance was positive in PF and negative in SF. Despite that soil carbon balances suggest that soils of SF are losing carbon, soil carbon stocks of SF were higher than of degraded pastures, suggesting that they have already started to recover soil carbon stocks lost under degraded pastures. This discrepancy can be partially explained by the effect of drier conditions on heterotrophic soil respiration as a consequence of a moderate El Niño event during the period of soil respiration measurements. The positive carbon balance in soils of PF despite the El Niño event, suggests that soils of PF accumulated about 664 Kg C ha−1 yr−1. Therefore, soil carbon dynamics mainly depended on successional status of vegetation and on climatic conditions. ^

A youth vision of the city: The socio-spatial lives and exclusion of street girls in Bogota, Colombia

This dissertation documents the everyday lives and spaces of a population of youth typically constructed as out of place, and the broader urban context in which they are rendered as such. Thirty-three female and transgender street youth participated in the development of this youth-based participatory action research (YPAR) project utilizing geo-ethnographic methods, auto-photography, and archival research throughout a six-phase, eighteen-month research process in Bogotá, Colombia. ^ This dissertation details the participatory writing process that enabled the YPAR research team to destabilize dominant representations of both street girls and urban space and the participatory mapping process that enabled the development of a youth vision of the city through cartographic images. The maps display individual and aggregate spatial data indicating trends within and making comparisons between three subgroups of the research population according to nine spatial variables. These spatial data, coupled with photographic and ethnographic data, substantiate that street girls’ mobilities and activity spaces intersect with and are altered by state-sponsored urban renewal projects and paramilitary-led social cleansing killings, both efforts to clean up Bogotá by purging the city center of deviant populations and places. ^ Advancing an ethical approach to conducting research with excluded populations, this dissertation argues for the enactment of critical field praxis and care ethics within a YPAR framework to incorporate young people as principal research actors rather than merely voices represented in adultist academic discourse. Interjection of considerations of space, gender, and participation into the study of street youth produce new ways of envisioning the city and the role of young people in research. Instead of seeing the city from a panoptic view, Bogotá is revealed through the eyes of street youth who participated in the construction and feminist visualization of a new cartography and counter-map of the city grounded in embodied, situated praxis. This dissertation presents a socially responsible approach to conducting action-research with high-risk youth by documenting how street girls reclaim their right to the city on paper and in practice; through maps of their everyday exclusion in Bogotá followed by activism to fight against it.^

Salinity and Chlorophyll a as Performance Measures to Rehabilitate a Mangrove-Dominated Deltaic Coastal Region: the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta–Pajarales Lagoon Complex, Colombia

Salinity, water temperature, and chlorophyll a (chl-a) biomass were used as performance measures in the period 1999–2001 to evaluate the effect of a hydrological rehabilitation project in the Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta (CGSM)–Pajarales lagoon complex, Colombia where freshwater diversions were initiated in 1995 and completed in 1998. The objective of this study was to evaluate how diversions of freshwater into previously hypersaline (>80) environments changed the spatial and temporal distribution of environmental characteristics. Following the diversion, 19 surveys and transects using a flow-through system were surveyed in the CGSM–Pajarales complex to continuously measure selected water quality parameters. Geostatistical analysis indicates that hydrology and salinity regimes and water circulation patterns in the CGSM lagoon are largely controlled by freshwater discharge from the Fundacion, Aracataca, and Sevilla Rivers. Residence times in the CGSM lagoon were similar before (15.5 ± 3.8 days) and after (14.2 ± 2.0 days) the rehabilitation project and indicated that the system is flushed regularly. In contrast, chl-a biomass was highly variable in the CGSM–Pajarales lagoon complex and not related to discharge patterns. Mean annual chl-a biomass (44–250 μg L−1) following the diversion project was similar to values recorded since the 1980s and still remains among the highest reported in coastal systems around the world owing to its unique hydrology regulated by the Magdalena River and Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta watersheds and the high teleconnection to the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Our results confirm that the reduction in salinity in the CGSM lagoon and Pajarales complex during 1999–2000 was largely driven by high precipitation (2500 mm) induced by the ENSO–La Niña rather than by the freshwater diversions.

Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia

Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.