32 resultados para Law Enforcement
Resumo:
This study examines some concerns that derive from Suriname‘s May-July 2010 elections, which resulted in the re-emergence of erstwhile military ruler and convicted drug trafficker, Désiré (Desi) Bouterse, as President of the Republic. The victory reflects Bouterse‘s political acumen in aggregating disparate political interests and in establishing a viable coalition government. But because of his history and profile, this triumph has generated anxiety in some places internationally. In this respect, the study examines anxieties related to three matters: (a) relations with Guyana, where there is an existing territorial dispute and a recently resolved maritime dispute, (b) illegal drug trafficking operations, and (c) foreign policy engagement with Venezuela. There has been a flurry of bilateral activities—including several presidential summits—with Guyana since President Bouterse‘s inauguration, albeit seemingly more about symbolism than substance. Although the maritime dispute was settled by a Tribunal of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea in 2007, the 15,000 km2 New River Triangle is still unresolved. Indeed, in June 2011 President Bouterse reasserted Suriname‘s claim to the Triangle. Suriname has upped the ante in that dispute by portraying internationally the map of Suriname as inclusive of the disputed area. In all likelihood that self-redefinition slowly will become the country‘s cartographic definition in the eyes of the world if Guyana does not successfully rebuff that move or pursue the definitive settlement of the dispute. A geonarcotics assessment shows Suriname to be still heavily implicated in trafficking, because of geography, law enforcement limitations, corruption, and other factors. But despite Bouterse‘s drug-related history and that of former senior military officers, several reasons suggest the inexpediency of a narco-state being created by Bouterse. As well, as part of Suriname‘s pursuit of increased Caribbean and South American engagement, it has boosted relations with Venezuela, which has included it in PetroCaribe and provided housing and agricultural aid. However, the engagement appears to be driven more by pragmatism and less by any ideological affinity with Hugo Chavez.
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For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.
Resumo:
The 10th Parallel marine and aerial routes linking South America and West Africa harbor a long history of trade between the two continents. More recently, these routes have become one of the preferred routes used by Latin American traffickers for shipping multi-tons of cocaine destined for the growing European market. The Parallel’s growing importance in cocaine trafficking has made it known as cocaine “Highway 10” among law enforcement. Latin American cocaine trafficking organizations, particularly the Colombian ones, have established stable bases in West Africa, controlling and developing the route. West African facilitators, Nigerians as well as an increasing number of nationals from all countries where shipments are stocked, have developed a stronger capacity for taking over more ambitious and lucrative role in the business as transporters, partners, and final buyers. In one case (Guinea), the West African partner had already started developing his own trafficking and manufacturing capacity, reproducing the patterns that made Colombia the business model of the drug industry. In this reshaped context, of particular concern is the role played by the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) as provider of cocaine shipments to West African cocaine entrepreneurs, as well as the impact of drug trafficking money on the financing of terrorist and rebel groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan belt.
Resumo:
Brazil’s growing status as a potential world power cannot obscure the characteristics of its other reality: that of a country with vast inequalities and high crime rates. The Comando Vermelho, the most prominent organized crime syndicate in Rio de Janeiro, besieges the beauty and charm that attracts tourists to this city. The CV arose not only as a product of the political dictatorship of the seventies, but also of the disenfranchised urban poor crammed into Rio’s favela slums. Today, the CV presents a powerful challenge to the State’s control of parts of Rio territory. As Brazil’s soft power projection grows, it is seriously challenged by its capacity to eliminate organized crime. Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply embedded organization like the CV. In fact, Brazil’s success may yet further retrench the CV’s activities. Culpability for organized crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but must also be shared among the willing consumers, among whom can be found educated and elite members of society, as well as the impoverished and desperate. The Brazilian government needs a top-down response addressing the schism between rich and poor. However, Brazil’s citizens must also take responsibility and forge a bottom-up response to the drug- and corruption-riddled elements of its most respected members of society. Brazil must target reform across public health, housing, education and above all, law enforcement. Without such changes, Brazil will remain a two-track democracy. Rio’s wealthy will still be able to revel in the city’s beauty albeit from behind armored cars and fortified mansions, while the city’s poor will yield – either as victims or perpetrators – to the desperate measures of organized crime.
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Despite significant concern among policy, law enforcement and intelligence communities in the United States (U.S.) over the possible spread of radical Islamist thought throughout the world as part of a global jihad movement, there has been little investigation into the growing cyber networks in Latin America that promote strong anti-Semitic and anti-U.S. messages. This paper offers an overview of that network, focusing on the structure of Shi’ite websites that promote not only religious conversion but are also supportive of Iran -- a designated State-sponsor of terrorism – its nuclear program. Hezbollah, and the “Bolivarian revolution” led by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and his allies in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. There is also a smaller group of Sunni Muslim websites, mostly tied to the legacy organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of the Shi’ite websites are linked to each other consistently portray Israel as a Nazi State, and the United States as an imperialist war monger. The Palestinian issue is frequently juxtaposed with the anti-imperialist struggle that those states supporting Chávez’ Bolivarian revolution claim to wage against the United States. Some of the Islamist websites claim thousands of new convert, but such claims are difficult to verify. Most of the websites visited touted the conversion of one or two individuals as significant victories and signs of progress, implying that there are few, if any, mass conversions. While conducting this research, no websites directly claiming to be linked to Hezbollah were found, although there numerous sites hosted by that group that were active until around 2006. Several of the inactive links are supportive of Hezbollah as a political party. No websites linked to al Qaeda were found. Yet a substantial Internet network remains operational. Much of the outreach for Shi’ite Muslims, closely tied to Iran, is sponsored on numerous websites across the region, including El Salvador, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia. Numerous Facebook forums for discussion are also hosted around Latin America. These links must be viewed in the context of the rapidly expanding diplomatic, intelligence, political and economic ties of Iran in recent years with the self-proclaimed Bolivarian states. Given the sparse literature available and the rich vein of un-mined information on the sites cited as well as others that one could find with additional research, the cyber network of Islamist groups remains one of the least understood or studied facets of their presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. It merits significantly more investigation.
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Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.
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The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.
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Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but it is rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation. The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved very slowly. The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to develop military capacity beyond current levels since they see economic and social development and disaster relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military hardware. The RSS depends on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material. In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism. Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security from their own resources. While larger CARICOM economies can do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same. The CARICOM region including the RSS member countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in security collaboration. Implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation and permanent legacy institutions for the regional security toolbox. The most important tier of security relationships for the region is the United States and particularly USSOUTHCOM. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of the Caribbean countries and promote regional ownership of security initiatives. Future developments under discussion by policy makers in the Caribbean security environment include the granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space. The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” particularly Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional security collaboration. Regional security cooperation should embrace wider traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21st century. Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region. The objective should not be the creation of new agencies but rather the generation of new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes. Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states. The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean. RSS collaboration should build on the process of operational level synergies with traditional military partners. In this context, the United States must be a true partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment. Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option.
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Despite the ongoing "war on drugs" the seizure rates for phenethylamines and their analogues have been steadily increasing over the years. The illicit manufacture of these compounds has become big business all over the world making it all the more attractive to the inexperienced "cook". However, as a result, the samples produced are more susceptible to contamination with reactionary byproducts and leftover reagents. These impurities are useful in the analysis of seized drugs as their identities can help to determine the synthetic pathway used to make these drugs and thus, the provenance of these analytes. In the present work two fluorescent dyes, 4-fluoro-7-nitrobenzofurazan and 5-(4,6-dichlorotriazinyl)aminofluorescein, were used to label several phenethylamine analogues for electrophoretic separation with laser-induced fluorescence detection. The large scale to which law enforcement is encountering these compounds has the potential to create a tremendous backlog. In order to combat this, a rapid, sensitive method capable of full automation is required. Through the utilization of the inline derivatization method developed whereby analytes are labeled within the capillary efficiently in a minimum span of time, this can be achieved. The derivatization and separation parameters were optimized on the basis of a variety of experimentally determined factors in order to give highly resolved peaks in the fluorescence spectrum with limits of detection in the low µg/mL range.
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Paper Presentation
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Individual cues to deception are subtle and often missed by lay people and law enforcement alike. Linguistic statement analysis remains a potentially useful way of overcoming individual diagnostic limitations (e.g. Criteria based Content Analysis; Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Reality monitoring; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Scientific Content Analysis; Sapir, 1996). Unfortunately many of these procedures are time-consuming, require in-depth training, as well as lack empirical support and/or external validity. The current dissertation develops a novel approach to statement veracity analysis that is simple to learn, easy to administer, theoretically sound, and empirically validated. Two strategies were proposed for detecting differences between liars' and truth-tellers' statements. Liars were hypothesized to strategically write statements with the goal of self-exoneration. Liars' statements were predicted to contain more first person pronouns and fewer third person pronouns. Truth-tellers were hypothesized to be motivated toward being informative and thus produce statements with fewer first person pronouns and more third person pronouns. Three studies were conducted to test this hypothesis. The first study explored the verbal patterns of exoneration and informativeness focused statements. The second study used a traditional theft paradigm to examine these verbal patterns in guilty liars and innocent truth tellers. In the third study to better match the context of a criminal investigation a cheating paradigm was used in which spontaneous lying was induced and written statements were taken. Support for the first person pronoun hypothesis was found. Limited support was found for the third person pronoun hypothesis. Results, implications, and future directions for the current research are discussed.
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The purpose of the research is to study the relationship between international drug interdiction policies and domestic politics in fragile democracies, and to demonstrate how international drug control policies and the use of force fit the rhetoric of war, are legitimized by the principles of a just war, but may also cause collateral damage and negative unintended consequences. The method used is a case study of the Dominican Republic. The research has found that international drug control regimes, primarily led by the U.S. and narrowly focused on interdiction, have influenced an increasingly militarized approach to domestic law enforcement in the Dominican Republic. The collateral damage caused by militarized enforcement comes in the form of negative perceptions of citizen security, loss of respect for the rule of law and due process, and low levels of civil society development. The drug war has exposed the need for significant reform of the institutions charged with carrying out enforcement, the police force and the judicial system in particular. The dissertation concludes that the extent of drug trafficking in the Dominican Republic is beyond the scope of domestic reform efforts alone, but that the programs implemented do show some potential for future success. The dissertation also concludes that the framework of warfare is not the most appropriate for the international problems of drug traffic and abuse. A broader, multipronged approach should be considered by world policy makers in order to address all conditions that allow drugs to flourish without infringing upon democratic and civil rights in the process.
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SmartWater is a chemical taggant used as a crime deterrent. The chemical taggant is a colorless liquid that fluoresces yellow under ultra-violet (UV) light and contains distinctive, identifiable and traceable elemental composition. For instance, upon a break and entry scenario, the burglar is sprayed with a solution that has an elemental signature custom-made to a specific location. The residues of this taggant persist on skin and other objects and can be easily recovered for further analysis. The product has been effectively used in Europe as a crime deterrent and has been recently introduced in South Florida. In 2014, Fourt Lauderdale Police Department reported the use of SmartWater products with a reduction in burglaries of 14% [1]. The International Forensic Research Institute (IFRI) at FIU validated the scientific foundation of the methods of recovery and analysis of these chemical tagging systems using LA-ICP-MS. Analytical figures of merit of the method such as precision, accuracy, limits of detection, linearity and selectivity are reported in this study. Moreover, blind samples were analyzed by LA-ICP-MS to compare the chemical signatures to the company’s database and evaluate error rates and the accuracy of the method. This study demonstrated that LA-ICP-MS could be used to effectively detect these traceable taggants to assist law enforcement agencies in the United States with cases involving transfer of these forensic coding systems.
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Law enforcement officials routinely rely on eyewitness identification evidence to solve crimes. Nonetheless, this form of evidence is prone to errors. Researchers have previously attempted to examine conditions under which such errors can be reduced. The present study examines whether giving witnesses an explicit not sure response option increases the accuracy of lineup identification decisions. 251 participants watched a mock crime video before viewing a lineup that either included the perpetrator, or was made up of innocent suspects. Results indicated that witnesses provided with a not sure option made fewer false identifications, fewer filler identifications, and a similar number of correct identifications as witnesses who were not provided with this option. Furthermore, these benefits occurred regardless of whether witnesses received otherwise biased or unbiased instructions. Results suggest that the inclusion of an explicit not sure response option is a simple procedure that can increase the quality of eyewitness lineup decisions.
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Individual cues to deception are subtle and often missed by lay people and law enforcement alike. Linguistic statement analysis remains a potentially useful way of overcoming individual diagnostic limitations (e.g. Criteria based Content Analysis; Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Reality monitoring; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Scientific Content Analysis; Sapir, 1996). Unfortunately many of these procedures are time-consuming, require in-depth training, as well as lack empirical support and/or external validity. The current dissertation develops a novel approach to statement veracity analysis that is simple to learn, easy to administer, theoretically sound, and empirically validated. ^ Two strategies were proposed for detecting differences between liars' and truth-tellers' statements. Liars were hypothesized to strategically write statements with the goal of self-exoneration. Liars' statements were predicted to contain more first person pronouns and fewer third person pronouns. Truth-tellers were hypothesized to be motivated toward being informative and thus produce statements with fewer first person pronouns and more third person pronouns. Three studies were conducted to test this hypothesis. The first study explored the verbal patterns of exoneration and informativeness focused statements. The second study used a traditional theft paradigm to examine these verbal patterns in guilty liars and innocent truth tellers. In the third study to better match the context of a criminal investigation a cheating paradigm was used in which spontaneous lying was induced and written statements were taken. Support for the first person pronoun hypothesis was found. Limited support was found for the third person pronoun hypothesis. Results, implications, and future directions for the current research are discussed.^