Essays on Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry

Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare. Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support. Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.

Three Essays on the Economics of Defense Contracting, Output and Income Inequality

This dissertation analyzes both the economics of the defense contracting process and the impact of total dollar obligations on the economies of U.S. states. Using various econometric techniques, I will estimate relationships across individual contracts, state level output, and income inequality. I will achieve this primarily through the use of a dataset on individual contract obligations. The first essay will catalog the distribution of contracts and isolate aspects of the process that contribute to contract dollar obligations. Accordingly, this study describes several characteristics about individual defense contracts, from 1966-2006: (i) the distribution of contract dollar obligations is extremely rightward skewed, (ii) contracts are unevenly distributed in a geographic sense across the United States, (iii) increased duration of a contract by 10 percent is associated with an increase in costs by 4 percent, (iv) competition does not seem to affect dollar obligations in a substantial way, (v) contract pre-payment financing increases the obligation of contracts from anywhere from 62 to 380 percent over non-financed contracts. The second essay will turn to an aggregate focus, and look the impact of defense spending on state economic output. The analysis in chapter two attempts to estimate the state level fiscal multiplier, deploying Difference-in-Differences estimation as an attempt to filter out potential endogeneity bias. Interstate variation in procurement spending facilitates utilization of a natural experiment scenario, focusing on the spike in relative spending in 1982. The state level relative multiplier estimate here is 1.19, and captures the short run, impact effect of the 1982 spending spike. Finally I will look at the relationship between defense contracting and income inequality. Military spending has typically been observed to have a negative relationship with income inequality. The third chapter examines the existence of this relationship, combining data on defense procurement with data on income inequality at the state level, in a longitudinal analysis across the United States. While the estimates do not suggest a significant relationship exists for the income share of the top ten percent of households, there is a significant positive relationship for the income share of top one percent households for an increase in defense procurement.