O problema mente-corpo na psicologia fenomenológica de Edith Stein : implicações para uma fundamentação da ciência psicológica

Psychology is a relatively new scientific branch and still lacks consistent methodological foundation to support its investigations. Given its immaturity, this science finds difficulties to delimit its ontological status, which spawnes several epistemological and methodological misconceptions. Given this, Psychology failed to demarcate precisely its object of study, leading, thus, the emergence of numerous conceptions about the psychic, which resulted in the fragmentation of this science. In its constitution, psychological science inherited a complex philosophical problem: the mind-body issue. Therefore, to define their status, Psychology must still face this problem, seeking to elucidate what is the mind, the body and how they relate. In light of the importance of this issue to a strict demarcation of psychological object, it was sought in this research, to investigate the mind-body problem in the Phenomenological Psychology of Edith Stein (1891-1942), phenomenologist philosopher who undertook efforts for a foundation of Psychology. For that, the discussion was subsidized from the contributions of the Philosophy of Mind and the support of the phenomenological method to the mind-body problem. From there, by a qualitative bibliographical methodology, it sought to examine the problem of research through the analysis of some philosophical-psychological philosopher's works, named: "Psychic Causality” (Kausalität Psychische, 1922) and “Introduction to Philosophy" (Einführung in die Philosophie, 1920). For this investigation, it was made, without prejudice to the discussion, a terminological equivalence between the terms mind and psyche, as the philosopher used the latter to refer to the object of Psychology. It sought to examine, therefore, how Stein conceived the psyche, the body and the relationship between them. Although it wasn't the focus of the investigation, it also took into account the spiritual dimension, as the philosopher conceived the human person as consisting of three dimensions: body, psyche and spirit. Given this, Stein highlighted the causal mechanism of the psyche, which is based on the variations of the vital force that emerges from the vital sphere. In relation to the corporeal dimension, the philosopher, following the analysis of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), highlighted the dual aspect of the body, because it is at the same time something material (Körper) and also a linving body (Leib). On the face of it, it is understood that the psyche and the body are closely connected, so that it constitutes a dual-unit which is manifested in the Leib. This understanding of the problem psyche-mind/body provides a rich analysis of this issue, enabling the overcoming of some inconsistencies of the monistic and dualistic positions. Given this, it allows a strict elucidation of the Psychology object, contributing to the foundation of this science.

As relações de interação e integração entre cérebro, corpo-propriamente-dito e meio-ambiente na constituição da mente consciente

This dissertation will be marked by our proposal to hold a theoretical perspective to the classical mind-body problem, and more precisely for the defense of the idea that consciousness (or conscious mind) emerges from the interaction and integration relationships between body proper, brain and environment. This purpose will lead us to assume an alternative position with respect to the more traditional perspectives to the mind-body problem, ie an alternative perspective not only in relation to the dualistics forms of mind-body, but also in regards to the reductive physicalists, which usually reduces mind to brain. Aiming to support a position that both avoid the idea that mind and body are distinct substances and the theory that the brain explains the consciousness in its totality, we will dedicate an important part of this work to explain how the structure of consciousness depends significantly of the body proper and the bodily information mechanisms as well as the environment and the physiological mechanisms through which we place ourselves in space, in front of us and the other bodies (organic and inorganic). Given that the relationship between brain, body and environment involves different mental levels — from the most primitive and unconscious mental mechanisms until conscious and sophisticated levels — we will proceed to the task of assuming a model to explain in what sense these levels contribute to that our instincts and the most sophisticated dimensions of our mental life are part of the one and the same process, which is why we will structure our argument from the ideia that mind, self, and consciousness are the different hierarchical levels which make up the totality of our psychic life and therefore organic one. Imbued with this conceptual approach, we will advance to the focus of this work, namely the reasons that will lead us to give a prominent role to the body proper and the environment in the constitution of the conscious mind, or even the reasons that will lead us to defend the thesis according to which we are embodied and situated, as well as the reasons that will lead us to reject the theoretical positions that dichotomize man and world. In order to support the thesis that we are embodied and situated, and therefore with the purpose of overcoming the theoretical paradigms that dichotomize consciousness and world, we will turn out to the authors and the perspectives we believe to be more successful in this endeavor, including the phenomenological approaches to bodily self-consciousness, the enactivists perspectives and the researches dedicated to mapping the interaction and integration relationships between brain, body and environment. To achieve our goals, the dissertation will be divided into two chapters: the first chapter will emphasize in what way the structuring of consciousness depends on the body proper and the environment, while in the second chapter we will resort to the phenomenological dimensions of bodily self-consciousness, emphasizing the bodily information channels that provide us the immediate certainty, in a first person perspective, that the self is bodily in a non-metaphorical sense.