The impacts of trade policy reforms on the Sri Lankan economy

This dissertation presents an analysis of the impacts of trade policy reforms in Sri Lanka. A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is constructed with detailed description of the domestic production structure and foreign trade. The model is then used to investigate the effects of trade policy reforms on resource allocation and welfare.^ Prior to 1977, Sri Lanka maintained stringent control over its imports through rigid quantitative restrictions. A new economic policy reform package was introduced in 1977, and it shifted Sri Lanka's development strategy toward an export oriented policy regime. The shift of policy focus from a restrictive trade regime toward a more open trade regime is expected to have a significant impact on the volume of external trade, domestic production structure, allocation of resources, and social welfare.^ Simulations are carried out to assess the effects of three major policy reforms: (1) a devaluation of the Sri Lanka rupee, (2) a partial or a complete elimination of export duties, and (3) a devaluation-cum-removal of export duties.^ Simulation results indicate that the macroeconomic impact of a devaluation-cum-removal of export duties can be substantial. They also suggest that the resource-pull effects of a devaluation and a devaluation-cum-export duty removal policy are significant. However, the model shows that a devaluation combined with an export duty reduction is likely to be a superior strategy. ^

Closing the productivity gap and trade *policy

The relationship between trade policy and productivity growth is regarded as ambiguous in the literature. This dissertation examines under what condition the relationship would be positive (or negative). Through the use of static and dynamic analysis, we find two conflicting effects (the pro-protection effect and the pro-competitive effect) that cause the relationship to be ambiguous. If there exists a productivity gap between the import-competing and foreign industries, and if the level of protection is low (high), the relationship is positive (negative). We also show that the import-competing firm responds to a change in the protection level by choosing a level of investment in innovation which yields a different rate of productivity growth. The policy implication, therefore, is that a trade-policy maker should set the trade protection at a level which induces the firm to choose the highest rate of productivity growth, and, as a result, leading the firm to close the initial productivity gap in the most efficient way. ^

Essays on the political economy of trade policy and economic *development

This dissertation studies the political economy of trade policy in a developing country, namely Turkey, under different economic and political regimes. The research analyzes the effects of these different regimes on the import structure, the trade policy and the industrialization process in Turkey and derives implications for aggregate welfare. ^ In the second chapter, the effects of trade liberalization policies on import demand are examined. Using disaggregated industry-level data, import demand elasticities for various sectors have been computed, analyzed under different economic regimes, and compared with those of developed countries. The results are statistically significant and reliable, and conform to the predictions of economic theory. Estimation of these elasticities is also a necessary ingredient for the third chapter of the dissertation. ^ The third chapter examines the predictions of the state-of-the-art “Protection For Sale” model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). Employing advanced econometric methods and a unique data set, strong support is found for the fundamental predictions of the model in the context of Turkey. Specifically, the government is found to attach a much higher weight to social welfare than to political contributions. This weight is higher under the democratic regime than under the dictatorship, a result potentially of interest to all researchers in the area of political economy. ^ The fourth chapter looks at the effects of industry concentration and import price shocks on protection, promotion and the choice of policy instruments in Turkey. In this context, it examines and finds support for the predictions of some well-known models in the literature. ^