Disater Risk Management Disparity in the Caribbean: Evidence from Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago

This study on risk and disaster management capacities of four Caribbean countries: Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, examines three main dimensions: 1) the impact of natural disasters from 1900 to 2010 (number of events, number of people killed, total number affected, and damage in US$); 2) institutional assessments of disaster risk management disparity; and 3) the 2010 Inter-American Bank for Development (IADB) Disaster Risk and Risk Management indicators for the countries under study. The results show high consistency among the different sources examined, pointing out the need to extend the IADB measurements to the rest of the Caribbean countries. Indexes and indicators constitute a comparison measure vis-à-vis existing benchmarks in order to anticipate a capacity to deal with adverse events and their consequences; however, the indexes and indicators could only be tested against the occurrence of a real event. Therefore, the need exists to establish a sustainable and comprehensive evaluation system after important disasters to assess a country’s performance, verify the indicators, and gain feedback on measurement systems and methodologies. There is diversity in emergency and preparedness for disasters in the four countries under study. The nature of the event (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and seismic activity), especially its frequency and the intensity of the damage experienced, is related to how each has designed its risk and disaster management policies and programs to face natural disasters. Vulnerabilities to disaster risks have been increasing, among other factors, because of uncontrolled urbanization, demographic density and poverty increase, social and economic marginalization, and lack of building code enforcement. The four countries under study have shown improvements in risk management capabilities, yet they are far from being completed prepared. Barbados’ risk management performance is superior, in comparison, to the majority of the countries of the region. However, is still far in achieving high performance levels and sustainability in risk management, primarily when it has the highest gap between potential macroeconomic and financial losses and the ability to face them. The Dominican Republic has shown steady risk performance up to 2008, but two remaining areas for improvement are hazard monitoring and early warning systems. Jamaica has made uneven advances between 1990 and 2008, requiring significant improvements to achieve high performance levels and sustainability in risk management, as well as macroeconomic mitigation infrastructure. Trinidad and Tobago has the lowest risk management score of the 15 countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region as assessed by the IADB study in 2010, yet it has experienced an important vulnerability reduction. In sum, the results confirmed the high disaster risk management disparity in the Caribbean region.

Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia

Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.

Armed Groups and Violence in Paraguay

Armed violence in Paraguay is not a recent phenomenon. During the second half of the XX Century, Paraguay saw the rise of a larger number of underground, revolutionary movements that sought the overthrow of the Alfredo Stroessner’s (1954-1989) government. From among those movements emerged the Partido Patria Libre (or, Free Fatherland, also known for its acronym PPL), made up of a two branches: one legal and the other one, operational. The latter was based on people’s power, as represented by “Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo” (or, the Paraguayan People’s Army, with acronym EPP). After EPP broke with PPL in March 2008, this Marxist-oriented revolutionary project, which was apparently oriented to put an end to the social, political and economic inequalities in Paraguay, began to carry out markedly criminal activities, which included bank robberies, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorist attacks and armed confrontations. Its strategies and modus operandi utilized by the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC). Paraguay features a farm sector in a state of crisis, in which cattle-ranchers, peasants and agro-exporting companies live in a constant strife. The Paraguayan Departments that are the most affected by this situation are Concepciόn, San Pedro, Canindeyú y Caazapá, which also suffer from a weak government presence. This deficiency has made these departments ripe for drug-trafficking activity by Brazilian groups such as Primer Comando Capital (i.e., First Capital command), also PCC and Comando Vermelho, (i.e., The Red Command). That is why many peasants, now recruited by EPP, have joined the drug-trafficking business and that, not only as marihuana growers but as “campanas” (i.e., early warning sentinels) for the organization. This helps shape their attitudes for their future involvement in all areas of drug-trafficking. Paraguayan society is the result of social inequity and inequality, such as those resulting from a lack of opportunity. Although Paraguay has successfully recovered from the last world economic crisis, economic growth, by itself, does not ensure an improvement in the quality of life. As long as such economic and social gaps persist and the government fails to enact the policies that would result in a more just society and toward EPP neutralization or containment, the latter is bound to grow stronger. In this context, the situation in Paraguay calls for more research into the EPP phenomenon. It would also seem necessary for Paraguay to promote an open national debate that includes all sectors of society in order to raise consciousness and to induce society to take actual steps to eliminate the EPP, as well as any other group that might arise in the immediate future. EPP has strong connections with the Frente Patriόtico Manuel Rodríguez in Chile and other armed groups and peasant movements in other countries of this region. Although most governments in the region are aware that the armed struggle is not a solution to current problems, it might be worth it to hold a regional debate about armed or insurgent groups in Latin American to seek common strategies and cooperation on dealing with them since the expansion of these armed groups is a problem for all.

The Basis of Support for Hugo Chávez: Measuring the Determinants of Presidential Job Approval in Venezuela

Since 1999, Venezuela has experienced a dramatic transformation of its political system with the coming to power of Hugo Chávez and his movement, known in Venezuela as Chavismo. Chávez has dismantled the previous political system and established neo-populist structures that rely on his personal appeal and the close collaboration of the armed forces. Chávez has relied heavily on significant support from the poor and those who felt economically and politically excluded by the “Punto Fijo system.” President Chávez has built an impressive record of electoral victories; winning every electoral contest except one since coming to power in 1999. He continues to receive relatively high levels of support among sectors of Venezuelan society. However, there is evidence of growing discontent with high crime rates, high levels of inflation, and significant corruption in the public administration. Using data from the AmericasBarometer surveys conducted in 2007, 2008 and 2010, this paper seeks to examine the basis of Chávez’s popular support. In general, the AmericasBarometer findings suggest that Venezuelans support for President Chávez is closely linked to the access to social programs and that as long as the government is able to fund these social programs or missions, particularly MERCAL and Barrio Adentro, it will possess an important tool to garner and sustain support for President Chávez. Our analysis, however, also indicates that evaluations of the national economic situation, more than crime or insecurity, are a key factor that could undermine support for the regime.

The Current State of Argentina's Oil Industry

An oil wealthy country, Argentina has repeatedly tried and failed to capitalize on its potential. The unfortunate energy policies of subsequent Argentinean government and a lack of investment capital have been two of the main reasons that have significantly limited the production of export oil in the recent past. Yet, with recent discoveries and changes to the country’s hydrocarbon laws, there may be a new dawn for Argentina’s oil industry. Since 1999 when Argentina’s oil production peaked at approximately 800,000 barrels per day, there has been a 24 percent decrease in its oil output. The country’s oil reserves have also been in steady decline. Yet, the recently enacted reforms by Argentina’s government to incentivize foreign investment in the oil industry seem to be working, allowing investors to negotiate the terms of exploration directly with local governments. As a result, foreign investment is increasing, as well as new willingness to finance exploration of untapped reserves. Also, the discovery of shale oil in Argentina may provide the potential to become a key exporter in the region. Nonetheless, there are challenges that need to be overcome and it may be years before the various oil projects underway become profitable. The success of current oil projects, coupled with the potential of shale oil, new discoveries and the sustainability of the current energy policy reforms will likely determine if Argentina is finally able to fulfill its potential and exert itself as an oil exporter country in Latin America.

Two Decades Out of the Whirlpool: Past (and Possible Future) United States Interventions in Latin America [Student's Paper Series]

This paper examines the history of U.S. interventions in Latin America and attempts to explain their frequency by highlighting two factors – besides security and economic interests – that have made American interventions in Latin America so common. First, immense differences in size and influence between the United States and the States of Latin America have made interventions appear to be a low risk solution to crises that threaten American interests in the region. Second, when U.S government concerns and aspirations for Latin America converge with the general fears and aspirations of American foreign policy, interventions become much more likely. Such a convergence pushes Latin American issues high up the U.S. foreign policy agenda because of the region’s proximity to the United States and the perception that costs of intervening are low. The leads proponents of intervention to begin asking questions like “if we cannot stop communism/revolutions/drug-trafficking in Latin America, where can we stop it?” This article traces how these factors influenced the decision to intervene in Latin America during the era of Dollar Diplomacy and during the Cold War. It concludes with three possible scenarios that could lead to a reemergence of an American interventionist policy in Latin America. It makes the argument that even though the United Sates has not intervened in Latin America during the twenty-two years, it is far from clear that American interventions in Latin America will be consigned to the past.

Rio and the Reds: The Comando Vermelho, Organized Crime and Brazil’s Economic Ascent [Student’s Paper Series]

Brazil’s growing status as a potential world power cannot obscure the characteristics of its other reality: that of a country with vast inequalities and high crime rates. The Comando Vermelho, the most prominent organized crime syndicate in Rio de Janeiro, besieges the beauty and charm that attracts tourists to this city. The CV arose not only as a product of the political dictatorship of the seventies, but also of the disenfranchised urban poor crammed into Rio’s favela slums. Today, the CV presents a powerful challenge to the State’s control of parts of Rio territory. As Brazil’s soft power projection grows, it is seriously challenged by its capacity to eliminate organized crime. Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply embedded organization like the CV. In fact, Brazil’s success may yet further retrench the CV’s activities. Culpability for organized crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but must also be shared among the willing consumers, among whom can be found educated and elite members of society, as well as the impoverished and desperate. The Brazilian government needs a top-down response addressing the schism between rich and poor. However, Brazil’s citizens must also take responsibility and forge a bottom-up response to the drug- and corruption-riddled elements of its most respected members of society. Brazil must target reform across public health, housing, education and above all, law enforcement. Without such changes, Brazil will remain a two-track democracy. Rio’s wealthy will still be able to revel in the city’s beauty albeit from behind armored cars and fortified mansions, while the city’s poor will yield – either as victims or perpetrators – to the desperate measures of organized crime.

Silence by Stealth: Freedom of the Press and Polarization in Latin America

The weak democratic systems that followed decades of military dictatorships in Latin America coupled with the emergence of new authoritarian regimes of the left have had a significant impact on the relationships between the governments and the media. The new populist leaders have challenged the media that have generally reflected the perspectives of the traditional elites. This ideological clash has renewed direct and indirect censorship, curtailing freedom of expression and thus, freedom of the press. In this context, this paper discusses the mechanisms used by Latin American governments, particularly the new authoritarianism of the left, to silence dissident voices. Many of these mechanisms are legal, found in laws related to personal injury and defamation. Others have been of constitutional nature, invoking states of emergency or national security concerns. Some governments have used institutional means to close down newspapers and other sources of information. Current media conditions in Latin America show growing polarization. This has led to considerable levels of violence and intimidation against editors, journalists, and news crews in several countries. It is precisely this type of deterioration of fundamental rights that leads to questioning the strength and sustainability of Latin American democracies.

Islamist Cyber Networks in Spanish-Speaking Latin America

Despite significant concern among policy, law enforcement and intelligence communities in the United States (U.S.) over the possible spread of radical Islamist thought throughout the world as part of a global jihad movement, there has been little investigation into the growing cyber networks in Latin America that promote strong anti-Semitic and anti-U.S. messages. This paper offers an overview of that network, focusing on the structure of Shi’ite websites that promote not only religious conversion but are also supportive of Iran -- a designated State-sponsor of terrorism – its nuclear program. Hezbollah, and the “Bolivarian revolution” led by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and his allies in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. There is also a smaller group of Sunni Muslim websites, mostly tied to the legacy organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of the Shi’ite websites are linked to each other consistently portray Israel as a Nazi State, and the United States as an imperialist war monger. The Palestinian issue is frequently juxtaposed with the anti-imperialist struggle that those states supporting Chávez’ Bolivarian revolution claim to wage against the United States. Some of the Islamist websites claim thousands of new convert, but such claims are difficult to verify. Most of the websites visited touted the conversion of one or two individuals as significant victories and signs of progress, implying that there are few, if any, mass conversions. While conducting this research, no websites directly claiming to be linked to Hezbollah were found, although there numerous sites hosted by that group that were active until around 2006. Several of the inactive links are supportive of Hezbollah as a political party. No websites linked to al Qaeda were found. Yet a substantial Internet network remains operational. Much of the outreach for Shi’ite Muslims, closely tied to Iran, is sponsored on numerous websites across the region, including El Salvador, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia. Numerous Facebook forums for discussion are also hosted around Latin America. These links must be viewed in the context of the rapidly expanding diplomatic, intelligence, political and economic ties of Iran in recent years with the self-proclaimed Bolivarian states. Given the sparse literature available and the rich vein of un-mined information on the sites cited as well as others that one could find with additional research, the cyber network of Islamist groups remains one of the least understood or studied facets of their presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. It merits significantly more investigation.

Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions

Three key states are relevant in considering future nuclear proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are critical because of their relatively advanced nuclear capabilities. For historical and geopolitical reasons, neither Argentina nor Brazil is likely to reactive nuclear weapons programs. Venezuela’s President, Hugo Chávez, has repeatedly demonstrated interest in developing a nuclear program, yet Venezuela lacks any serious nuclear expertise. Even if it had the managerial and technological capacity, the lead-time to develop an indigenous nuclear program would be measured in decades. Acquisition of nuclear technology from international sources would be difficult because members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would insist on safeguards, and potential non-Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) suppliers are highly surveilled, risking the exposure of such a program before Venezuela could put a deterrent into place. While South American states have historically opposed nuclear weapons, their acquisition by Brazil and Argentina would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation. Brazil and Argentina are both geopolitically satisfied powers that are deeply embedded in a regional security community. On the other hand, Venezuela under President Chávez is perceived as a revisionist power seeking a transformation of the international system. Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would be met with alarm by the United States and Colombia, and it would prompt nuclear weapons development by Brazil and possibly Argentina, more for reasons of preserving regional leadership and prestige than for fear of a Venezuelan threat.

The Transitioning Economic Dynamics of the Military in Communist Regimes: A Comparison of Cuba, China and Vietnam [Student's Paper Series]

Several factors can increase or decrease military-economic involvement in communist regimes. This anomalous form of military behavior, labeled as the Military Business Complex (MBC), emerged in various communist regimes in the 1980s. However, in early 2000s, the communist governments of China and Vietnam began to decrease the number of military-managed industries, while similar industries increased in Cuba. This paper explains why military industries in Cuba have increased over the last two decades, while they decreased in the Chinese and Vietnamese examples. This question is answered by comparatively testing two hypotheses: the Communist Party and the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian (BA) Hypotheses. The Communist Party hypotheses helps explain how the historical and current structures of Party oversight of the military have been lacking in strength and reliability in Cuba, while they traditionally have been more robust in China and Vietnam. The BA hypotheses helps explain how, due to the lack of a strong civilian institutional oversight, the Cuban military has grown into a bureaucratic entity with many political officers holding autonomous positions of power, an outcome that is not prevalent in the Chinese and Vietnamese examples. Thus, with the establishment of a bureaucratic military government and with the absence of a strong party oversight, the Cuban military has been able to protect its economic endeavors while the Chinese and Vietnamese MBC regimes have contracted.

The Rise of Native Voices Against Natural Resource Extraction in Latin America [Student's Paper Series]

Latin America, a region rich in both energy resources and native heritage, faces a rising politico-social confrontation that has been growing for over two decades. While resources like oil and gas are exploited to enhance the state’s economic growth, indigenous groups feel threatened because the operations related to this exploitation are infringing on their homelands. Furthermore, they believe that the potential resource wealth found in these environmentally-sensitive regions is provoking an “intrusion” in their ancestral territory of either government agencies or corporations allowed by governmental decree. Indigenous groups, which have achieved greater political voice over the past decade, are protesting against government violations. These protests have reached the media and received international attention, leading the discourse on topics such as civil and human rights violations. When this happens, the State finds itself “between a rock and a hard place”: In a debate between indigenous groups’ rights and economic sustainability.

Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America

The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.