Liquidity, governance and adverse selection in asset pricing

A plethora of recent literature on asset pricing provides plenty of empirical evidence on the importance of liquidity, governance and adverse selection of equity on pricing of assets together with more traditional factors such as market beta and the Fama-French factors. However, literature has usually stressed that these factors are priced individually. In this dissertation we argue that these factors may be related to each other, hence not only individual but also joint tests of their significance is called for. ^ In the three related essays, we examine the liquidity premium in the context of the finer three-digit SIC industry classification, joint importance of liquidity and governance factors as well as governance and adverse selection. Recent studies by Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) and Ben-Rephael, Kadan and Wohl (2010) find that governance and liquidity premiums are dwindling in the last few years. One reason could be that liquidity is very unevenly distributed across industries. This could affect the interpretation of prior liquidity studies. Thus, in the first chapter we analyze the relation of industry clustering and liquidity risk following a finer industry classification suggested by Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2009). In the second chapter, we examine the dwindling influence of the governance factor if taken simultaneously with liquidity. We argue that this happens since governance characteristics are potentially a proxy for information asymmetry that may be better captured by market liquidity of a company's shares. Hence, we jointly examine both the factors, namely, governance and liquidity - in a series of standard asset pricing tests. Our results reconfirm the importance of governance and liquidity in explaining stock returns thus independently corroborating the findings of Amihud (2002) and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). Moreover, governance is not subsumed by liquidity. Lastly, we analyze the relation of governance and adverse selection, and again corroborate previous findings of a priced governance factor. Furthermore, we ascertain the importance of microstructure measures in asset pricing by employing Huang and Stoll's (1997) method to extract an adverse selection variable and finding evidence for its explanatory power in four-factor regressions.^

Liquidity, Governance and Adverse Selection in Asset Pricing

A plethora of recent literature on asset pricing provides plenty of empirical evidence on the importance of liquidity, governance and adverse selection of equity on pricing of assets together with more traditional factors such as market beta and the Fama-French factors. However, literature has usually stressed that these factors are priced individually. In this dissertation we argue that these factors may be related to each other, hence not only individual but also joint tests of their significance is called for. In the three related essays, we examine the liquidity premium in the context of the finer three-digit SIC industry classification, joint importance of liquidity and governance factors as well as governance and adverse selection. Recent studies by Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) and Ben-Rephael, Kadan and Wohl (2010) find that governance and liquidity premiums are dwindling in the last few years. One reason could be that liquidity is very unevenly distributed across industries. This could affect the interpretation of prior liquidity studies. Thus, in the first chapter we analyze the relation of industry clustering and liquidity risk following a finer industry classification suggested by Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2009). In the second chapter, we examine the dwindling influence of the governance factor if taken simultaneously with liquidity. We argue that this happens since governance characteristics are potentially a proxy for information asymmetry that may be better captured by market liquidity of a company’s shares. Hence, we jointly examine both the factors, namely, governance and liquidity – in a series of standard asset pricing tests. Our results reconfirm the importance of governance and liquidity in explaining stock returns thus independently corroborating the findings of Amihud (2002) and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). Moreover, governance is not subsumed by liquidity. Lastly, we analyze the relation of governance and adverse selection, and again corroborate previous findings of a priced governance factor. Furthermore, we ascertain the importance of microstructure measures in asset pricing by employing Huang and Stoll’s (1997) method to extract an adverse selection variable and finding evidence for its explanatory power in four-factor regressions.

Three essays on the microstructure of exchange traded funds

Exchange traded funds (ETFs) have increased significantly in popularity since they were first introduced in 1993. However, there is still much that is unknown about ETFs in the extant literature. This dissertation attempts to fill gaps in the ETF literature by using three related essays. In these three essays, we compare ETFs to closed ended mutual funds (CEFs) by decomposing the bid-ask spread into its three components; we look at the intraday shape of ETFs and compare it to the intraday shape of equities as well as examine the co-integration factor between ETFs on the London Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange; we also examine the differences between leveraged ETFs and unleveraged ETFs by analyzing the impact of liquidity and volatility. These three essays are presented in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, respectively. ^ Chapter one uses the Huang and Stoll (1997) model to decompose the bid-ask spread in CEFs and ETFs for two distinct periods—a normal and a volatile period. We show a higher adverse selection component for CEFs than for ETFs without regard to volatility. However, both ETFs and CEFs increased in magnitude of the adverse selection component in the period of high volatility. Chapter two uses a mix of the Werner and Kleidon (1993) and the Hupperets and Menkveld (2002) methods to get the intraday shape of ETFs and analyze co-integration between London and New York trading. We find two different shapes for New York and London ETFs. There also appears to be evidence of co-integration in the overlapping two-hour trading period but not over the entire trading day for the two locations. The third chapter discusses the new class of ETFs called leveraged ETFs. We examine the liquidity and depth differences between unleveraged and leveraged ETFs at the aggregate level and when the leveraged ETFs are classified by the leveraged multiples of -3, -2, -1, 2, and 3, both for a normal and a volatile period. We find distinct differences between leveraged and unleveraged ETFs at the aggregate level, with leveraged ETFs having larger spreads than unleveraged ETFs. Furthermore, while both leveraged and unleveraged ETFs have larger spreads in high volatility, for the leveraged ETFs the change in magnitude is significantly larger than for the unleveraged ETFs. Among the multiples, the -2 leveraged ETF is the most pronounced in its liquidity characteristics, more so in volatile times. ^

Microstructure Characteristics of U.S. Futures Markets

Prior finance literature lacks a comprehensive analysis of microstructure characteristics of U.S. futures markets due to the lack of data availability. Utilizing a unique data set for five different futures contract this dissertation fills this gap in the finance literature. In three essays price discovery, resiliency and the components of bid-ask spreads in electronic futures markets are examined. In order to provide comprehensive and robust analysis, both moderately volatile pre-crisis and volatile crisis periods are included in the analysis. The first essay entitled “Price Discovery and Liquidity Characteristics for U.S. Electronic Futures and ETF Markets” explores the price discovery process in U.S. futures and ETF markets. Hasbrouck’s information share method is applied to futures and ETF instruments. The information share results show that futures markets dominate the price discovery process. The results on the factors that affect the price discovery process show that when volatility increases, the price leadership of futures markets declines. Furthermore, when the relative size of bid-ask spread in one market increases, its information share decreases. The second essay, entitled “The Resiliency of Large Trades for U.S. Electronic Futures Markets,“ examines the effects of large trades in futures markets. How quickly prices and liquidity recovers after large trades is an important characteristic of financial markets. The price effects of large trades are greater during the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. Furthermore, relative to the pre-crisis period, during the crisis period it takes more trades until liquidity returns to the pre-block trade levels. The third essay, entitled “Components of Quoted Bid-Ask Spreads in U.S. Electronic Futures Markets,” investigates the bid-ask spread components in futures market. The components of bid-ask spreads is one of the most important subjects of microstructure studies. Utilizing Huang and Stoll’s (1997) method the third essay of this dissertation provides the first analysis of the components of quoted bid-ask spreads in U.S. electronic futures markets. The results show that order processing cost is the largest component of bid-ask spreads, followed by inventory holding costs. During the crisis period market makers increase bid-ask spreads due to increasing inventory holding and adverse selection risks.