The impacts of trade policy reforms on the Sri Lankan economy

This dissertation presents an analysis of the impacts of trade policy reforms in Sri Lanka. A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is constructed with detailed description of the domestic production structure and foreign trade. The model is then used to investigate the effects of trade policy reforms on resource allocation and welfare.^ Prior to 1977, Sri Lanka maintained stringent control over its imports through rigid quantitative restrictions. A new economic policy reform package was introduced in 1977, and it shifted Sri Lanka's development strategy toward an export oriented policy regime. The shift of policy focus from a restrictive trade regime toward a more open trade regime is expected to have a significant impact on the volume of external trade, domestic production structure, allocation of resources, and social welfare.^ Simulations are carried out to assess the effects of three major policy reforms: (1) a devaluation of the Sri Lanka rupee, (2) a partial or a complete elimination of export duties, and (3) a devaluation-cum-removal of export duties.^ Simulation results indicate that the macroeconomic impact of a devaluation-cum-removal of export duties can be substantial. They also suggest that the resource-pull effects of a devaluation and a devaluation-cum-export duty removal policy are significant. However, the model shows that a devaluation combined with an export duty reduction is likely to be a superior strategy. ^

Raúl Castro's Government: Recent Economic Reforms and Some Political Considerations.

Four years after calling for structural and conceptual changes, Raúl Castro finally unveiled a roadmap of substantive economic reforms. Over the next 18 months, at least a million workers will be laid off from the bloated state sector. Alternative forms of earning a living – self-employment, cooperatives, leasing of land or physical space, among others – are being authorized as old constraints on these alternatives are rescinded. From the perspective of ordinary Cubans, these reforms – called an actualizaciόn, or an update of the economic model – were long overdue. Yet, in hindsight, the slow-paced process can be explained, not in terms of the need for time to “identify” Cuba’s economic problems which have been known for decades, but by Raúl Castro’s emphasis on la institucionalidad, the need to channel decision making through institutions. His brother left a chaotic state apparatus which first needed mending before an elite consensus on the reform package could be forged. Cuba is entering a situation without precedent: this package is likely to run its own course without the Comandante (Fidel Castro) stopping it. By 2015, Cuban society will probably look different than today, featuring unprecedented inequality and living standards that are on the rise.