Essays in economic growth, political economy and institutions

This dissertation analyzes the effects of political and economic institutions on economic development and growth.^ The first essay develops an overlapping-generations political economy model to analyze the incentives of various social groups to finance human capital accumulation through public education expenditures. The contribution of this study to the literature is that it helps explain the observed differences in the economic growth performance of natural resource-abundant countries. The results suggest that the preferred tax rates of the manufacturers on one hand and the political coalition of manufacturers and landowners, on the other hand, are equal to the socially optimal tax rate. However, we show that owners of natural resources prefer an excessively high tax rate, which suppresses aggregate output to a suboptimal level.^ The second essay examines the relationship between the political influence of different social classes and public education spending in panel data estimation. The novel contribution of this paper to the literature is that I proxy the political power and influence of the natural resource owners, manufacturers, and landowners with macroeconomic indicators. The motivation behind this modeling choice is to substantiate the definition of the political power of social classes with economic fundamentals. I use different governance indicators in the estimations to find out how different institutions mediate the overall impact of the political influence of various social classes on public education spending. The results suggest that political stability and absence of violence and rule of law are the important governance indicators.^ The third essay develops a counter argument to Acemoglu et al. (2010) where the thesis is that French institutions and economic reforms fostered economic progress in those German regions invaded by the Napoleonic armies. By providing historical data on urbanization rates used as proxies for economic growth, I demonstrate that similar different rates of economic growth were observed in the regions of France in the post-Napoleonic period as well. The existence of different economic growth rates makes it hard to argue that the differences in economic performance in the German regions that were invaded by the French and those that were spared a similar fate follow from regional differences in economic institutions.^

Three essays on the economics of defense contracting, output and income inequality

This dissertation analyzes both the economics of the defense contracting process and the impact of total dollar obligations on the economies of U.S. states. Using various econometric techniques, I will estimate relationships across individual contracts, state level output, and income inequality. I will achieve this primarily through the use of a dataset on individual contract obligations. ^ The first essay will catalog the distribution of contracts and isolate aspects of the process that contribute to contract dollar obligations. Accordingly, this study describes several characteristics about individual defense contracts, from 1966-2006: (i) the distribution of contract dollar obligations is extremely rightward skewed, (ii) contracts are unevenly distributed in a geographic sense across the United States, (iii) increased duration of a contract by 10 percent is associated with an increase in costs by 4 percent, (iv) competition does not seem to affect dollar obligations in a substantial way, (v) contract pre-payment financing increases the obligation of contracts from anywhere from 62 to 380 percent over non-financed contracts. ^ The second essay will turn to an aggregate focus, and look the impact of defense spending on state economic output. The analysis in chapter two attempts to estimate the state level fiscal multiplier, deploying Difference-in-Differences estimation as an attempt to filter out potential endogeneity bias. Interstate variation in procurement spending facilitates utilization of a natural experiment scenario, focusing on the spike in relative spending in 1982. The state level relative multiplier estimate here is 1.19, and captures the short run, impact effect of the 1982 spending spike. ^ Finally I will look at the relationship between defense contracting and income inequality. Military spending has typically been observed to have a negative relationship with income inequality. The third chapter examines the existence of this relationship, combining data on defense procurement with data on income inequality at the state level, in a longitudinal analysis across the United States. While the estimates do not suggest a significant relationship exists for the income share of the top ten percent of households, there is a significant positive relationship for the income share of top one percent households for an increase in defense procurement.^

Three Essays on the Economics of Defense Contracting, Output and Income Inequality

This dissertation analyzes both the economics of the defense contracting process and the impact of total dollar obligations on the economies of U.S. states. Using various econometric techniques, I will estimate relationships across individual contracts, state level output, and income inequality. I will achieve this primarily through the use of a dataset on individual contract obligations. The first essay will catalog the distribution of contracts and isolate aspects of the process that contribute to contract dollar obligations. Accordingly, this study describes several characteristics about individual defense contracts, from 1966-2006: (i) the distribution of contract dollar obligations is extremely rightward skewed, (ii) contracts are unevenly distributed in a geographic sense across the United States, (iii) increased duration of a contract by 10 percent is associated with an increase in costs by 4 percent, (iv) competition does not seem to affect dollar obligations in a substantial way, (v) contract pre-payment financing increases the obligation of contracts from anywhere from 62 to 380 percent over non-financed contracts. The second essay will turn to an aggregate focus, and look the impact of defense spending on state economic output. The analysis in chapter two attempts to estimate the state level fiscal multiplier, deploying Difference-in-Differences estimation as an attempt to filter out potential endogeneity bias. Interstate variation in procurement spending facilitates utilization of a natural experiment scenario, focusing on the spike in relative spending in 1982. The state level relative multiplier estimate here is 1.19, and captures the short run, impact effect of the 1982 spending spike. Finally I will look at the relationship between defense contracting and income inequality. Military spending has typically been observed to have a negative relationship with income inequality. The third chapter examines the existence of this relationship, combining data on defense procurement with data on income inequality at the state level, in a longitudinal analysis across the United States. While the estimates do not suggest a significant relationship exists for the income share of the top ten percent of households, there is a significant positive relationship for the income share of top one percent households for an increase in defense procurement.