Stray dogs in Bucharest, and the political economy of Romanian socialism. From hunting the “enemies” of Stalinist economy, to poisoning urban parasites, and the rise of urban anarchy: 1950s-1990s.

My paper discusses three different ways in which stray dogs have been intertwined with ideologies of economic and urban development in Romania. I categorize results from archival and ethnographic research under three major time periods: early socialism, late socialism, and post-socialism. During early socialism stray dogs were seen to be damaging the soviet economy by killing species that humans could also hunt, like rabbits. During late socialism, stray dogs appeared as the enemies of the communist city, and the department of urban sanitation was given orders to poison dogs with strychnine. Finally, the increasing number of stray dogs in Bucharest after the collapse of communism was seen as a direct result of former communist demolitions, and was also taken as a sign of the collapsing state. Through such examples my paper discusses how the state and particular population groups have seen dogs as parts of an unwanted and dangerous nature, rather than a species that needs to be protected. I argue that distinctions of nature and culture have served discourses of civilization and the view of Bucharest as a model socialist, and then European city. Throughout my paper I juxtapose the treatment of stray dogs with other, more “valued” urban natures like the protection of parks, the wide-spread hobby of pigeon breeding during socialist years, the most recent debate on saving the rural area of Rosia Montana from non-environmentally friendly methods of gold extraction, and the current trend of healthy eating and living.

Essays on the political economy of the dominican reform process

This dissertation provides an analytical framework to study the political economy of policy reform in the Dominican Republic during the nineties. Based on a country study, I develop two theoretical models that replicate the mechanisms of policy approval in developing countries with weak democracies. The first model considers a pro-reform President who submits a tariff bill to an anti-reform Congress dominated by the opposition party. In between, two opposing lobbies try to get their favored policy approved. Lobbies act as Stackelberg leaders vis a vis a weak President. The behavior of the Congress is determined exogenously while the lobbies act strategically pursuing the approval of the reform bill and indirectly affecting the President's decision. I show that in such a setting external agents like the Press play an important role in the decision-making process of the political actors. The second model presents a similar framework. However, the President, who is a Stackelberg leader, is allowed only two choices, total reform or status-quo. I show how a lobby reacts to an increase in its rival's or its own size. These reactions depend on the President's level of commitment to the reform. Finally, I discuss the effect of variations in the size of the lobbies on the President's choice. The model suitably explains real events that took place in the Dominican Republic in the mid-nineties.