Building Regional Security: Cooperation in the 21st Century: The Case of the Caribbean Regional Security System [RSS]

Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but it is rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation. The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved very slowly. The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to develop military capacity beyond current levels since they see economic and social development and disaster relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military hardware. The RSS depends on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material. In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism. Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security from their own resources. While larger CARICOM economies can do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same. The CARICOM region including the RSS member countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in security collaboration. Implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation and permanent legacy institutions for the regional security toolbox. The most important tier of security relationships for the region is the United States and particularly USSOUTHCOM. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of the Caribbean countries and promote regional ownership of security initiatives. Future developments under discussion by policy makers in the Caribbean security environment include the granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space. The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” particularly Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional security collaboration. Regional security cooperation should embrace wider traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21st century. Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region. The objective should not be the creation of new agencies but rather the generation of new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes. Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states. The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean. RSS collaboration should build on the process of operational level synergies with traditional military partners. In this context, the United States must be a true partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment. Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option.

Consolidating Security and Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama

Colombia's increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social, and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, a large-scale narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-populated areas. Important differences exist, however in the nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the government response to them and the nature of government and society that affects the applicability of Colombia's experience to Peru. The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and Colombian insurgents --often a linked phenomenon-- are in many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the government -- as the case of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and Peru. The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or small towns where state presence is minimal. The central lesson learned from Colombia is the need to define and then address the key problem of a "sovereignity gap," lack of legitimate state presence in many part of the country. Colombia's success in broadening the presence of the national government between 2002 and the presence is owed to many factors, including an effective national strategy, improvements in the armed forces and police, political will on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buy-in to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in conflicted areas. Control of territory and effective state presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs. Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority, improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens, and furthering development to wean communities away from drugs. State coordinated "integration" efforts in Peru as practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru's traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be overcome if this effort is to be successful.

A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Finance in the United States and Japan From 1880 to 1930

This study explained the diversity of corporate financial practices in two nations. Existing studies have emphasized the reliance on equity finance in U.S. firms and bank loans in Japanese firms. In fact, patterns of corporate finance were much more complex. Financial institutions, which were created by national economic policy and regulation, affected corporate financial practices, but corporate financial practices often differed from what policymakers expected. Differences in corporate financial practices between nations also reflected differences in the mixture of industries in each nation. Many factors such as the amount of fixed capital, the process of production, the level of risk, the degree of innovation, and the importance of the industry in the national economy affected corporate financial practices. In addition, corporate financial practices within each nation differed from firm to firm due to managers’ considerations about stock ownership, which would affect their control power; corporate finance was closely related to control over management through ownership. To explain these complexities of corporate financial practices, the study linked corporate finance with the development of financial institutions in the United States and in Japan. While financial institutions affected corporate financial practices, the response of the firms to financial institutions and opportunities were diverse. The study also attempted to grasp variations in corporate financial practices by dealing with companies in three sectors: railroads, public utilities, and manufacturing. Finally, the study examined the structure of firm ownership. Contradictory to the widely held belief that U.S. firms distributed securities more widely to the public than did Japanese firms, many large American firms remained closely held, while some Japanese counterparts built publicly-held corporations.