Quota bonuses in a principle-agent setting

Theoretical articles on incentive systems almost excusively focus on linear compensations, while in practice, nonlinear elements, eg. quota bonuses are not uncommon. Our article tries to bridge that gap and show how the use of quotas can increase the owners’ profit.

Quota bonuses as localized sales bonuses

Managerial bonus schemes and their effects on firm strategies and market outcomes are extensively discussed in the literature. Though quota bonuses are not uncommon in practice, they have not been analysed so far. In this article we compare quota bonuses to profit-based evaluation and sales (quantity) bonuses. In a duopoly setting with independent demand shocks we find that under certain circumstances choosing quota bonuses is a dominant strategy. This may explain the widespread use of quota bonuses in situations where incentive problems are relevant.

A villamos erőművek szén-dioxid-kibocsátásának modellezése reálopciók segítségével = Modelling of the carbon dioxide emissions of a power plant, using real options

A szerző egy, a szennyezőanyag-kibocsátás európai kereskedelmi rendszerében megfelelésre kötelezett gázturbinás erőmű szén-dioxid-kibocsátását modellezi négy termékre (völgy- és csúcsidőszaki áramár, gázár, kibocsátási kvóta) vonatkozó reálopciós modell segítségével. A profitmaximalizáló erőmű csak abban az esetben termel és szennyez, ha a megtermelt áramon realizálható fedezete pozitív. A jövőbeli időszak összesített szén-dioxid-kibocsátása megfeleltethető európai típusú bináris különbözetopciók összegének. A modell keretein belül a szén-dioxid-kibocsátás várható értékét és sűrűségfüggvényét becsülhetjük, az utóbbi segítségével a szén-dioxid-kibocsátási pozíció kockáztatott értékét határozhatjuk meg, amely az erőmű számára előírt megfelelési kötelezettség teljesítésének adott konfidenciaszint melletti költségét jelenti. A sztochasztikus modellben az alaptermékek geometriai Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-folyamatot követnek. Ezt illesztette a szerző a német energiatőzsdéről származó publikus piaci adatokra. A szimulációs modellre támaszkodva megvizsgálta, hogy a különböző technológiai és piaci tényezők ceteris paribus megváltozása milyen hatással van a megfelelés költségére, a kockáztatott értékére. ______ The carbon-dioxide emissions of an EU Emissions Trading System participant, gas-fuelled power generator are modelled by using real options for four underlying instruments (peak and off-peak electricity, gas, emission quota). This profit-maximizing power plant operates and emits pollution only if its profit (spread) on energy produced is positive. The future emissions can be estimated by a sum of European binary-spread options. Based on the real-option model, the expected value of emissions and its probability-density function can be deducted. Also calculable is the Value at Risk of emission quota position, which gives the cost of compliance at a given confidence level. To model the prices of the four underlying instruments, the geometric Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is supposed and matched to public available price data from EEX. Based on the simulation model, the effects of various technological and market factors are analysed for the emissions level and the cost of compliance.

Are parliaments with more parties cheaper to bribe?

We collect data about 172 countries: their parliaments, level of corruption, perceptions of corruption of parliament and political parties. We find weak empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that corruption increases as the number of parties increases. To provide a theoretical explanation of this finding we present a simple theoretical model of parliaments formed by parties, which must decide whether to accept or reject a proposal in the presence of a briber, who is interested in having the bill passed. We compute the number of deputies the briber needs to persuade on average in parliaments with different structures described by the number of parties, the voting quota, and the allocation of seats among parties. We find that the average number of seats needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases. Restricting the minimal number of seats a party may have, we show that the average number of seats to be bribed is smaller in parliaments without small parties. Restricting the maximum number of seats a party may have, we find that under simple majority the average number of seats needed to be bribed is smaller for parliaments in which one party has majority, but under qualified majority it hardly changes.