Social and cultural influences in the formation of identity: A cross-national/cultural study

This multi-site, multi-ethnic/cultural study examined the effects of variation between ethnic/cultural groups and the effects of institutional variation within ethnic/cultural groups on identity formation. The participants were 892 late adolescent college students from six sites in 5 countries (Brazil, China, Costa Rica, US, and Sweden) representing different linguistic and ethnic/cultural traditions living in the context of varied social conditions. As hypothesized, there were significant differences in the proportion of identity statuses between sites in the Personal domain, $\chi\sp2$(20, N = 858) = 164.78, $p<.001,$ the Interpersonal domain, $\chi\sp2$(20, N = 858) = 145.69, $p<.001,$ and the World View domain, $\chi\sp2$(20, N = 858) = 120.89, $p<.001,$ but the distribution of the differences was more complex than expected. In addition, there were significant differences in Identity Satisfaction among sites, F(15, 2325) = 12.65, $p<.001.$ Further univariate analyses revealed that differences among sites were found on Identity Satisfaction in the personal, interpersonal and world view domain. The direction of the differences, however, were more complex than hypothesized.^ The second hypothesis was confirmed but only with the world view identity status and not for each of the six sites. Stepwise discriminant analyses showed that Identity status in the world view domain was predicted by Institutional Support in Nebraska, gender and Institutional Change in Brazil, and Institutional Access in China. Lastly and as hypothesized, some Institutional Attributes significantly predicted Overall Identity Satisfaction in all sites as revealed by multivariate regression analyses, except in Sweden, F (5, 79) =.660, p =.65. These findings extend the literature on identity formation not only by having investigated how culture influences the process of identity formation with samples representing different ethnic/cultural and linguistically different populations but also by empirically testing the role that social processes play in identity formation at the cross-cultural level. ^

Social and cultural influences in the formation of identity: a cross-national/cultural study.

This multi-site, multi-ethnic/cultural study examined the effects of variation between ethnic/cultural groups and the effects of institutional variation within ethnic/cultural groups on identity formation. The participants were 892 late adolescent college students from six sites in 5 countries (Brazil, China, Costa Rica, US, and Sweden) representing different linguistic and ethnic/cultural traditions living in the context of varied social conditions. As hypothesized, there were significant differences in the proportion of identity statuses between sites in the Personal domain, X2(20, N=858)= 164.78, p2(20, N=858)= 145.69, p2(20, N=858)= 120.89, p

China's Relations with Brazil and Argentina and Implications for U.S. Security Concerns [Student's Paper Series]

This study on China’s relations with Brazil and Argentina, as well as its implications for U.S. concerns examines two main questions: Why China’s increasing influence on Brazil and Argentina may be considered a cause for U.S. security concerns? And if this is the case, how do China’s strategic alliances with the two countries has impacted U.S. leadership? In an effort to look at China’s influence from multidimensional angles and beyond China’s visible economic influence in these two countries, this paper argues that China’s interest in the Latin American region, with a focus on brazil and Argentina, responds to a more crafted, pragmatic and tailored vision with long-term strategic and political goals. The results of this study reveal that China – avoiding intra-regional competition through a strategic diversification of sectors – has been able to secure critical resources for its population as well as promote enduring alliances in the region that could represent a plausible cause of concern for U.S. interests. In this regard, China’s avoidance of a direct challenge to traditional partners’ influence has responded to the gaps left by a gradual, but steady lack of U.S. involvement.

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Pollution generation in the Carajas region of Brazil: An extended input -output approach

The economic development of any region involves some consequences to the environment. The choice of a socially optimal development plan must consider a measure of the strategy's environmental impact. This dissertation tackles this problem by examining environmental impacts of new production activities. The study uses the experience of the Carajás region in the north of Brazil. This region, which prior to the 1960's was an isolated outpost of the Amazon area, was integrated to the rest of the country with a non-sophisticated but strategic road system and eventually became the second largest iron ore mining area in the world. Finally, in the 1980's, the area was linked, by way of a railroad, to the nearest seaport along the Atlantic Ocean. The consequence of such changes was a burst of economic growth along the railroad Corridor and neighboring areas. In this work, a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is used to construct a 2-region (Corridor and surrounding area), fixed price, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model to examine the relationship between production and pollution by measuring the different pollution effects of alternative growth strategies. SAMs are a very useful tool to examine the environmental impacts of development by linking production activities to measurable indices of natural resource degradation. The simulation results suggest that the strategies leading to faster economic growth in the short run are also those that lead to faster rates of environmental degradation. The simulations also show that the strategies that leads to faster rates of short run growth do so at the price of a rate of environmental depletion that is unsustainable from a long run perspective. These results, therefore, support the concern expressed by environmental economists and policy makers regarding the possible trade-offs between economic growth and environmental preservation. This stresses the need for a careful analysis of the environmental impacts of alternative growth strategies. ^

Examining Perspectives On China's Near-Monopoly Of Rare Earths

China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. This thesis first examines the underlying causes behind China’s rise to the status of rare-earths near-monopolist, including government support; lax environmental controls; unregulated production; and relatively low costs compared to the rest of the world. Second, the thesis also examines the preeminent international and domestic factors influencing China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths. International factors include international demand; international trade pressure; international price-setting authority issues; and geopolitical factors. I next identify domestic factors that exert influence over China’s rare earths-related behavior: environmental protection; rare earth resource protection; rare earths industry regulation; and protecting and aiding China’s domestic rare earths industry. The study concludes with a synthesis of the factors influencing China’s rare-earths-related behavior in the overall context of support and direction by China’s Central Government.

China's Building of a Blue-Water Fleet

In recent years the People’s Republic of China has begun to exhibit a more aggressive naval policy as a result of its decision to switch its naval force from a primarily green-water fleet (coastal) to a blue-water fleet (expeditionary) (“China’s New,” n.d.). This decision has brought China to loggerheads not only with other local East and South Asian powers such as India and Japan, but also with the predominant blue-water power of the world, the United States, that sees its supremacy threatened (“When Grand,” n.d.). Why would China embark on a route that would pit it against the world naval superpower, the United States, which has a huge lead on China in terms of naval blue-water power? Why would China try to challenge and match the U.S. Navy’s eleven aircraft carriers (“The World’s,” n.d.)? What could compel China to embark on a plan that would so disrupt the balance of power in the waters around Asia? To fully understand the Chinese government’s decision, one must first look at Chinese import figures and Chinese trade routes.