China's Relations with Brazil and Argentina and Implications for U.S. Security Concerns [Student's Paper Series]

This study on China’s relations with Brazil and Argentina, as well as its implications for U.S. concerns examines two main questions: Why China’s increasing influence on Brazil and Argentina may be considered a cause for U.S. security concerns? And if this is the case, how do China’s strategic alliances with the two countries has impacted U.S. leadership? In an effort to look at China’s influence from multidimensional angles and beyond China’s visible economic influence in these two countries, this paper argues that China’s interest in the Latin American region, with a focus on brazil and Argentina, responds to a more crafted, pragmatic and tailored vision with long-term strategic and political goals. The results of this study reveal that China – avoiding intra-regional competition through a strategic diversification of sectors – has been able to secure critical resources for its population as well as promote enduring alliances in the region that could represent a plausible cause of concern for U.S. interests. In this regard, China’s avoidance of a direct challenge to traditional partners’ influence has responded to the gaps left by a gradual, but steady lack of U.S. involvement.

Social and cultural influences in the formation of identity: A cross-national/cultural study

This multi-site, multi-ethnic/cultural study examined the effects of variation between ethnic/cultural groups and the effects of institutional variation within ethnic/cultural groups on identity formation. The participants were 892 late adolescent college students from six sites in 5 countries (Brazil, China, Costa Rica, US, and Sweden) representing different linguistic and ethnic/cultural traditions living in the context of varied social conditions. As hypothesized, there were significant differences in the proportion of identity statuses between sites in the Personal domain, $\chi\sp2$(20, N = 858) = 164.78, $p<.001,$ the Interpersonal domain, $\chi\sp2$(20, N = 858) = 145.69, $p<.001,$ and the World View domain, $\chi\sp2$(20, N = 858) = 120.89, $p<.001,$ but the distribution of the differences was more complex than expected. In addition, there were significant differences in Identity Satisfaction among sites, F(15, 2325) = 12.65, $p<.001.$ Further univariate analyses revealed that differences among sites were found on Identity Satisfaction in the personal, interpersonal and world view domain. The direction of the differences, however, were more complex than hypothesized.^ The second hypothesis was confirmed but only with the world view identity status and not for each of the six sites. Stepwise discriminant analyses showed that Identity status in the world view domain was predicted by Institutional Support in Nebraska, gender and Institutional Change in Brazil, and Institutional Access in China. Lastly and as hypothesized, some Institutional Attributes significantly predicted Overall Identity Satisfaction in all sites as revealed by multivariate regression analyses, except in Sweden, F (5, 79) =.660, p =.65. These findings extend the literature on identity formation not only by having investigated how culture influences the process of identity formation with samples representing different ethnic/cultural and linguistically different populations but also by empirically testing the role that social processes play in identity formation at the cross-cultural level. ^

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions

Three key states are relevant in considering future nuclear proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are critical because of their relatively advanced nuclear capabilities. For historical and geopolitical reasons, neither Argentina nor Brazil is likely to reactive nuclear weapons programs. Venezuela’s President, Hugo Chávez, has repeatedly demonstrated interest in developing a nuclear program, yet Venezuela lacks any serious nuclear expertise. Even if it had the managerial and technological capacity, the lead-time to develop an indigenous nuclear program would be measured in decades. Acquisition of nuclear technology from international sources would be difficult because members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would insist on safeguards, and potential non-Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) suppliers are highly surveilled, risking the exposure of such a program before Venezuela could put a deterrent into place. While South American states have historically opposed nuclear weapons, their acquisition by Brazil and Argentina would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation. Brazil and Argentina are both geopolitically satisfied powers that are deeply embedded in a regional security community. On the other hand, Venezuela under President Chávez is perceived as a revisionist power seeking a transformation of the international system. Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would be met with alarm by the United States and Colombia, and it would prompt nuclear weapons development by Brazil and possibly Argentina, more for reasons of preserving regional leadership and prestige than for fear of a Venezuelan threat.

Pirates, exiles, and empire: English seamen, Atlantic expansion, and Jamaican settlement, 1558–1658

A life of piracy offered marginal men a profession with a degree of autonomy, despite the brand of "outlaw" and the fear of prosecution. At various times throughout history, governments and crowned heads suspended much of their piracy prosecution, licensing men to work as "privateers" for the state, supplementing naval forces. This practice has a long history, but in sixteenth-century England, Elizabeth I (1558-1603) significantly altered this tradition. Recognizing her own weakness in effectively prosecuting these men and the profit they could contribute to the government, Elizabeth began incorporating pirates into the English naval corps in peacetime—not just in war. This practice increased English naval resources, income, and presence in the emerging Atlantic World, but also increased conflict with the powerful Spanish empire. By 1605, making peace with Spain, James VI/I (1603-1625) retracted Elizabeth's privateering promotion, prompting an emigration of English seamen to the American outposts they had developed in the previous century. Now exiles, no longer beholden to the Crown, seamen reverted back to piracy. The Carolinas and Jamaica served as bases for these rover communities. In 1650, the revolutionary leader Oliver Cromwell (1649-1658) once again recognized the merits of such policies. Determined to demonstrate his authority and solidify his rule, Cromwell offered citizenship and state support to Caribbean exiles in exchange for their aiding of his navy in the taking of Spanish Jamaica. Official chartering of Port Royal, Jamaica served as reward for these men's efforts and as the culmination of a century-long cycle of piracy legislation, creating one of England's most lucrative colonies in the middle of a traditionally Spanish Caribbean empire. Through legal and diplomatic records, correspondence, and naval and demographic records from England and Spain, this dissertation explores early modern piracy/privateering policy and its impact on the development of the Atlantic World. European disputes and imperial competition converged in these piracy debates with significant consequences for the definitions of criminality and citizenship and for the development of Atlantic empire.

The short reign of Sultan Osman and other stories

A character discovering and testing the limits of his emotional or psychological range most interests me. What will he choose to do? Stay within his old boundaries? Or try and go beyond them? What does he learn about himself in the process? And, finally, what price will be exacted, either for his staying where he is, or for his choosing a new level of self-knowledge? "The Short Reign Of Sultan Osman and Other Stories" is a collection of short stories set in either the United States, Greece, or Brazil, and ranging in time from 1972 to today. Each story presents its protagonist with challenges unique to a specific time and place. In most of these stories, the protagonists are driven by an urge for love or for mastery, and these urges send them across landscapes of delusion or folly before they can arrive at some sense of self-knowledge.

Pirates, Exiles, and Empire: English Seamen, Atlantic Expansion, and Jamaican Settlement, 1558-1658

A life of piracy offered marginal men a profession with a degree of autonomy, despite the brand of “outlaw” and the fear of prosecution. At various times throughout history, governments and crowned heads suspended much of their piracy prosecution, licensing men to work as “privateers” for the state, supplementing naval forces. This practice has a long history, but in sixteenth-century England, Elizabeth I (1558-1603) significantly altered this tradition. Recognizing her own weakness in effectively prosecuting these men and the profit they could contribute to the government, Elizabeth began incorporating pirates into the English naval corps in peacetime—not just in war. This practice increased English naval resources, income, and presence in the emerging Atlantic World, but also increased conflict with the powerful Spanish empire. By 1605, making peace with Spain, James VI/I (1603-1625) retracted Elizabeth’s privateering promotion, prompting an emigration of English seamen to the American outposts they had developed in the previous century. Now exiles, no longer beholden to the Crown, seamen reverted back to piracy. The Carolinas and Jamaica served as bases for these rover communities. In 1650, the revolutionary leader Oliver Cromwell (1649-1658) once again recognized the merits of such policies. Determined to demonstrate his authority and solidify his rule, Cromwell offered citizenship and state support to Caribbean exiles in exchange for their aiding of his navy in the taking of Spanish Jamaica. Official chartering of Port Royal, Jamaica served as reward for these men’s efforts and as the culmination of a century-long cycle of piracy legislation, creating one of England’s most lucrative colonies in the middle of a traditionally Spanish Caribbean empire. Through legal and diplomatic records, correspondence, and naval and demographic records from England and Spain, this dissertation explores early modern piracy/privateering policy and its impact on the development of the Atlantic World. European disputes and imperial competition converged in these piracy debates with significant consequences for the definitions of criminality and citizenship and for the development of Atlantic empire.