Brazil Under Dilma Rousseff: Similar Policy Directions Maintained.

It is unlikely that the newly elected government of Dilma Rousseff will make any fundamental changes to the major imperatives that underlie Brazilian policy: that is, macroeconomic stability and poverty alleviation. These policy imperatives have set the country on the road to good governance and have provided former presidents a chance to claim continuity. While President Rousseff of the Worker’s Party (PT) may have a distinct style, personality, and set of leadership skills compared to her predecessors, she is expected to maintain the core macroeconomic stability and social policies that are currently in place. Many who expected Rousseff to be former president Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva’s carbon copy are discovering that from day one she has showcased a different governing style than her mentor. She has emphasized her commanding authority and has brought about fresh approaches to delicate matters, which entail domestic economic issues and foreign policy. For example, her administration has aggressively applied a set of macro-prudential measures to counter inflationary pressures on the Brazilian currency (Real). And in foreign policy, she has steadfastly recalibrated Itamarity’s stance on the controversial issues, such as Iran, and now appears to have refocused its short-term efforts on cementing Brazil’s leadership role in the region’s southern cone.

The New Transatlantic Bonanza: Cocaine on Highway 10.

The 10th Parallel marine and aerial routes linking South America and West Africa harbor a long history of trade between the two continents. More recently, these routes have become one of the preferred routes used by Latin American traffickers for shipping multi-tons of cocaine destined for the growing European market. The Parallel’s growing importance in cocaine trafficking has made it known as cocaine “Highway 10” among law enforcement. Latin American cocaine trafficking organizations, particularly the Colombian ones, have established stable bases in West Africa, controlling and developing the route. West African facilitators, Nigerians as well as an increasing number of nationals from all countries where shipments are stocked, have developed a stronger capacity for taking over more ambitious and lucrative role in the business as transporters, partners, and final buyers. In one case (Guinea), the West African partner had already started developing his own trafficking and manufacturing capacity, reproducing the patterns that made Colombia the business model of the drug industry. In this reshaped context, of particular concern is the role played by the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) as provider of cocaine shipments to West African cocaine entrepreneurs, as well as the impact of drug trafficking money on the financing of terrorist and rebel groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan belt.

Venezuela and Chile: Two Opposite Paths of Democratic Consolidation and Economic Development.

In the past 20 years, Chile and Venezuela have followed divergent paths of democratic and economic development. When the Cold War ended, Venezuela was one of the few Latin American countries where democracy had survived the authoritarian wave of the 1960 and 1970s. Heralded in the late 1980s as the most stable democracy and one of the most developed and globalized economies in the region, Venezuela has since experienced deterioration of democratic institutions, political polarization, economic stagnation, and instability. In contrast, Chile has experienced a democratic renaissance since 1990. Rapid economic growth, an increasingly efficient public sector, significant reductions in poverty, and improvements in social programs have all made Chile a regional leader in democratic consolidation and sustainable development. Chile emerges as a success story and Venezuela as a country lagging behind in terms of making progress in economic development and poverty reduction. While Chile has developed a democratic system based on institutions, Venezuela has seen its democracy evolve towards increasing concentration of power on the hands of President Hugo Chávez.

Lan American Coups: Have They Vanished or Taken New Shapes?

In the following pages, three well-known Latinoamericanists share their views on the current prospects for coups in Latin America. They are: Rut Diamint of the University Torcuatto de Tella in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Pablo Policzer of the University of Calgary in Canada; and Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, DC. Each looks at the potential for coups from different perspectives but, all three come to similar conclusions. That is, that despite substantial gains in democracy, the threat of coups in Latin America remains latent. The authors agree that democracy is growing in the region. Opinion surveys such as the Americas Barometer consistently show that citizens in Latin America have gradually incorporated democracy as part of their core value system. Yet, the authors argue convincingly that Latin America faces new types of interruptions to its democratic process that should be considered coups, even if not following the traditional style of military coup that predominated in the past. Situations that have taken place in Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras and other countries serve to illustrate the new trends. More specifically, Professor Diamint argues that in Latin America a culture of intolerance, demonization of the opposition, and the utilization of any method to achieve power prevails. In a region with a very high threshold of violence, governments fail to set an example of establishing a culture of debate, consensus, and transparency. This culture is inclined to uncontrollable political expressions, preferring confrontational means to resolve conflict. Within this scenario, “messianic” solutions are promoted and coups cannot be discarded as an option that would never transpire. Professor Policzer looks more closely to the constitutional loopholes that allow for a transformation of limited into absolute power. He argues that coups can be constitutional or unconstitutional, and that a constitutional coup can occur when violations to democracy actually stem from the constitutions themselves. In Honduras, for example specific provisions in the Constitution itself created conditions for a constitutional crisis; similar provisions have also led to constitutional authoritarianism in Venezuela and other countries. Dr. Policzer stresses that when a head of state or the military take absolute power, even temporarily, based on provisions in their constitutions; they are in essence staging a constitutional coup. These blind spots in constitutions, he argues, may be more serious threat to democracy than that of traditional coups. Lastly, Dr. Shifter argues that some kind of coup should be expected in Latin America in coming years, not only because fundamental institutions remain weak in some countries, but because the regional political environment is less prepared to respond effectively to transgressions than it was a few years ago. The good news, however, is that only a handful of countries, show no interest in governing. The bad news is that in those few countries where situations are indeed shaky, they are also in some cases aggravated by rising food and fuel prices, and spreading criminality, which pose serious risks to the rule of law and democratic governance.

The Indigenous in Plurinational Bolivia: Perceptions of Indigenous People in Bolivia Before & During the Morales Government

Indigenous people in Bolivia have historically been excluded from the social and political life of their country, where socioeconomic differences are highly correlated with ethnic identities. However, after a serious political crisis, in 2005 an indigenous leader was elected President in an unprecedented election, and the country has since faced aggressive social and political transformations. Using survey data that ranges from 1998 to 2010, this paper shows some relevant changes in the perceptions and attitudes of indigenous people towards the democratic regime, its political institutions, and other citizens. The trends shown suggest that the average relationship of indigenous citizens with the estate and its institutions has improved both in relative and in absolute terms. However, levels of political tolerance among indigenous Bolivians do not seem to have increased at the same rate as those of non-indigenous Bolivians.

Disater Risk Management Disparity in the Caribbean: Evidence from Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago

This study on risk and disaster management capacities of four Caribbean countries: Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, examines three main dimensions: 1) the impact of natural disasters from 1900 to 2010 (number of events, number of people killed, total number affected, and damage in US$); 2) institutional assessments of disaster risk management disparity; and 3) the 2010 Inter-American Bank for Development (IADB) Disaster Risk and Risk Management indicators for the countries under study. The results show high consistency among the different sources examined, pointing out the need to extend the IADB measurements to the rest of the Caribbean countries. Indexes and indicators constitute a comparison measure vis-à-vis existing benchmarks in order to anticipate a capacity to deal with adverse events and their consequences; however, the indexes and indicators could only be tested against the occurrence of a real event. Therefore, the need exists to establish a sustainable and comprehensive evaluation system after important disasters to assess a country’s performance, verify the indicators, and gain feedback on measurement systems and methodologies. There is diversity in emergency and preparedness for disasters in the four countries under study. The nature of the event (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and seismic activity), especially its frequency and the intensity of the damage experienced, is related to how each has designed its risk and disaster management policies and programs to face natural disasters. Vulnerabilities to disaster risks have been increasing, among other factors, because of uncontrolled urbanization, demographic density and poverty increase, social and economic marginalization, and lack of building code enforcement. The four countries under study have shown improvements in risk management capabilities, yet they are far from being completed prepared. Barbados’ risk management performance is superior, in comparison, to the majority of the countries of the region. However, is still far in achieving high performance levels and sustainability in risk management, primarily when it has the highest gap between potential macroeconomic and financial losses and the ability to face them. The Dominican Republic has shown steady risk performance up to 2008, but two remaining areas for improvement are hazard monitoring and early warning systems. Jamaica has made uneven advances between 1990 and 2008, requiring significant improvements to achieve high performance levels and sustainability in risk management, as well as macroeconomic mitigation infrastructure. Trinidad and Tobago has the lowest risk management score of the 15 countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region as assessed by the IADB study in 2010, yet it has experienced an important vulnerability reduction. In sum, the results confirmed the high disaster risk management disparity in the Caribbean region.

Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia

Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.

Armed Groups and Violence in Paraguay

Armed violence in Paraguay is not a recent phenomenon. During the second half of the XX Century, Paraguay saw the rise of a larger number of underground, revolutionary movements that sought the overthrow of the Alfredo Stroessner’s (1954-1989) government. From among those movements emerged the Partido Patria Libre (or, Free Fatherland, also known for its acronym PPL), made up of a two branches: one legal and the other one, operational. The latter was based on people’s power, as represented by “Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo” (or, the Paraguayan People’s Army, with acronym EPP). After EPP broke with PPL in March 2008, this Marxist-oriented revolutionary project, which was apparently oriented to put an end to the social, political and economic inequalities in Paraguay, began to carry out markedly criminal activities, which included bank robberies, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorist attacks and armed confrontations. Its strategies and modus operandi utilized by the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC). Paraguay features a farm sector in a state of crisis, in which cattle-ranchers, peasants and agro-exporting companies live in a constant strife. The Paraguayan Departments that are the most affected by this situation are Concepciόn, San Pedro, Canindeyú y Caazapá, which also suffer from a weak government presence. This deficiency has made these departments ripe for drug-trafficking activity by Brazilian groups such as Primer Comando Capital (i.e., First Capital command), also PCC and Comando Vermelho, (i.e., The Red Command). That is why many peasants, now recruited by EPP, have joined the drug-trafficking business and that, not only as marihuana growers but as “campanas” (i.e., early warning sentinels) for the organization. This helps shape their attitudes for their future involvement in all areas of drug-trafficking. Paraguayan society is the result of social inequity and inequality, such as those resulting from a lack of opportunity. Although Paraguay has successfully recovered from the last world economic crisis, economic growth, by itself, does not ensure an improvement in the quality of life. As long as such economic and social gaps persist and the government fails to enact the policies that would result in a more just society and toward EPP neutralization or containment, the latter is bound to grow stronger. In this context, the situation in Paraguay calls for more research into the EPP phenomenon. It would also seem necessary for Paraguay to promote an open national debate that includes all sectors of society in order to raise consciousness and to induce society to take actual steps to eliminate the EPP, as well as any other group that might arise in the immediate future. EPP has strong connections with the Frente Patriόtico Manuel Rodríguez in Chile and other armed groups and peasant movements in other countries of this region. Although most governments in the region are aware that the armed struggle is not a solution to current problems, it might be worth it to hold a regional debate about armed or insurgent groups in Latin American to seek common strategies and cooperation on dealing with them since the expansion of these armed groups is a problem for all.

The Basis of Support for Hugo Chávez: Measuring the Determinants of Presidential Job Approval in Venezuela

Since 1999, Venezuela has experienced a dramatic transformation of its political system with the coming to power of Hugo Chávez and his movement, known in Venezuela as Chavismo. Chávez has dismantled the previous political system and established neo-populist structures that rely on his personal appeal and the close collaboration of the armed forces. Chávez has relied heavily on significant support from the poor and those who felt economically and politically excluded by the “Punto Fijo system.” President Chávez has built an impressive record of electoral victories; winning every electoral contest except one since coming to power in 1999. He continues to receive relatively high levels of support among sectors of Venezuelan society. However, there is evidence of growing discontent with high crime rates, high levels of inflation, and significant corruption in the public administration. Using data from the AmericasBarometer surveys conducted in 2007, 2008 and 2010, this paper seeks to examine the basis of Chávez’s popular support. In general, the AmericasBarometer findings suggest that Venezuelans support for President Chávez is closely linked to the access to social programs and that as long as the government is able to fund these social programs or missions, particularly MERCAL and Barrio Adentro, it will possess an important tool to garner and sustain support for President Chávez. Our analysis, however, also indicates that evaluations of the national economic situation, more than crime or insecurity, are a key factor that could undermine support for the regime.

The Current State of Argentina's Oil Industry

An oil wealthy country, Argentina has repeatedly tried and failed to capitalize on its potential. The unfortunate energy policies of subsequent Argentinean government and a lack of investment capital have been two of the main reasons that have significantly limited the production of export oil in the recent past. Yet, with recent discoveries and changes to the country’s hydrocarbon laws, there may be a new dawn for Argentina’s oil industry. Since 1999 when Argentina’s oil production peaked at approximately 800,000 barrels per day, there has been a 24 percent decrease in its oil output. The country’s oil reserves have also been in steady decline. Yet, the recently enacted reforms by Argentina’s government to incentivize foreign investment in the oil industry seem to be working, allowing investors to negotiate the terms of exploration directly with local governments. As a result, foreign investment is increasing, as well as new willingness to finance exploration of untapped reserves. Also, the discovery of shale oil in Argentina may provide the potential to become a key exporter in the region. Nonetheless, there are challenges that need to be overcome and it may be years before the various oil projects underway become profitable. The success of current oil projects, coupled with the potential of shale oil, new discoveries and the sustainability of the current energy policy reforms will likely determine if Argentina is finally able to fulfill its potential and exert itself as an oil exporter country in Latin America.

Two Decades Out of the Whirlpool: Past (and Possible Future) United States Interventions in Latin America [Student's Paper Series]

This paper examines the history of U.S. interventions in Latin America and attempts to explain their frequency by highlighting two factors – besides security and economic interests – that have made American interventions in Latin America so common. First, immense differences in size and influence between the United States and the States of Latin America have made interventions appear to be a low risk solution to crises that threaten American interests in the region. Second, when U.S government concerns and aspirations for Latin America converge with the general fears and aspirations of American foreign policy, interventions become much more likely. Such a convergence pushes Latin American issues high up the U.S. foreign policy agenda because of the region’s proximity to the United States and the perception that costs of intervening are low. The leads proponents of intervention to begin asking questions like “if we cannot stop communism/revolutions/drug-trafficking in Latin America, where can we stop it?” This article traces how these factors influenced the decision to intervene in Latin America during the era of Dollar Diplomacy and during the Cold War. It concludes with three possible scenarios that could lead to a reemergence of an American interventionist policy in Latin America. It makes the argument that even though the United Sates has not intervened in Latin America during the twenty-two years, it is far from clear that American interventions in Latin America will be consigned to the past.