Can Compensation Committees Effectively Mitigate the CEO Horizon Problem? The Role of Co-opted Directors

Extant research finds inconclusive evidence about the CEO horizon problem. One possibility is that compensation committees design CEO compensation in a way that discourages retiring CEOs from opportunistic earnings management and R&D reduction. However, compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors may not be as effective as those with fewer co-opted directors in mitigating the CEO horizon problem, because directors co-opted by the CEO tend to bias their decisions in favor of the CEO. I find that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are associated with higher CEO compensation packages. I document R&D reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors, and find that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged by compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors when deciding CEO compensation. I also examine the effect of boards of directors and compensation committee characteristics on CEO compensation and on mitigating the CEO horizon problem. I find that CEO compensation positively associates with CEO power, director independence, and the percentage of busy directors, and negatively associates with board of directors and committee size and director ownership. Moreover, I find that retiring CEOs are more likely to reduce R&D expenditures when CEOs have more power, and director tenure is longer; retiring CEOs in firms with large boards of directors and compensation committees are less likely to manage accruals.

The impact of CEO compensation and CEO horizon on a firm's discretionary research and development expenditures

Agency costs are said to arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control inherent in the corporate form of ownership. One such agency problem concerns the potential variance between the time horizons of principal shareholders and agent managers. Agency theory suggests that these costs can be alleviated or controlled through performance-based Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contracting. However, components of a CEO's compensation contract can exacerbate or mitigate agency-related problems (Antle and Smith, 1985). According to the horizon hypothesis, a self-serving CEO reduces discretionary research and development (R&D) expenditures to increase earnings and earnings-based bonus compensation. Agency theorists contend that a CEO's market-based compensation component can mitigate horizon problems. This study seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between CEO earnings- and market-based compensation components and R&D expenditures in the largest United States industrial firms from 1987 to 1993.^ Consistent with the horizon hypothesis, results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary and bonus) and the firm's R&D expenditures. Consistent with the expectations of agency theory, results provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between market-based CEO compensation and R&D.^ Further results of this study provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between CEO tenure and the firm's R&D expenditures. Although there is a negative relationship between CEO age and the firm's R&D, it was not statistically significant at the 0.5 level. ^

Predicting Lodging Manager Annual Salary Based on Metropolitan Statistical Area Attributes and Lodging Industry Performance: Exploring the Concept

Using multiple regression analysis, lodging managers’ annual mean salaries in 143 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) within the U.S. were analyzed to identify what relationships existed with variables related to general MSA characteristics, along with the lodging industry’s size and performance. By examining the relationship between these variables, the authors predict the long-term possibility of predicting lodging industry managers’ salaries. These predictions may have an impact on financial performance of an individual lodging property or organization. Through this paper, this concept was applied and explored within U.S. MSAs. These findings may have value for a variety of stakeholders, including human resources practitioners, the hospitality education community, and individuals considering lodging management careers.

CEO Humility: Development of an Unobtrusive Measure and Strategic Implications

Over the past 30 years, the Upper Echelons perspective of strategic management has sought to explain a given organization’s strategies and effectiveness as a reflection of the differences in personality, background, and other characteristics of the senior executives that guides each organization. An important stream of research within this field has linked a firm’s strategy to the grandiose way that executives are often thought to view themselves – namely through examining the narcissism, core self-evaluations (CSE), and hubris of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). In this dissertation, I focus on understanding the strategic impact of CEO humility – a trait that has often been erroneously thought of to represent a poor view of oneself. Consistent with ancient writings and recent research, humility is defined herein as a multi-faceted trait that is the common core of four dimensions: self-awareness, developmental orientation/teachability, appreciation of others' strengths and contributions, and low self-focus. In the first essay, I explore the conceptual relevance and various potential implications of executive humility. Drawing on existing empirical research about the humility construct and general behavioral implications of humility, I argue that executive humility is a critical avenue toward a more rich and nuanced understanding of the delicate interplay and implications of executive self-concept. In essay two, I develop and validate an unobtrusive measure of CEO humility. Ten indicators of humility are suggested and then validated using a self-reported survey administered to a sample of 30 U.S. and Canadian CEOs. Two behaviors were found to be significantly positively related to self-reported humility: CEOs who volunteered some of their time for non-profit organizations and CEO’s who reported that part of their own firm’s success was due to the help of the board of directors. In essay three, I examine the relationship between the level of CEO humility and four firm-level outcomes. Employing a sample of 163 CEOs appointed to S&P 500 firms between 2005-2008, I show that firms led by humble CEOs (measured by the unobtrusive indicators) tend to outperform others in regards to corporate social performance, while at the same time showing that their financial performance is generally no better or worse.