The recruitment process of the Shining Path and MRTA guerrilla groups: A political psychological perspective

This thesis is an analysis of the recruitment process of the Shining Path -SP- and Revolutionary Movement “Túpac Amaru” -MRTA- guerrilla groups. Although SP was considered more aggressive, it gained more followers than MRTA. This thesis tries to explain why. Social Revolution Theory and Social Movement Theory provide explanations based on issues of “poverty”, disregarding the specific characteristics of the guerrilla groups and their supporters, as well as the influence of specific persuasive processes between the leaders of the groups and their followers. Integrative complexity theory, on the contrary, provides a consistent method to analyze cognitive processes: because people tend to reject complex and sophisticated explanations that require mental efforts, simplicity was the key for success. To prove which guerrilla group provided a simpler worldview, a sample of official documents of SP and MRTA are compared. Finally, content analysis is applied through the Paragraph Completion Test (P.C.T.). ^

Peru’s Shining Path: Recent Dynamics and Future Prospects

Although soundly defeated in the early to mid-1990s, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) did not disappear. Over the past five years, it has reemerged in a substantially different form, with both a military and a political component. The organization, once again coordinated by jailed leader Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, has eschewed shorter-term military objectives in favor of a longer-term strategy of slowly rebuilding popular support and establishing a party within the Peruvian political system. In so doing, it has also moved from extreme Maoist ideological rigidity to a more pragmatic, though perhaps only tactical, approach. Financial support is derived once again from cocaine production and trafficking in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). Although there may be some individual exceptions, Shining Path is not a narcoterrorist organization. At the same time, Sendero is still very small, in no way a threat to the Peruvian state, and divided. The Lima-based political organization and the military wing in the UHV continue to follow Guzmán‟s leadership, while the Apurímac-Ene Valleys (VRAE) group remains committed to the armed struggle. The Government of Peru (GOP) response to date, both military and civilian, has been inadequate. VRAE military operations are hampered by poor leadership, ill-trained troops, and an outdated strategy. VRAE development resources have been cut, and the long-promised paved road remains in the planning stage. Without significant GOP adjustments, Shining Path is likely to continue to grow.