A Note on The Weak Sequential Core of Dynamic TU Games

This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.

A projektek és a változtatások szerepelméleteinek összehasonlítása (Comparison of role concepts of projects and changes)

A szerzők jelen cikkükben a projektmenedzsment és a változásmenedzsment szakirodalmában olvasható szerepelméleteket hasonlítják össze. A hasonlóságok szembeötlőek, de nem nyilvánvaló, hogy az egyes definíciók pontosan miben egyeznek vagy térnek el egymástól. A két szakterület irodalmában nem találtak ilyen összehasonlító elemzést. Először összehasonlítják a projekt, az elsőfokú (morfostatikus) és a másodfokú (morfogenetikus) változás közkeletű definícióit, hogy körülhatárolhassák a közöttük lévő átfedéseket, ahol egyáltalán van értelme összevetniük a különböző szerepmeghatározásokat. Találnak közöttük átfedést, ahol a különböző szerepdefiníciók egyaránt érvényesek, így összehasonlíthatók egymással. A két szakterület szerepmeghatározásainak tartalmát elemezve teljes egyezések, részleges hasonlóságok és különbségek is találhatók. Legfontosabb megállapításuk az, hogy a tartalmi átfedések és kapcsolódások miatt mindkét szakterület oktatói, kutatói és gyakorlati művelői komoly haszonnal forgathatják a másik terület szerepelméleti szakirodalmát is. ________ This paper compares the role concepts which are in current use in project management and change management literature. The similarities are noticeable at first sight but it is not clear where the domains of the different definitions of the two management disciplines overlap and where they vary from each other significantly. The authors have not found such an interdisciplinary comparison in the literature of the two fields. At first, they compared the widely used definitions of project, first order (or morphostatic) and second order (or morphogenetic) changes to find the overlapping areas where it is reasonable to compare the different role definitions at all. They found an overlapping area where the different role definitions are all valid and the role theories can be compared. The typical project stakeholders are: project sponsor, project manager, project management team, project team, influencers, customer/user, performing organization etc. The typical change roles are: sponsor (initiating and sustaining), agent, target, advocate, facilitator etc. The authors found samenesses, similarities and differences alike between the two sets of roles. The most important conclusion is that the findings enable participants working on these types of activities to rely on both bodies of knowledge properly.

On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that satisfy these axioms. However, when considering an assignment game as a communication graph game where the game is simply the assignment game and the graph is a corresponding bipartite graph buyers are connected with sellers only, we show that Myerson's component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. Moreover, these two axioms have a natural interpretation for assignment games. Component efficiency yields submarket efficiency stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the worth of that submarket, where a submarket is a set of buyers and sellers such that all buyers in this set have zero valuation for the goods offered by the sellers outside the set, and all buyers outside the set have zero valuations for the goods offered by sellers inside the set. Fairness of the graph game solution boils down to valuation fairness stating that only changing the valuation of one particular buyer for the good offered by a particular seller changes the payoffs of this buyer and seller by the same amount.

A Theory of Natural Addiction

Economic theories of rational addiction aim to describe consumer behavior in the presence of habit-forming goods. We provide a biological foundation for this body of work by formally specifying conditions under which it is optimal to form a habit. We demonstrate the empirical validity of our thesis with an in-depth review and synthesis of the biomedical literature concerning the action of opiates in the mammalian brain and their eects on behavior. Our results lend credence to many of the unconventional behavioral assumptions employed by theories of rational addiction, including adjacent complementarity and the importance of cues, attention, and self-control in determining the behavior of addicts. We oer evidence for the special case of the opiates that "harmful" addiction is the manifestation of a mismatch between behavioral algorithms encoded in the human genome and the expanded menu of choices faced by consumers in the modern world.

On the impossibility of fair risk allocation

Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying the natural requirements of (Solution) Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games.

The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

Endogenous Timing of Moves in Bertrand-Edgeworth Triopolies

We determine the endogenous order of moves in which the firms set their prices in the framework of a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly. A three-period timing game that determines the period in which the firms announce their prices precedes the price-setting stage. We show for the non-trivial case (in which the Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly has only an equilibrium in non-degenerated mixed-strategies) that the firm with the largest capacity sets its price first, while the two other firms set their prices later. Our result extends a finding by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) from duopolies to triopolies. This extension was made possible by Hirata's (2009) recent advancements on the mixed-strategy equilibria of Bertrand-Edgeworth games.

On the impossibility of fair risk allocation

Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using coherent measures of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying simultaneously the natural requirements of Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games.

Observing population changes of thrips (Thysanoptera) species damaging forced pepper and their natural enemies

By the strengthening of environmental protection and food safety efforts in Hungary, integrated and especially biological pest control methods should increasingly put forward, for which a solid knowledge on the life course and efficiency of natural enemies applied against certain pests is necessary. Pepper has distinguished significance in domestic vegetable forcing, and the profitability of production is determined primarily by the efficiency of the control of thrips pests. This is why we attached great importance to study what results may be expected by introducing arthropod predators (Amblyseius cucumeris, Orius laevigatus) to control thrips species under domestic conditions on rock wool in a long vegetation period pepper culture. We also liked to find out what kind of role the cultivars play in the change of phytophagous and zoophagous populations. The A. cucumeris predatory mite introduced in late January proved to be effective in controlling thrips pests until mid-April. Despite repeated introductions, the predatory bug O. laevigatus (Heteroptera: Anthocoridae) did not proliferate. Among the three pepper cultivars (Hó, Keceli, Titán) grown at Ráckeve, thrips species proliferated in the highest number on cultivar ‘Hó’, while the population of predatory mites was lowest on the cultivar ‘Titán’, compared to the other two cultivars.