State Fragility and International Development Cooperation

Over the past few years addressing state fragility in the third world has become an important priority in international development cooperation. However, it seems that the international donor community has so far not been able to develop adequate instruments for dealing with the problems posed by state failure. We see two reasons for this: (i) there is growing recognition within the donor community that the lack of absorptive capacity, or bad economic policies in the partner country can actually make aid counterproductive, even harmful; and (ii) it is very difficult to manage effective development cooperation with weak governments. Channelling aid through NGOs, or giving limited aid in the form of capacity-building is clearly not sufficient to solve the problems fragile states face.

The impact of external market factors on operational practices and performance of companies

The links between operational practices and performance are well studied in the literature, both theoretically and empirically. However, mostly internal factors are inspected more closely as the basis of operational performance, even if the impact of external, environmental factors is often emphasized. Our research fills a part of this existing gap in the literature. We examine how two environmental factors, market dynamism and competition impact the use of some operational practices (such as quality improvement, product development, automation, etc.) and the resulting operations and business performance. The method of path analysis is used. Data were acquired through an international survey (IMSS – International Manufacturing Strategy Survey), which was executed in 2005, in 23 participating countries in so called "innovative" industries (ISIC 28-35) with a sample of 711 firms. Results show that both market dynamism and competition have large impact on business performance, but the indirect effects, through operations practices are rather weak compared to direct ones. The most influential practices are from the area of process and control, and quality management.

State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.