Think before you eat: Calories and exercise equivalents presented on menus at point-of-choice

Although calorie information at the point-of-purchase at fast food restaurants is proposed as a method to decrease calorie choices and combat obesity, research results have been mixed. Much of the supportive research has weak methodology, and is limited. There is a demonstrated need to develop better techniques to assist consumers to make lower calorie food choices. Eating at fast food restaurants has been positively associated with weight gain. The current study explored the possibility of adding exercise equivalents (EE) (physical activity required to burn off the calories in the food), along with calorie information as a possible way to facilitate lower calorie choice at the point-of-choice in fast food restaurants. This three-group experimental study, in 18-34 year old, overweight and obese women, examines whether presenting caloric information in the form of EE at the point-of-choice at fast food restaurants, will lead to lower calorie food choices compared to presenting simple caloric information or no information at all. Methods. A randomized repeated measures experiment was conducted. Participants ordered a fast food meal from Burger King with menus that contained only the names of the food choices (Lunch 1). One week later (Lunch 2), study participants were given one of three menus that varied: no information, calorie information, or calorie information and EE. Study participants included 62 college aged students. Additionally, the study controlled for dietary restraint by blocking participants, before randomization, to the three groups. Results. A repeated measures analysis of variance was conducted. The study was not sufficiently powered, and while the study was designed to determine large effect sizes, a small effect size of .026, was determined. No significant differences were found in the foods ordered among the various menu conditions. Conclusion. Menu labeling alone might not be enough to reduce calories at the point-of-choice at restaurants. Additional research is necessary to determine if calorie information and EE at the point-of-choice would lead to fewer calories chosen at a meal. Studies should also look at long-term, repeated exposure to determine the effectiveness of calories and or EE at the point-of-choice at fast food restaurants.

Think Before You Eat: Calories and Exercise Equivalents Presented on Menus at Point-of-Choice

Although calorie information at the point-of-purchase at fast food restaurants is proposed as a method to decrease calorie choices and combat obesity, research results have been mixed. Much of the supportive research has weak methodology, and is limited. There is a demonstrated need to develop better techniques to assist consumers to make lower calorie food choices. Eating at fast food restaurants has been positively associated with weight gain. The current study explored the possibility of adding exercise equivalents (EE) (physical activity required to burn off the calories in the food), along with calorie information as a possible way to facilitate lower calorie choice at the point-of-choice in fast food restaurants. This three-group experimental study, in 18-34 year old, overweight and obese women, examines whether presenting caloric information in the form of EE at the point-of-choice at fast food restaurants, will lead to lower calorie food choices compared to presenting simple caloric information or no information at all. Methods: A randomized repeated measures experiment was conducted. Participants ordered a fast food meal from Burger King with menus that contained only the names of the food choices (Lunch 1). One week later (Lunch 2), study participants were given one of three menus that varied: no information, calorie information, or calorie information and EE. Study participants included 62 college aged students. Additionally, the study controlled for dietary restraint by blocking participants, before randomization, to the three groups. Results: A repeated measures analysis of variance was conducted. The study was not sufficiently powered, and while the study was designed to determine large effect sizes, a small effect size of .026, was determined. No significant differences were found in the foods ordered among the various menu conditions. Conclusion: Menu labeling alone might not be enough to reduce calories at the point-of-choice at restaurants. Additional research is necessary to determine if calorie information and EE at the point-of-choice would lead to fewer calories chosen at a meal. Studies should also look at long-term, repeated exposure to determine the effectiveness of calories and or EE at the point-of-choice at fast food restaurants.

Relationship between Changes in Cash Flow and Investments in Publicy Traded Restaurant Firms in the United States

This research investigated the relationship between investments in fixed assets and free cash flows of U.S. restaurant firms while controlling for future investment opportunities and financial constraints. It also investigated investment and cash-flow sensitivity in the context of economic conditions. Results suggested that investments in small firms (with higher financial constraints) had relatively weaker sensitivity to cash flows than investments in large firms (with higher sensitivity). Controlling for economic conditions did not significantly change results. While the debate over sensitivity of investments to cash flows remains unresolved, it has not been explored widely in industry contexts, especially in services such as the restaurant industry. In addition to its contribution to this literature, this paper provides implications for cash-flow management in publicly traded restaurant companies.

Cash Investments are Required for Restaurant Purchases

An individual considering a restaurant purchase must look at a number of major items that require financing. An initial cash investment is also necessary. The author enumerates and discusses what the buyer must have to start in business.

The impact of CEO compensation and CEO horizon on a firm's discretionary research and development expenditures

Agency costs are said to arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control inherent in the corporate form of ownership. One such agency problem concerns the potential variance between the time horizons of principal shareholders and agent managers. Agency theory suggests that these costs can be alleviated or controlled through performance-based Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contracting. However, components of a CEO's compensation contract can exacerbate or mitigate agency-related problems (Antle and Smith, 1985). According to the horizon hypothesis, a self-serving CEO reduces discretionary research and development (R&D) expenditures to increase earnings and earnings-based bonus compensation. Agency theorists contend that a CEO's market-based compensation component can mitigate horizon problems. This study seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between CEO earnings- and market-based compensation components and R&D expenditures in the largest United States industrial firms from 1987 to 1993.^ Consistent with the horizon hypothesis, results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary and bonus) and the firm's R&D expenditures. Consistent with the expectations of agency theory, results provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between market-based CEO compensation and R&D.^ Further results of this study provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between CEO tenure and the firm's R&D expenditures. Although there is a negative relationship between CEO age and the firm's R&D, it was not statistically significant at the 0.5 level. ^

Three essays on corporate governance and meeting-beating or missing analyst forecasts

The beginning of the 21st century was plagued with unprecedented instances of corporate fraud. In an attempt to address apparent non-existent or “broken” corporate governance policies, sweeping measures of financial reporting reform ensued, having specific requirements relating to the composition of audit committees, the interaction between audit committees and external auditors, and procedures concerning auditors’ assessment of client risk. The purpose of my dissertation is to advance knowledge about “good” corporate governance by examining the association between meeting-or-beating analyst forecasts and audit fees, audit committee compensation, and audit committee tenure and “busyness”. Using regression analysis, I found the following: (1) the frequency of meeting-or-just beating (just missing) analyst forecasts is negatively (positively) associated with audit fees, (2) the extent by which a firm exceeds analysts’ forecasts is positively (negatively) associated with audit committee compensation that is predominately equity-based (cash-based), and (3) the likelihood of repeatedly meeting-or-just beating analyst forecasts is positively associated with audit committee tenure and “busyness”. These results suggest that auditors consider clients who frequently meet-or-just beat forecasts as being less “risky”, and clients that frequently just miss as being more “risky”. The results also imply that cash-based director compensation is more successful in preserving the effectiveness of the audit committee’s financial reporting oversight role, that equity-based compensation motivates independent audit committee directors to focus on short-term performance thereby aligning their interests with management, and that audit committee director tenure and the degree of director “busyness” can affect an audit committee member’s effectiveness in providing financial reporting oversight. Collectively, my dissertation provides additional insights regarding corporate governance practices and informs policy-makers for future relevant decisions.^

Implications of FIN 46 for Accruals Quality and Investment Efficiency

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Interpretation No. 46 (FIN 46), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities – An Interpretation of ARB No. 51, in January 2003 and revised it in December 2003, with the objective to improve the transparency of financial information. Under FIN 46, companies are required to consolidate variable interest entities (VIEs) on financial statements if they are the primary beneficiaries of the VIEs. This dissertation empirically examines whether the implementation of this new financial reporting guidance affects firms’ accruals quality and investment efficiency. A manually collected sample comprised of firms affected by FIN 46 and firms disclosing no material impact from FIN 46 is used in the empirical analyses.The first part of the dissertation investigates the effects of FIN 46 on accruals quality. By using different accrual quality measures in prior studies, this study found that firms affected by FIN 46 experienced a decrease in accrual quality compared to firms reporting no material impact from FIN 46. Among the firms affected by FIN 46, firms consolidating VIEs were compared with firms terminating or restructuring VIEs. The accruals quality of firms consolidating VIEs was found to be lower than that of firms terminating or restructuring VIEs. These results are consistent in tests using alternative control samples.The second part of this dissertation examines the effects of FIN 46 on investment efficiency. Mixed results were found from using two different proxies used in prior literature. Using the investment-cash flow sensitivity to proxy for investment efficiency, firms affected by FIN 46 experienced a decrease in investment efficiency compared to firms reporting no material impact. It was also found that higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms consolidating VIEs during post-FIN 46 periods compared to both the no-impact firms and the matched pair control sample. Contrasting results were found when the deviation from expected investment is used as another proxy for investment efficiency. Empirical analyses show that FIN 46 firms experienced improved investment efficiency measured by the deviation from expected investment after their adoption of FIN 46. This study also provides explanations for the opposite results from the two different proxies.

The Broken Mirror: Maternal Agency and Identity in Charles Dickens's Bleak House

This paper examined how Esther Summerson, Dickens’s ideal good mother, can be understood as a woman who has maternal agency and identity both as a character and as a narrator, and how she contrasts with other maternal characters in the novel, both major and minor. While more transgressive mothers, such as Lady Dedlock, Mrs. Jellyby and even Krook’s cat, are doomed to death, ineffectiveness and madness, Esther moves from a frozen, “unsexualized” state into a space of life and sexual possibility. In addition, Esther has agency and identity as a narrator since she shares the narration with a third-person male narrator. Esther becomes the one who speaks rather than the one who is spoken of, and her maternal, nurturing voice provides a balm for the often harsh, judgmental voice of the male narrator. As the narrator’s patriarchal voice dies away at the end, it is Esther’s maternal voice that survives.