Putting the Green in Bureaucracy: Practices of Quantification and Valuation in Environmental Regulation

While researchers have devoted considerable attention to exploring the ways that intentional environmental reregulation creates new avenues for capital accumulation (e.g. Smith, 2007; Castree, 2008), it remains somewhat unclear how the less grandiose day-to-day work of environmental regulators may also help create new sources of ecological value. Through an ethnographic study of environmental regulators tasked with enforcing key environmental laws, I shed light on the subtle ways that rule interpretation and scientific practice structure the frames, models, and methodologies regulators use to enact “best professional judgments” about ecological systems, and ultimately to assign particular values to nature. I also show the ways that non-human nature pushes back against such assessments, which in combination with the interpretive work of environmental regulation, opens spaces of conflict in at least two arenas: one focused on modes of quantification, where actors contend between economistic, ecological, statutory, and moral frames for making value assessments; and one focused on presentations of value, where actors contend between value assessments that best represent their self-defined interests. The ‘value settlements’ environmental regulators reach in these contested spaces allow processes of commensuration to proceed, and ultimately make nature legible for capitalization and exchange. Accounting for the ways that these basic regulatory practice help create ecological value is essential for creating a fuller picture of the ways capital and natural capital relate.

The use of presidential executive orders to control the management and administration of the federal government

As long as governmental institutions have existed, efforts have been undertaken to reform them. This research examines a particular strategy, coercive controls, exercised through a particular instrument, executive orders, by a singular reformer, the president of the United States. The presidents studied-- Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton--are those whose campaigns for office were characterized to varying degrees as against Washington bureaucracy and for executive reform. Executive order issuance is assessed through an examination of key factors for each president including political party affiliation, levels of political capital, and legislative experience. A classification typology is used to identify the topical dimensions and levels of coerciveness. The portrayal of the federal government is analyzed through examination of public, media, and presidential attention. The results show that executive orders are significant management tools for the president. Executive orders also represent an important component of the transition plans for incoming administrations. The findings indicate that overall, while executive orders have not increased in the aggregate, they are more intrusive and significant. When the factors of political party affiliation, political capital, and legislative experience are examined, it reveals a strong relationship between executive orders and previous executive experience, specifically presidents who served as a state governor prior to winning national election as president. Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton (all former governors) have the highest percent of executive orders focusing on the federal bureaucracy. Additionally, the highest percent of forceful orders were issued by former governors (41.0%) as compared to their presidential counterparts who have not served as governors (19.9%). Secondly, political party affiliation is an important, but not significant, predictor for the use of executive orders. Thirdly, management strategies that provide the president with the greatest level of autonomy--executive orders--redefine the concept of presidential power and autonomous action. Interviews of elite government officials and political observers support the idea that executive orders can provide the president with a successful management strategy, requiring less expenditure of political resources, less risk to political capital, and a way of achieving objectives without depending on an unresponsive Congress. ^

The Everglades Ecosystem and the Politics of Nature

In this article, I offer an institutional history of the ecosystem concept, tracing shifts in its meaning and application as it has become the key organizing principle for the Everglades restoration program in Florida. Two institutional forms are analyzed here: (1) quasigovernmental organizations, a term I use to describe interagency science collaboratives and community stakeholder organizations, and (2) government bureaucracies, which are the administrative agencies tasked with Everglades restoration planning and implementation. In analyzing these knowledge trajectories, I both document the complex networks of relations that facilitate the ecosystem’s emergence as an object of knowledge and examine the bureaucratic claims to authority that circumscribe the ecosystem’s transformation into policy.

A deontic analysis of inter -organizational control requirements

This research focuses on the design and verification of inter-organizational controls. Instead of looking at a documentary procedure, which is the flow of documents and data among the parties, the research examines the underlying deontic purpose of the procedure, the so-called deontic process, and identifies control requirements to secure this purpose. The vision of the research is a formal theory for streamlining bureaucracy in business and government procedures. ^ Underpinning most inter-organizational procedures are deontic relations, which are about rights and obligations of the parties. When all parties trust each other, they are willing to fulfill their obligations and honor the counter parties’ rights; thus controls may not be needed. The challenge is in cases where trust may not be assumed. In these cases, the parties need to rely on explicit controls to reduce their exposure to the risk of opportunism. However, at present there is no analytic approach or technique to determine which controls are needed for a given contracting or governance situation. ^ The research proposes a formal method for deriving inter-organizational control requirements based on static analysis of deontic relations and dynamic analysis of deontic changes. The formal method will take a deontic process model of an inter-organizational transaction and certain domain knowledge as inputs to automatically generate control requirements that a documentary procedure needs to satisfy in order to limit fraud potentials. The deliverables of the research include a formal representation namely Deontic Petri Nets that combine multiple modal logics and Petri nets for modeling deontic processes, a set of control principles that represent an initial formal theory on the relationships between deontic processes and documentary procedures, and a working prototype that uses model checking technique to identify fraud potentials in a deontic process and generate control requirements to limit them. Fourteen scenarios of two well-known international payment procedures—cash in advance and documentary credit—have been used to test the prototype. The results showed that all control requirements stipulated in these procedures could be derived automatically.^

A Deontic Analysis of Inter-Organizational Control Requirements

This research focuses on the design and verification of inter-organizational controls. Instead of looking at a documentary procedure, which is the flow of documents and data among the parties, the research examines the underlying deontic purpose of the procedure, the so-called deontic process, and identifies control requirements to secure this purpose. The vision of the research is a formal theory for streamlining bureaucracy in business and government procedures. Underpinning most inter-organizational procedures are deontic relations, which are about rights and obligations of the parties. When all parties trust each other, they are willing to fulfill their obligations and honor the counter parties’ rights; thus controls may not be needed. The challenge is in cases where trust may not be assumed. In these cases, the parties need to rely on explicit controls to reduce their exposure to the risk of opportunism. However, at present there is no analytic approach or technique to determine which controls are needed for a given contracting or governance situation. The research proposes a formal method for deriving inter-organizational control requirements based on static analysis of deontic relations and dynamic analysis of deontic changes. The formal method will take a deontic process model of an inter-organizational transaction and certain domain knowledge as inputs to automatically generate control requirements that a documentary procedure needs to satisfy in order to limit fraud potentials. The deliverables of the research include a formal representation namely Deontic Petri Nets that combine multiple modal logics and Petri nets for modeling deontic processes, a set of control principles that represent an initial formal theory on the relationships between deontic processes and documentary procedures, and a working prototype that uses model checking technique to identify fraud potentials in a deontic process and generate control requirements to limit them. Fourteen scenarios of two well-known international payment procedures -- cash in advance and documentary credit -- have been used to test the prototype. The results showed that all control requirements stipulated in these procedures could be derived automatically.

The use of presidential executive orders to control the management and administration of the federal government

As long as governmental institutions have existed, efforts have been undertaken to reform them. This research examines a particular strategy, coercive controls, exercised through a particular instrument, executive orders, by a singular reformer, the president of the United States. The presidents studied- Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton-are those whose campaigns for office were characterized to varying degrees as against Washington bureaucracy and for executive reform. Executive order issuance is assessed through an examination of key factors for each president including political party affiliation, levels of political capital, and legislative experience. A classification typology is used to identify the topical dimensions and levels of coerciveness. The portrayal of the federal government is analyzed through examination of public, media, and presidential attention. The results show that executive orders are significant management tools for the president. Executive orders also represent an important component of the transition plans for incoming administrations. The findings indicate that overall, while executive orders have not increased in the aggregate, they are more intrusive and significant. When the factors of political party affiliation, political capital, and legislative experience are examined, it reveals a strong relationship between executive orders and previous executive experience, specifically presidents who served as a state governor prior to winning national election as president. Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton (all former governors) have the highest percent of executive orders focusing on the federal bureaucracy. Additionally, the highest percent of forceful orders were issued by former governors (41.0%) as compared to their presidential counterparts who have not served as governors (19.9%). Secondly, political party affiliation is an important, but not significant, predictor for the use of executive orders. Thirdly, management strategies that provide the president with the greatest level of autonomy-executive orders redefine the concept of presidential power and autonomous action. Interviews of elite government officials and political observers support the idea that executive orders can provide the president with a successful management strategy, requiring less expenditure of political resources, less risk to political capital, and a way of achieving objectives without depending on an unresponsive Congress.