A jelzálogpiaci válság és a Közép-Kelet-Európában aktív nagybankok részvényárfolyama (The impact of the subprime crisis on the banks being active in Central and Eastern Europe)

Tanulmányunkban azt vizsgáljuk, hogy a jelzálogpiaci válsághoz köthető hírek milyen hatással vannak a Közép-Kelet-Európában aktív nagybankokra. A vizsgálathoz tíz Közép-Kelet-Európában aktív, tőzsdei nagybankot választottunk ki, amelyek közül hat nyugat-európai, míg négy közép-kelet-európai székhelyű bank volt. A tíz pénzintézettel kapcsolatosan 128 hírt gyűjtöttünk össze a 2007. június 1. és 2009. december 31. közötti időszakból. A híreket öt kategóriába csoportosítottuk, és az egyes kategóriáknak a részvényárfolyamokra gyakorolt, rövid távú hatását külön vizsgáltuk. Számításaink alapján a jelzálogpiaci válság során a befektetők pozitívan fogadták az állami feltőkésítéssel kapcsolatos bejelentéseket és a kielégítő védelmet nyújtó, átfogó kormányzati bankmentő csomagokat. A veszteségekkel, a leminősítéssel és az ECB intézkedéseivel kapcsolatos hírek esetén rövid távon nem tudtunk szignifikáns hatást kimutatni. A kutatás során a hírek számosságában igen, de a hírek által kiváltott hatás nagyságrendjében nem észleltünk jelentős különbséget a nyugat-európai és a középkelet- európai bankok között. ______ The research measures the impact of the subprime crisis on the shareholders of the banks being active in Central and Eastern Europe. The analysis focuses on the ten largest banks of the region measured by the asset size. The authors address the question whether the crisis affected more signifi cantly the large banks headquartered in Western Europe or the banks domiciled in Central and Eastern Europe. With the aim of capturing the short-term impact of various news on the shareholders of the banks, the popular event-study methodology with a one-day event window is employed. Within the period of 1 June 2007 and 31 December 2009, altogether 128 news were collected and grouped into fi ve categories (downgrades, loss, capital strengthening, governmental rescue packages, interventions of the ECB). Among others, the authors found empirical evidence that the shareholders appreciated the interventions of the governments: their capital injections resulted in signifi cant positive abnormal returns. Governmental rescue packages also resulted in signifi cant abnormal returns in the share price, however, the sign of the returns was unambiguous. No empirical evidence was found that in the short run the news in connection with loss announcements, downgrades and ECB interventions resulted in signifi cant abnormal returns. We concluded that although Western European banks and banks domiciled in Central and Eastern Europe differed in the number of news announced, the crisis affected the banks in both regions in a similar manner.

A költségvetési korlát megkeményítése a posztszocialista országokban = Hardening of the budget constraint in the post-socialist countries

A költségvetési korlát megkeményítése nem egyforma mértékben ment végbe minden posztszocialista gazdaságban. Egyes országokban messzire jutottak ebben a tekintetben, másokban viszont alig változott az indulóállapot. A tanulmány áttekinti a költségvetési korlát puhaságának különböző megnyilvánulásait: az állami támogatásokat, a puha adózást, a nem teljesítő bankkölcsönöket, a vállalatközi tartozások felgyülemlését és a kifizetetlen béreket. A jelenséget sokféle tényező okozza, amelyek többnyire együttesen jelentkeznek. Az állami tulajdon fenntartása kedvez a puha költségvetési szindróma megrögződésének, a privatizálás elősegíti a keményítést, de nem elégséges feltétele a kemény korlát érvényesítésének. Ehhez megfelelő politikai, jogi és gazdasági környezetet kell céltudatosan kialakítani. A posztszocialista átmenet kezdetén sokan azt hitték, hogy a hatékony piacgazdaság létrehozásához elegendő lesz megvalósítani a liberalizáció, privatizáció és stabilizáció "szentháromságát". Mára már kiderült, hogy a költségvetési korlát megkeményítése az említett három feladattal egyenrangúan fontos. Ahol ez nem valósul meg (például Oroszország), ott a privatizáció nem hozza meg a várt eredményt. ___________________ The budget constraint has not hardened to equal degrees in the various post-socialist countries. In some of them, a great deal has been done in this respect, while in others there has been hardly any change from the initial state. This study surveys the typical manifestations of softness of the budget constraint, such as state subsidies, soft taxation, non-performing loans, the accumulation of trade arrears between firms, and the build-up of wage arrears. Softness of the budget constraint is caused by several factors that tend to act in combination. Thus retention of state ownership helps to preserve the soft budget-constraint syndrome, while privatization encourages the budget constraint to harden, although it does not form a sufficient condition for it to happen. Purposeful development of the requisite political, legal and economic conditions is also required. It was widely maintained at the outset of the post-socialist transition that the 'Holy Trinity' of liberalization, privatization and stabilization would suffice to produce an efficient market economy. Since then, it has become clear that hardening the budget constraint needs to be given equal priority with these. Otherwise, the effects of privatization will fall short of expectations, as they have in Russia, for example.

Az államcsőd költségei régen és ma (Costs of sovereign defaults now and long ago)

Az államoknak nyújtott hitelekre gyakran gondolunk biztonságos befektetésként, lehetetlen vagy legalábbis valószerűtlen kimenetelként kezelve az államcsőd lehetőségét. Pedig államcsődök azóta vannak, amióta szuverén államok hitelt vesznek fel, és még csak nem is ritka eseményekről van szó. Amikor egy-egy válság vagy csődesemény felhívja erre a figyelmünket, a leggyakrabban elhangzó kérdés az, hogy miért következett be a csőd. Ebben a tanulmányban a szerző ennél furcsább kérdésre hívja fel a figyelmet: mi késztet egy hitelt felvevő államot arra, hogy visszafizesse hiteleit, vagyis miért nem megy csődbe? Ez rögtön felvet egy további, talán még meglepőbb problémát: miért kap egyáltalán egy szuverén állam hitelt? Ezekre a kérdésekre már régóta tudni véljük a választ: azért, mert az államcsődnek költségei vannak. A lehetséges költségek és a hozzájuk kapcsolódó empirikus kutatások értelmezésével és rendszerezésével, az ellentmondások feltárásával azonban a szerző felhívja a figyelmet arra, hogy bár elképzeléseink vannak és lehetnek, valójában nem ismerjük a törlesztést kikényszerítő és így az államadósságok létezését biztosító mechanizmusokat. Talán éppen azért nem, mert az államcsőd lehetséges politikai, gazdasági következményei - azaz költségei - idővel legalább annyira változnak, mint öltözködési, étkezési és közlekedési szokásaink. ____ Loans to sovereign states are often referred to as safe investments, treating default as an impossible or at least improbable event. Yet sovereign defaults have been arising ever since countries borrowed money. They are not rare at all. When a debt crisis or default event draws attention to the problem, the commonest question put is why defaults occur. This paper stresses the need to ask a less common question as well: why sovereign states repay loans, why they do not default. Consequent on that is why rational lenders give money to countries. The answer to these questions seems to be because defaults are costly. The paper reviews and systematizes possible cost types and explores inconsistencies in the related literature, to show that the mechanisms supporting the existence of sovereign debts are not precisely known. One reason why costs of defaults are challenging to study may be that the possible political and economic consequences of defaults change over time.

Can Europe recover without credit?

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Can Europe recover without credit?

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Breaking promises. The Hungarian experience

My main aim is to present the phenomena related to fulfilment and breach of promises and the economic, political and ethical problems arising from these. I discuss questions that we all meet with in daily life and see mentioned in the press, other forums of public discourse, gatherings of friends, or sessions of Parliament. There are some who complain that a building contractor has not done a renovation job properly according to contract. Economists argue over the outcome of late repayments on loans advanced for purchasing real estate. Opposition meetings chide the governing party over unfulfilled campaign promises. I am seeking what is common among these seemingly different cases. Can we see identical or similar behavior patterns and social mechanisms in them? Do they lead to similar decision-making dilemmas and reactions?

Banking Contagion under Different Exchange Rate Regimes in CEE

The global crisis of 2008 caused both liquidity shortage and increasing insolvency in the banking system. The study focuses on credit default contagion in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, which originated in bank runs generated by non-performing loans granted to non-financial clients. In terms of methodology, the paper relies on one hand on review of the literature, and on the other hand on a data survey with comparative and regression analysis. To uncover credit default contagion, the research focuses on the combined impact of foreign exchange rates and foreign private indebtedness.

Banking Contagion under Different Exchange Rate Regimes in CEE

The global crisis of 2008 caused both liquidity shortage and increasing insolvency in the banking system. The study focuses on credit default contagion in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, which originated in bank runs generated by non-performing loans granted to non-financial clients. In terms of methodology, the paper relies on one hand on review of the literature, and on the other hand on a data survey with comparative and regression analysis. To uncover credit default contagion, the research focuses on the combined impact of foreign exchange rates and foreign private indebtedness.

A magyar fiatalok jellemzése pénzügyi attitűdjeik és magatartásuk mentén – Vizsgálat a felsőoktatásban tanulók pénzügyi attitűdjeiről és magatartásáról = Characterization of the Hungarian youth with their financial attitudes and behaviours – A survey about the financial behaviour and attitudes of students

A pénzügyi piacok és termékek egyre komplexebbé válnak, ami együtt jár a pénzügyeket illető információs szakadék mélyülésével is – a lakosság egyre kevésbé képes pénzügyeiről körültekintő döntéseket hozni. Jelen tanulmány a magyar felsőoktatásban tanuló fiatalokat pénzügyi attitűdjeik mentén szegmentálja és jellemzi, annak érdekében, hogy hozzájáruljon a pénzügyi kultúra szintjét növelő programok sikerességéhez, legyen az állami indíttatású (pénzügyi edukáció) vagy a versenyszféra által vezérelt. A vizsgált fiatalok alapvetően három csoportba sorolhatók: (1) Konzervatívak, (2) Lázadók és (3) Tapasztaltak. A Konzervatívakra a stabil morális értékrend, alacsony kockázatvállalási hajlandóság jellemző, céljaik között egyaránt találunk rövid és hosszú távúakat is – informáltságuk, és ebből eredően pénzügyi ismeretszintjük alacsony, a hitelekkel szembeni attitűdjük negatív. A Lázadók csoportjára az „Élj a mának!” magatartás a jellemző, vagyis rövid távú céljaik vannak, kevésbé tudatosak, pénzügyi ismeretszintjük alacsony, ugyanakkor nyitottak az újdonságokra és a kockázatvállalási szintjük magasabb a másik két csoporténál. A Tapasztaltak csoportjára a tudatosság és a pénzügyi megfontoltság a jellemző – pénzügyi ismeretszintjük magasabb a másik két csoporténál. Náluk a hosszú távú célok dominálnak, de alacsony kockázatvállalási hajlandóság mellett. _____ Financial markets and financial instruments have become more and more complex in the last decades. Unfortunately, financial literacy of population cannot keep up with the innovation activity of financial sector. By segmenting and describing Hungarian young adults along their financial attitudes, the aim of this study is to provide recommendations to the programs aiming to enhance the development of financial literacy. According to the authors’ results, 18-25 year-old young adults can be categorized as (1) conservatives, (2) rebels and (3) experienced. Conservatives can be characterized by stable moral and values, low risktaking willingness and inappropriate financial knowledge. Both short and long term goals can be explored among their preferences. Conservatives have negative attitude to bank loans. The rebels can be described by the ancient Latin saying: “Carpe Diem”. They have short-term goals and the future financial stability is not an issue for them – their financial literacy is low. However, rebels are open-minded and their risk-taking willingness is greater than the other two group members. Despite of the low level of risk-taking willingness, the highest level of financial literacy is showed by the experienced group. They have long-term goals and are able to receive information about complex financial instruments.

The effect of focusing on loan decisions

In this paper we investigate some implications of recent results about salience on loan decisions. Using the framework of focus-weighted utility we show that consumers might take out loans even when that yield them negative utility. We claim however, that consumers are more prudent in their decisions and might be less likely to take out such loans when the usual fixed- and increasing-installment plans are coupled with a decreasing-installment option. We argue that harmful loan consumption, especially in the case of loans with increasing-installments (e.g. alternative mortgage loans), could be decreased if a policy would prescribe presentation of loan repayment schedules in a way that employs this effect. Moreover, using the model of focus-weighted utility we give a possible explanation for the unpopularity of decreasing-installment plans, the success of increasing-installment plans and their higher default rate during the financial crisis.

The effect of focusing on loan decisions

In this paper we investigate some implications of recent results about salience on loan decisions. Using the framework of focus-weighted utility we show that consumers might take out loans even when that yield them negative utility. We claim however, that consumers are more prudent in their decisions and might be less likely to take out such loans when the usual fixed- and increasing-installment plans are coupled with a decreasing-installment option. We argue that harmful loan consumption, especially in the case of loans with increasing-installments (e.g. alternative mortgage loans), could be decreased if a policy would prescribe presentation of loan repayment schedules in a way that employs this effect. Moreover, using the model of focus-weighted utility we give a possible explanation for the unpopularity of decreasing-installment plans, the success of increasing-installment plans and their higher default rate during the financial crisis.

Implicit rating: A potential new method to alert crisis on the interbank lending market

A new measure called “implicit rating” is introduced which might be a component of an early warning system. The proposed methodology relies on the aggregation of experts’ knowledge hidden in the transactional data of the interbank market of unsecured loans. Banks are simultaneously assessing the creditworthiness of each other which is reflected in the partner limits and in the interest rates. In the Hungarian interbank market the overall trading volume and the average interest rate did not show any negative trends before the crisis of 2008, however the average implicit partner limit started to decrease several months earlier, hence it might serve as a stress indicator.

Designing Choice Sets to Exploit Focusing Illusion

Focusing illusion describes how, when making choices, people may put disproportionate attention on certain attributes of the options and hence, causing those options to be overvalued. For instance, in deciding whether or not to take out a loan, people may focus more on getting the loan than on its small and dispersed costs. Building on recent literature on focusing illusion in economic choice, we theoretically propose and empirically test that focusing illusion can be advantageously exploited such that attention is put back on the ignored attributes. To demonstrate this, we use hypothetical loan decisions where people choose between loans with different repayment plans to finance a purchase. We show that when adding a steeply decreasing-installments plan to the original choice set of not borrowing or borrowing under a fixed-installments plan, the preference for the fixed-installments plan is lessened. This is because preference for the fixed-installments plan shifted towards not borrowing. We discuss potential applications of our results in designing choice sets of intertemporal sequences.