South American Defense Council: What it Means for Regional Security?

The South American Defense Council (CSD), created in March 2009 as a military coordinating body of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) demonstrates a growing trend among Latin American countries to approach matters of regional security independent of the United States. The CSD also indicates a maturation of democratic civil military relations in a region once dominated by authoritarian military regimes. The CSD aims to facilitate the exchange of information about regional defense policies, promote collaboration for disaster relief, and promote civil-military engagement. In less than a year it is hardly a tested entity, but the presence of 12 South American states coming together around security policy marks an important moment in the evolution of civil-military relations in the region. Brazil has taken on an important leadership role in the CSD, acting as a leader in recent regional peacekeeping efforts. As a geopolitical move, Brazil also sees a benefit in promoting good relationships with all countries of South america, given its common border with nine of them. Although the United States is not a member of the CSD, the organization's agenda of infromation exchange of defense policies, military cooperation, and capacity building, including disaster assistance and preparedness provide opportunities for greater collaboration. The CSD is not part of the Inter-American System created after the Second World War. It is unclear how its work will coincide with the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security or its Secretariat for Multidimensional Security. The U.S. should view the CSD as a mechanism to promote joint initiatives that encourage democratic governance in the region.

The Cuban military in Angola: The limits of internationalism

The Cuban military involvement in Angola has often been seen as a response to the wishes of the former Soviet Union. Yet, Castro intervened in Angola following his theory of internationalism. Internationalism, as conceived by Castro, sent Cubans on a voluntary basis to serve abroad, either in the military or in the civilian sector. This thesis will illustrate that from its inception, Castro sent military troops to Angola to divert domestic concerns and to boost Cuba's alliances throughout the world. Angola is different from other internationalist missions, because in Angola--for the first time--regular combat troops were used. Castro intervened in Angola to prevent a collapse of the Moviemento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) government, and stayed on to ensure the viability of the MPLA. The primary sources are interviews conducted by the author, of participants in the Angolan civil war. The secondary sources consulted are works on Cuba, Southern Africa, Portuguese colonialism and Angola. ^

From stability to insurgency: The root and proximate causes of the September 2002 civil war in Côte d'Ivoire

This dissertation was an analysis of the root and proximate causes of the September 2002 civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. The central question of this study was: Why did Côte d’Ivoire, which was relatively stable under President Houphouët-Boigny, suddenly begin to experience political violence in the 1990s and an explosion in 2002? Côte d’Ivoire was an interesting case because it was stable for a long period of time, apparently making it an infertile ground for conflict. It was also interesting for comparative purposes because of the fact that several states in West Africa (for instance, Benin, Togo, and Ghana) have experienced military coups but not have civil wars. Finally, this case was an opportunity to revisit the debate on the causes of civil wars in the African context. Chapter one has outlined the entire dissertation project and contextualized the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters. Chapter two has reviewed the literature on civil wars in general, identified the different types of civil wars, and the type the Ivoiran war is. Chapter three has examined the domestic and international political economy as a source of the civil violence in Côte d’Ivoire. Chapter four has examined the role of ethnicity and region as identities of the war, while chapter five has analyzed the role of the foreign relations in the civil war, as well as the regional political context. Chapter six has distinguished between the root and proximate causes of the Ivoirian civil war, made judgments about the relative weight of the various causes, and the extent to which the weight of the causes can be measured. The study found that the “Ivoirité” was the most important trigger of the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. The overall conclusion of my dissertation was that the September 2002 crisis in that country was a political crisis which occured in the context of a political reform. It first started with succession problems in 1993 followed by the controversial elections in 1995 and 2000. Later, this electoral politics spread beyond electoral issues, namely citizenship matters.

A Land That Has Yet to Heal: The Burmese Civil War (1948 – present)

Since its independence from Great Britain in 1948, the state of Burma has been at war with itself. Ethnic and religious tension fuel the conflict and has led to territorial disputes while no resolution to this strife is expected under a fragile and corrupt central government. Additionally, proxy wars have delayed any peaceful negotiations. The combinations of failing social welfare programs and prolonged peace talks have led many Burmese people join the military as soldiers in either the Burmese military or any one of the numerous ethnic paramilitary groups in the country. Human rights violations are common in Burma, including rape, pillaging, and ethnic cleansing. Essentially, Burma has had the longest ongoing civil war due to combination of grievances, many of which predate the 21st century.

From Stability to Insurgency: The Root and Proximate Causes of the September 2002 Civil War in Cote d'Ivoire

This dissertation was an analysis of the root and proximate causes of the September 2002 civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. The central question of this study was: Why did Côte d’Ivoire, which was relatively stable under President Houphouët-Boigny, suddenly begin to experience political violence in the 1990s and an explosion in 2002? Côte d’Ivoire was an interesting case because it was stable for a long period of time, apparently making it an infertile ground for conflict. It was also interesting for comparative purposes because of the fact that several states in West Africa (for instance, Benin, Togo, and Ghana) have experienced military coups but not have civil wars. Finally, this case was an opportunity to revisit the debate on the causes of civil wars in the African context. Chapter one has outlined the entire dissertation project and contextualized the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters. Chapter two has reviewed the literature on civil wars in general, identified the different types of civil wars, and the type the Ivoiran war is. Chapter three has examined the domestic and international political economy as a source of the civil violence in Côte d’Ivoire. Chapter four has examined the role of ethnicity and region as identities of the war, while chapter five has analyzed the role of the foreign relations in the civil war, as well as the regional political context. Chapter six has distinguished between the root and proximate causes of the Ivoirian civil war, made judgments about the relative weight of the various causes, and the extent to which the weight of the causes can be measured. The study found that the “Ivoirité” was the most important trigger of the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. The overall conclusion of my dissertation was that the September 2002 crisis in that country was a political crisis which occured in the context of a political reform. It first started with succession problems in 1993 followed by the controversial elections in 1995 and 2000. Later, this electoral politics spread beyond electoral issues, namely citizenship matters.

The social development strategy of the Shiites in Lebanon

This study examines what many scholars have neglected to investigate when addressing post Civil War issues in Lebanon. Most studies have addressed political issues surrounding activities of Shiite movements, such as Harakat Amal or Hizb Allah, while socioeconomic issues have been neglected.^ Imam Musa Sadr challenged the power of traditional Shiite leaders by creating official Shiites institutions and movements like Amal. The Iranian Revolution and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 sparked the creation of Hizb Allah which, not only struggled against its foes, but also provided social services to the Shiites. This development program has been central in creating political legitimacy for Hizb Allah, regardless of its military situation, which suggests that socioeconomic development can transform a militia into a legitimate actor on the Lebanese political scene. The survivability of Shiite parties is therefore tantamount to not only their military might, but also to their social involvement. ^

Square and compass: Freemasonry's tools for constructing a global civil society

The concept of a global civil society is gaining greater acceptance among International Relations (IR) scholars, yet few studies exist that look at the role of fraternal organizations and their influence in constructing this realm. Freemasonry, one of the oldest fraternal orders, exerts a powerful influence on its membership through its symbolism, architecture and ritual, based on the tenets of mutual respect and tolerance towards all human beings. Such principles helped in creating a body of practices and institutions as early as the eighteenth century which two hundred years later were identified and conceptualized as global civil society. ^ The allegations of anti-Masons and conspiracy theorists offer a continuous account of Masonry's influence on the political scene since its modern founding in 1717 Great Britain. Conspiracy theorists portray the coming of a New World Order, orchestrated and directed by a secret hierarchy of Masons/Illuminati. Even though the lens of conspiracy theories paints a distorted view of reality, it does focus attention to Freemasonry's activities as a major player in politics over the span of three centuries. Not only do such theories challenge the novelty of practices that make up a global civil society, but also the notion that it is an inclusive and growing sector that unites people across the globe. They also provide a valuable critique by pointing out the inconsistencies and discriminatory practices of Masonry as contrasted with the lofty ideals and aims for humanity. ^ The Masonic influence in the social world is perceived as one that reflects the liberal worldview where the nation-state and power structures are in pursuit of human progress, or profit. The symbolism of Masonry, however, carries a message that can be characterized as representing republican ideals. Masonic symbolism and ritual create spaces of meaning where the contradictions between the ideals and the structures of inequality and elitism can be resolved. Freemasonry as a symbolic system proclaiming their inherent republican values does have a global reach. However, the effectiveness of these values is bounded by the constraints that are inherent in a liberal world dominated by nation-states. ^

The Use of the Military for Law Enforcement Activities in Central America

Faced with the violence, criminality and insecurity now threatening peace and democratic governance in Central America, the region’s governments have decided to use the Armed Forces to carry out actions in response to criminal actions, looking to improve their performance. Although public demand for including the Armed Forces in these functions takes place within a legally legitimate framework, it is motivated by tangible circumstances such as increased levels of violence, delinquency and crime. Despite being coupled with the perception of institutional weakness within the security and judicial system (particularly police) and the recognition of prestige, efficiency, discipline and severity in fulfilling the Armed Forces’ missions, these arguments are insufficient to legitimize the use of the military as a police force. Within this context, this paper reflects on the implications or consequences of the use of the Armed Forces in duties traditionally assigned to the police in the Central American region with the goal of contributing to the debate on this topic taking place in the Americas. To achieve this end, first we will focus on understanding the actual context in which a decision is made to involve the Armed Forces in security duties in the region. Second, we will examine the effects and implications of this decision on the Armed Forces’ relations within their respective societies. Third and finally, considering this is already a reality in the region, this paper will provide recommendations. The main findings of this research, resulting from the application of an analyticaldescriptive and historically based study, are organized in three dimensions: the political dimension, by implication referring to the relationship between the ultimate political authority and the Armed Forces; the social dimension, by implication the opinion of citizens; and other implications not only affecting the structural and cultural organization of armies and police but also the complementary operational framework within a context of comprehensive response by the State. As a main conclusion, it poses there is an environment conducive to the use of the Armed Forces in citizen’s security, in view of the impact of threats provoked by criminal structures of a military nature currently operating in Central America. However, this participation creates an inevitable social and political impact if implemented in isolation or given a political leading role and/or operational autonomy. This participation poses risks to the institutions of the Armed Forces and the police as well. Finally, this paper identifies an urgent need for the Armed Forces’ role to be more clearly defined with regard to security matters, limiting it to threats that impact States’ governability and existence. Nonetheless, Central American States should seek a COMPREHENSIVE response to current crime and violence, using all necessary institutions to confront these challenges, but with defined roles and responsibilities for each and dynamic coordination to complement their actions.

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Altered Landscape or Arms Race? Making Sense of Military Spending in South America

In 2009, South American military spending reached a total of $51.8 billion, a fifty percent increased from 2000 expenditures. The five-year moving average of arms transfers to South America was 150 percent higher from 2005 to 2009 than figures for 2000 to 2004.[1] These figures and others have led some observers to conclude that Latin America is engaged in an arms race. Other reasons, however, account for Latin America’s large military expenditure. Among them: Several countries have undertaken long-prolonged modernization efforts, recently made possible by six years of consistent regional growth.[2] A generational shift is at hand. Armed Forces are beginning to shed the stigma and association with past dictatorial regimes.[3] Countries are pursuing specific individual strategies, rather than reacting to purchases made by neighbors. For example, Brazil wants to attain greater control of its Amazon rainforests and offshore territories, Colombia’s spending demonstrates a response to internal threats, and Chile is continuing a modernization process begun in the 1990s.[4] Concerns remain, however: Venezuela continues to demonstrate poor democratic governance and a lack of transparency; neighbor-state relations between Colombia and Venezuela, Peru and Chile, and Bolivia and Paraguay, must all continue to be monitored; and Brazil’s military purchases, although legitimate, will likely result in a large accumulation of equipment.[5] These concerns can be best addressed by strengthening and garnering greater participation in transparent procurement mechanism.[6] The United States can do its part by supporting Latin American efforts to embrace the transparency process. _________________ [1] Bromley, Mark, “An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and Implications of Military Expenditures in South America,” Brookings Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3rd, 2010, Transcript Pgs. 12,13, and 16 [2] Robledo, Marcos, “The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective,” Power Point presentation, slide 18, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium, Miami, Florida, May 25th-26th, 2010 [3] Yopo, Boris, “¿Carrera Armamentista en la Regiόn?” La Tercera, November 2nd, 2009, http://www.latercera.com/contenido/895_197084_9.shtml, accessed October 8th, 2010 [4] Walser, Ray, “An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and Implications of Military Expenditures in South America,” Brookings Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3rd, 2010, Transcript Pgs. 49,50,53 and 54 [5] Ibid., Guevara, Iñigo, Pg. 22 [6] Ibid., Bromley, Mark, Pgs. 18 and 19

Democracy promotion and Turkey

The dissertation documented the degree of Turkey's involvement in the promotion of democracy in the Arab Middle East (ME). Initially, I investigated why and under what conditions Turkey promotes democracy in the ME, and then I explained strategies through which Turkey promotes democracy in the region. I applied the neo-classical realist theoretical framework and a mixed methodology in the research, and I provided evidence from two sources: face-to-face interviews with the Turkish and foreign officials and common citizens, and the statistical data from institutions, such as the OECD, Turkish Statistical Institute, and World Bank.^ My research indicates that Turkey promotes democracy through seven channels. These channels are official development assistance (ODA), mentoring, demonstrative effect, normative pressure, conditionality, military power, enlargement, and civil society organizations. Turkey promotes democracy in the ME for three substantial reasons: first, to advance its security and economic interests; second, to improve the political, social, and economic conditions of people living in the region; and third, to create long-term regional stability, crucial for cooperation in economic and security realms.^ I attempted to engage in debates with two distinct, but interrelated fields of comparative politics and international relations. My most important contribution to the field is that I documented Turkey's case of democracy promotion regarding the degree of Turkey's involvement in this endeavor, its strategies, specificities, and effectiveness in the region. I also contribute to the field as I explained the difference between democracy promotion policies of a regional power, such as Turkey, and global powers, such as the US. I further engaged in discussions that illuminate some aspects of the interplay between the identity and strategic interests in states' foreign policy decisions.^