Audit pricing, reporting quality, and auditor switches in the post -SOX period

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act represents an important watershed event in the history and regulation of the accounting profession. In this dissertation, I develop arguments as to why we can expect differences in auditor behavior before and after SOX and empirically test if indeed there were differences in auditor behavior before and after SOX. My dissertation consists of three essays. For the three essays, I investigate issues related to auditor independence, audit pricing, the impact of auditor changes in the post-SOX period. The motivation for the first part of my research comes from the SEC's assertions that there are differences between types of non-audit services in terms of their potential to adversely impact auditor independence. The first part of my dissertation empirically validates the SEC's assertions that auditors would be more conservative in those instances where the tax and other non-audit services fee ratios are high but not when the audit-related fee ratio is high. The second part of my study examines if auditors are less likely to "low ball" their audit fees in the period after SOX than in the period preceding SOX. Legislators, regulators, and the media have expressed concerns that auditors "low ball" the fees for initial year audits and that such low-balling can lead to reduced audit quality. I find that there is significant initial year audit fee discount in pre-SOX period and but the fee discount does not hold in post-SOX periods. The third part of my dissertation examines the association between auditor switches and auditor conservatism. I find that a large portion of Big 4 clients switch to non-Big 4 auditors and there is no significant evidence indicating that successor auditors are more conservative in the post-SOX period.

Shareholder ratification of the auditor and audit market competition

In my dissertation, I examine factors associated with firms’ submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification and test if shareholder ratification of auditor selection is associated with the extent of price competition in the audit market (as measured by audit fees) and audit quality (as measured by clients’ earnings management). The dissertation is motivated from the recent recommendation of the U.S. Treasury’s Advisory Committee on Auditing Profession (ACAP) regarding the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification votes. The ACAP suggests that this practice may improve the competition in the audit market; yet, there is no empirical evidence supporting the ACAP’s recommendation. My dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the literature on an issue of current interest to the auditing profession. I find that firm size, CEO-Chair duality, insider ownership and institutional ownership are associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. However, I do not find an association between audit committee variables and the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The second essay investigates the association between auditor ratification and audit fees. Audit fees are higher in firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification. The finding is not consistent with the increased price competition predicted by the ACAP. The third essay of my dissertation examine whether the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification is associated with earnings management. I find that firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification are more likely to have lower level of earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that the same factors that are associated with higher quality monitoring also may be associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The results call into question the one-size-fits-all approach recommended by the ACAP.

An empirical analysis of the global audit market: International Financial Reporting Standards-related changes and differences within the Big 4 global networks

Ongoing debates within the professional and academic communities have raised a number of questions specific to the international audit market. This dissertation consists of three related essays that address such issues. First, I examine whether the propensity to switch between auditors of different sizes (i.e., Big 4 versus non-Big 4) changes as adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) becomes a more common phenomenon, arguing that smaller auditors have an opportunity to invest in necessary skills and training needed to enter this market. Findings suggest that clients are relatively less (more) likely to switch to (away from) a Big 4 auditor if the client's adoption of IFRS occurs in more recent years. ^ In the second essay, I draw on these inferences and test whether the change in audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption changes over time. As the market becomes less concentrated, larger auditors becomes less able to demand a premium for their services. Consistent with my arguments, results suggest that the change in audit service fees declines over time, although this effect seems concentrated among the Big 4. I also find that this effect is partially attributable to a differential effect of the auditors' experience in pricing audit services related to IFRS based on the period in which adoption occurs. The results of these two essays offer important implications to policy debates on the costs and benefits of IFRS adoption. ^ In the third essay, I differentiate Big 4 auditors into three classifications—Parent firms, Brand Name affiliates, and Local affiliates—and test for differences in audit fee premiums (relative to non-Big 4 auditors) and audit quality. Results suggest that there is significant heterogeneity between the three classifications based on both of these characteristics, which is an important consideration for future research. Overall, this dissertation provides additional insights into a variety of aspects of the global audit market.^

Shareholder Ratification of The Auditor and Audit Market Competition

In my dissertation, I examine factors associated with firms’ submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification and test if shareholder ratification of auditor selection is associated with the extent of price competition in the audit market (as measured by audit fees) and audit quality (as measured by clients’ earnings management). The dissertation is motivated from the recent recommendation of the U.S. Treasury’s Advisory Committee on Auditing Profession (ACAP) regarding the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification votes. The ACAP suggests that this practice may improve the competition in the audit market; yet, there is no empirical evidence supporting the ACAP’s recommendation. My dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the literature on an issue of current interest to the auditing profession. I find that firm size, CEO-Chair duality, insider ownership and institutional ownership are associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. However, I do not find an association between audit committee variables and the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The second essay investigates the association between auditor ratification and audit fees. Audit fees are higher in firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification. The finding is not consistent with the increased price competition predicted by the ACAP. The third essay of my dissertation examine whether the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification is associated with earnings management. I find that firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification are more likely to have lower level of earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that the same factors that are associated with higher quality monitoring also may be associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The results call into question the one-size-fits-all approach recommended by the ACAP.