Current Status of Collectibility of Gaming-Related Credit Dollars

In her piece entitled - Current Status Of Collectability Of Gaming-Related Credit Dollars - Ruth Lisa Wenof, Graduate Student at Florida International University initially states: “Credit is an important part of incentives used to lure gamblers to gaming establishments. However, a collection problem exists in casinos retrieving gaming-related credit losses of individuals living in states where gambling is illegal. The author discusses the history of this question, citing recent cases related to Atlantic City.” This author’s article is substantially laden with legal cases associated with casinos in New Jersey; Atlantic City to be exact. The piece is specific to the segment of the gaming industry that the title suggests, and as such is written in a decidedly technical style. “Legalized casino gaming, which was approved by the citizens of New Jersey on November 8, 1976, has been used as a unique tool of urban redevelopment for Atlantic City,” Wenof says in providing some background on this ‘Jersey shore municipality. “Since Resorts International opened its casino…revenues from gambling have increased rapidly. Resorts' gross win in 1978 was $134 million,” Wenof says. “Since then, the combined gross win of the city's 11 casinos has been just shy of $7.5 billion.” The author points out that the competition for casino business is fierce and that credit dollars play an integral role in soliciting such business. “Credit plays a most important part in every casino hotel. This type of gambler is given every incentive to come to a particular hotel,” says the author. “Airplanes, limousines, suites, free meals, and beverages all become a package for the person who can sign a marker. The credit department of a casino is similar to that of a bank. A banker who loans money knows that it must be paid back or his bank will fail. This is indeed true of a casino,” Wenof warns in outlining the potential problem that this article is fundamentally designed around. In providing further background on credit essentials and possible pitfalls, Wenof affords: “…on the Casino Control Act the State Commission of Investigation recommended to the legislature that casinos should not be allowed to extend credit at all, by reason of a concern for illicit diversion of revenues, which is popularly called skimming within the industry…” Although skimming is an after-the-fact problem, and is parenthetic to loan returns, it is an important element of the collective [sic] credit scheme. “A collection problem of prime importance is if a casino can get back gaming-related credit dollars advanced by the casino to a gambler who lives in a state where gambling is illegal,” is a central factor to consider, Wenof reveals. This is a primary focus of this article. Wenof touches on the social/societal implications of gambling, and then continues the discussion by citing a host of legal cases pertaining to debt collection.

The Nevada Gaming Debt Collection Experience

In the discussion - The Nevada Gaming Debt Collection Experience - by Larry D. Strate, Assistant Professor, College of Business and Economics at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Assistant Professor Strate initially outlines the article by saying: “Even though Nevada has had over a century of legalized gaming experience, the evolution of gaming debt collection has been a recent phenomenon. The author traces that history and discusses implications of the current law.” The discussion opens with a comparison between the gaming industries of New Jersey/Atlantic City, and Las Vegas, Nevada. This contrast serves to point out the disparities in debt handling between the two. “There are major differences in the development of legalized gaming for both Nevada and Atlantic City. Nevada has had over a century of legalized gambling; Atlantic City, New Jersey, has completed a decade of its operation,” Strate informs you. “Nevada's gaming industry has been its primary economic base for many years; Atlantic City's entry into gaming served as a possible solution to a social problem. Nevada's processes of legalized gaming, credit play, and the collection of gaming debts were developed over a period of 125 years; Atlantic City's new industry began with gaming, gaming credit, and gaming debt collection simultaneously in 1976 [via the New Jersey Casino Control Act] .” The irony here is that Atlantic City, being the younger venue, had or has a better system for handling debt collection than do the historic and traditional Las Vegas properties. Many of these properties were duplicated in New Jersey, so the dichotomy existed whereby New Jersey casinos could recoup debt while their Nevada counterparts could not. “It would seem logical that a "territory" which permitted gambling in the early 1800’s would have allowed the Nevada industry to collect its debts as any other legal enterprise. But it did not,” Strate says. Of course, this situation could not be allowed to continue and Strate outlines the evolution. New Jersey tactfully benefitted from Nevada’s experience. “The fundamental change in gaming debt collection came through the legislature as the judicial decisions had declared gaming debts uncollectable by either a patron or a casino,” Strate informs you. “Nevada enacted its gaming debt collection act in 1983, six years after New Jersey,” Strate points out. One of the most noteworthy paragraphs in the entire article is this: “The fundamental change in 1983, and probably the most significant change in the history of gaming in Nevada since the enactment of the Open Gaming Law of 1931, was to allow non-restricted gaming licensees* to recover gaming debts evidenced by a credit instrument. The new law incorporated previously litigated terms with a new one, credit instrument.” The term is legally definable and gives Nevada courts an avenue of due process.

Internal control reporting by non-accelerated filers

I examine three issues related to internal control reporting by non-accelerated filers. Motivation for the three studies comes from the fact that Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) continues to be controversial, as evidenced by the permanent exemption from Section 404(b) of SOX granted to non-accelerated filers by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act also requires the SEC to study compliance costs associated with smaller accelerated filers. In the first part of my dissertation, I document that the audit fee premium for non-accelerated filers disclosing a material weakness in internal controls (a) is significantly lower than the corresponding premium for accelerated filers, and (b) declines significantly over time. I also find that in the case of accelerated filers remediating clients pay lower fees compared to clients continuing to report internal control problems; however, such differences are not observed in the case of non-accelerated filers. The second essay focuses on audit report lag. The results indicate that presence of material weaknesses are associated with increased audit report lags, for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The results also indicate that the decline in report lag following remediation of problems is greater for accelerated filers than for non-accelerated filers. The third essay examines early warnings (pursuant to Section 302 disclosures) for firms that subsequently disclosed internal control problems in their 404 reports. The analyses indicate that non-accelerated firms with shorter CFO tenure, presence of accounting experts on the audit committee, and more frequent audit committee meetings are more likely to provide prior Section 302 warnings. Overall the results suggest that there are differences in internal control reporting between the accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The results provide empirical grounding for the ongoing debate about internal control reporting by non-accelerated filers.