The impacts of trade policy reforms on the Sri Lankan economy

This dissertation presents an analysis of the impacts of trade policy reforms in Sri Lanka. A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is constructed with detailed description of the domestic production structure and foreign trade. The model is then used to investigate the effects of trade policy reforms on resource allocation and welfare.^ Prior to 1977, Sri Lanka maintained stringent control over its imports through rigid quantitative restrictions. A new economic policy reform package was introduced in 1977, and it shifted Sri Lanka's development strategy toward an export oriented policy regime. The shift of policy focus from a restrictive trade regime toward a more open trade regime is expected to have a significant impact on the volume of external trade, domestic production structure, allocation of resources, and social welfare.^ Simulations are carried out to assess the effects of three major policy reforms: (1) a devaluation of the Sri Lanka rupee, (2) a partial or a complete elimination of export duties, and (3) a devaluation-cum-removal of export duties.^ Simulation results indicate that the macroeconomic impact of a devaluation-cum-removal of export duties can be substantial. They also suggest that the resource-pull effects of a devaluation and a devaluation-cum-export duty removal policy are significant. However, the model shows that a devaluation combined with an export duty reduction is likely to be a superior strategy. ^

Closing the productivity gap and trade *policy

The relationship between trade policy and productivity growth is regarded as ambiguous in the literature. This dissertation examines under what condition the relationship would be positive (or negative). Through the use of static and dynamic analysis, we find two conflicting effects (the pro-protection effect and the pro-competitive effect) that cause the relationship to be ambiguous. If there exists a productivity gap between the import-competing and foreign industries, and if the level of protection is low (high), the relationship is positive (negative). We also show that the import-competing firm responds to a change in the protection level by choosing a level of investment in innovation which yields a different rate of productivity growth. The policy implication, therefore, is that a trade-policy maker should set the trade protection at a level which induces the firm to choose the highest rate of productivity growth, and, as a result, leading the firm to close the initial productivity gap in the most efficient way. ^

Essays on the political economy of trade policy and economic *development

This dissertation studies the political economy of trade policy in a developing country, namely Turkey, under different economic and political regimes. The research analyzes the effects of these different regimes on the import structure, the trade policy and the industrialization process in Turkey and derives implications for aggregate welfare. ^ In the second chapter, the effects of trade liberalization policies on import demand are examined. Using disaggregated industry-level data, import demand elasticities for various sectors have been computed, analyzed under different economic regimes, and compared with those of developed countries. The results are statistically significant and reliable, and conform to the predictions of economic theory. Estimation of these elasticities is also a necessary ingredient for the third chapter of the dissertation. ^ The third chapter examines the predictions of the state-of-the-art “Protection For Sale” model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). Employing advanced econometric methods and a unique data set, strong support is found for the fundamental predictions of the model in the context of Turkey. Specifically, the government is found to attach a much higher weight to social welfare than to political contributions. This weight is higher under the democratic regime than under the dictatorship, a result potentially of interest to all researchers in the area of political economy. ^ The fourth chapter looks at the effects of industry concentration and import price shocks on protection, promotion and the choice of policy instruments in Turkey. In this context, it examines and finds support for the predictions of some well-known models in the literature. ^

The World Trade Organization, competition policy, and developing countries: A cross -country examination of domestic policy actions

This dissertation addresses the following research question: in a particular policy area, why do countries that display unanimity in their international policy behavior diverge from each other in their domestic policy actions? I address this question in the context of the divergent domestic competition policy actions undertaken by developing countries during the period 1996-2007, after these countries had quite conspicuously displayed near-unanimity in opposing this policy measure at the World Trade Organization (WTO). This divergence is puzzling because (a) it does not align with their near-unanimous behavior at the WTO over competition policy and (b) it is at variance with the objectives of their international opposition to this policy at the WTO. Using an interdisciplinary approach, this dissertation examines the factors responsible for this divergence in the domestic competition policy actions of developing countries. ^ The theoretical structure employed in this study is the classic second-image-reversed framework in international relations theory that focuses on the domestic developments in various countries following an international development. Methodologically, I employ both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis to ascertain the nature of the relationship between the dependent variable and the eight explanatory variables that were identified from existing literature. The data on some of the key variables used in this dissertation was uniquely created over a multi-year period through extensive online research and represents the most comprehensive and updated dataset currently available. ^ The quantitative results obtained from logistic regression using data on 131 countries point toward the significant role played by international organizations in engineering change in this policy area in developing countries. The qualitative analysis consisting of three country case studies illuminate the channels of influence of the explanatory variables and highlight the role of domestic-level factors in these three carefully selected countries. After integrating the findings from the quantitative and qualitative analyses, I conclude that a mix of international- and domestic-level variables explains the divergence in domestic competition policy actions among developing countries. My findings also confirm the argument of the second-image-reversed framework that, given an international development or situation, the policy choices that states make can differ from each other and are mediated by domestic-level factors. ^

An evaluation of exchange rate policy and economic adjustment in Nicaragua, 1993--1995

Since the late 1970's, but particularly since the mid-1980s, the economy of Nicaragua has had persistent and large macroeconomic imbalances, while GDP per-capita has declined to 1950s' levels. By the second half of the 1990s, huge fiscal deficits and a reduction of foreign financing resulted in record hyperinflation. The Sandinista government's (1979–1990) harsh stabilization program in 1988–89 had only modest and short-lived success. It was doomed by their inability to lower the public sector deficit due to the war, plus diminishing financial support from abroad. Hyperinflation stopped only after their 1990 electoral defeat ended the war and massive aid began to flow in. Five years later, macroeconomic stability is still very fragile. A sluggish recovery of export agriculture plus import liberalization, have impeded a reduction of huge trade and current account deficits. Facing the prospects of diminished aid flows, the government's strategy has hinged on the achievement of a real devaluation through a crawling-peg adjustment of the nominal rate. However, at the end of 1995 the situation of the external accounts was still critical, and the modest progress achieved was attributable to cyclical terms-of-trade improvement and changes in the political outlook of agricultural producers. Using a Computable General Equilibrium Model and a Social Accounting Matrix constructed for this dissertation, the importance of structural rigidities in production and demand in explaining such outcome is shown. It is shown that under the plausible structural assumptions incorporated in the model, the role of devaluation in the adjustment process is restricted by structural rigidities. Moreover, contrary to the premise of the orthodox economic thinking behind the economic program, it is the contractionary effect of devaluation more than its expenditure-switching effects that provide the basis for is use in solving the external sector's problems. A fixed nominal exchange rate is found to lead to adverse results. The broader conclusion that emerges from the study is that a new social compact and a rapid increase in infrastructure spending plus fiscal support for the traditional agro-export activities is at the center of a successful adjustment towards external viability in Nicaragua. ^

Three essays on trade and investment

From H. G. Johnson's work (Review of Economic Studies, 1953–54) on tariff retaliation, the questions of whether a country can win a “tariff war” and how or even the broader question of what will affect a country's strategic position in setting bilateral tariff have been tackled in various situations. Although it is widely accepted that a country will have strategic advantages in winning the tariff war if its relative monopoly power is sufficiently large, it is unclear what are the forces behind such power formation. The goal of this research is to provide a unified framework and discuss various forces such as relative country size, absolute advantages and relative advantages simultaneously. In a two-country continuum-of-commodity neoclassical trade model, it is shown that sufficiently large relative country size is a sufficient condition for a country to choose a non-cooperative tariff Nash equilibrium over free trade. It is also shown that technology disparities such as absolute advantage, rate of technology disparity and the distribution of the technology disparity all contribute to a country's strategic position and interact with country size. ^ Leverage effect is usually used to explain the phenomenon of asymmetric volatility in equity returns. However, leverage itself can only account for parts of the asymmetry. In this research, it is shown that stock return volatility is related to firms’ financial status. Financially constrained firms tend to be more sensitive to the return changes. Financial constraint factor explains why some firms tend to be more volatile than others. I found that the financial constraint factor explains the stock return volatility independent of other factors such as firm size, industry affiliation and leverage. Firms’ industry affiliations are shown to be very weak in differentiating volatility. Firm size is proven to be a good factor in distinguishing the different levels of volatility and volatility-return sensitivity. Leverage hypothesis is also partly corroborated and the situation where leverage effect is not applicable is discussed. Finally, I examined the macroeconomic policy's effects on overall market volatility. ^

Trade, justice, and the politics of difference: Small developing states in the World Trade Organization

The purpose of this research project was to investigate two distinct types of research questions – one theoretical, the other empirical: (1) What would justice mean in the context of the international trade regime? (2.Using the small developing states of the Commonwealth Caribbean as a case study, what do Commonwealth Caribbean trade negotiators mean when they appeal to justice? Regarding the first question, Iris Young's framework which focuses on the achievement of social justice in a domestic context by acknowledging social differences such as those based on race and gender, was adopted and its relevance argued in the international context of interstate trade negotiation so as to validate the notion of (size, location, and governance capacity) difference in this latter context. The point of departure is that while states are typically treated as equals in international law – as are individuals in liberal political theory – there are significant differences between states which warrant different treatment in the international arena. The study found that this re-formulation of justice which takes account of such differences between states, allows for more adequate policy responses than those offered by the presumption of equal treatment. Regarding the second question, this theoretical perspective was used to analyze the understandings of justice from which Commonwealth Caribbean trade negotiators proceed. Interpretive and ethnographic methods, including participant observation, interviews, field notes, and textual analysis, were employed to analyze their understandings of justice. The study found that these negotiators perceive such justice as being justice to difference because of the distinct characteristics of small developing states which combine to constrain their participation in the international trading system; based on this perception, they seek rules and outcomes in the multilateral trade regime which are sensitive to such different characteristics; and while these issues were examined in a specific region, its findings are relevant for other regions consisting of small developing states, such as those in the ACP group.

Structure of international cooperation in trade, investment and environment

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.

ALBA: A Political Tool for Venezuela’s Foreign Policy

Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) negotiations which took place November 2003, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering political favors and goodwill through the financing of social development projects, ALBA has created a political environment whereby countries on the take and their respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies. To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin American country, Syria. Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil wealth to pursue political capital. Under the Chávez government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort countering the U.S. Following Cuba‟s demise in the region as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation. Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez has been spreading economic aid throughout the region, funding several development projects. From stepping in to buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica, Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in the region. As in the past, Venezuela has invested significantly both in time and money in the Caribbean, providing development assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are neither member nor observer states of ALBA. The aid Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost. It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15 members, leading experts and leaders in the region to question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S. Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on the Venezuelan economy. Its success hinges on continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of Chávez to remain in power.

Does U.S counter-drug policy affect nationalism in the Anglophone Caribbean? A comparative study on the impact of counter-drug policy on nationalism in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago

This dissertation examined the effect of United States counter-drug policy on nationalism in small states, focusing on Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The states were selected for their roles and geostrategic importance in the illegal drug trade; Jamaica being the largest drug producing country in the Anglophone Caribbean and having strong links to the trade of Colombian cocaine, and Trinidad being a mere seven miles from the South American coast. Since U.S. counterdrug policies have frequently been viewed in the region as imperialistic, this dovetails into ideas on the perceptions of smallness and powerlessness of Caribbean nations. Hence, U.S. drug policies affect every vulnerability faced by the Caribbean, individually and collectively. Thus, U.S. drug policy was deemed the most appropriate independent variable, with nationalism as the dependent variable. In both countries four Focus Groups and one Delphi Study were conducted resulting in a total of 60 participants. Focus Group participants, recruited from the general population, were asked about their perception of the illegal drug trade in the country and the policies their government had created. They were also asked their perception on how deeply involved the U.S. was in the creation of these policies and their opinions on whether this involvement was positive or negative. The Delphi Study participants were experts in the field of local drug policies and also gave their interpretations of the role the U.S. played in local policy creation. Coupled with this data, content analysis was conducted on various newspaper articles, press releases, and speeches made regarding the topic. In comparing both countries, it was found that there is a disconnect between government actions and the knowledge and perceptions of the general public. In Trinidad and Tobago this disconnect was more apparent given the lack of awareness of local drug policies and the utter lack of faith in government solutions. The emerging conclusion was that the impact of U.S. drug policy on nationalism was more visible in Trinidad and Tobago where there was a weaker civil society-government relationship, while the impact on nationalism was more obscure in Jamaica, which had a stronger civil-society government relationship.

A Market Study of Organic and Fair Trade Coffee in Bolivia

The purpose of this research is to study the commercialization of Fairtrade and Organic coffee in the Bolivia. Fairtrade and Organic coffee are alternative trade systems designed to promote the equitable and environmentally sustainable production of coffee. However, these alternative trading systems often fail to meet these goals. The producers and environment these systems are intended to protect remain marginalized. These failures are due to a number of local institutions. In order to better understand these institutions, this research conducted interviews of various stakeholders including producers, cooperative leaders, organic/Fair Trade certifiers, government agencies and private buyers. All these stakeholders influence the success of the alternative trade systems. By better understanding how these stakeholders impact the commercialization of coffee in Bolivia; new policies can be develop to improve the outcomes of alternative trade, to benefit both producers and the environment. This is especially critical in Bolivia because of the environmentally sensitive area in which coffee is grown, the potentially damaging impact of coca on the region and, the devastating economic impact to farmers.