A technológiai fejlődés hatása a tartós eszközök gazdasági értékcsökkenésére (The effect of technological progress on economic depreciation of durable assets)

A cikk a tartós eszközök gazdasági értékcsökkenésének elméleti hátterét vizsgálja az eszközökben megtestesülő szolgálatok felemésztődése szempontjából. Ezt a felemésztődést az eszközök kimerülésén és elhasználódásán túl, a gazdasági környezetben megjelenő testet öltő és testet nem öltő technológiai fejlődés következtében fellépő avulás is befolyásolja, mely avulás hatását a cikk részletesen tárgyalja. A technológiai fejlődés következtében fellépő avulásnak igen fontos szerepe van az eszközökhöz, és azok használati módjához legjobban illeszkedő értékcsökkenési minta kirajzolásában, amely alapján meghatározott értékcsökkenés központi eleme a vállalkozások jövedelmének, valamint a vállalkozási output egységköltségének, ami az output árazásának fontos tényezője. Ezáltal az értékcsökkenés meghatározásánál figyelembe vett avulás hatással van a vállalkozás termék és tőkepiaci versenyképességére. ___________ The paper examines the theoretical background of durable asset’s economic depreciation, from the embodied services consumption point of view. This consumption is affected by the exhaustion and deterioration beyond obsolescence which is due to embodied and disembodied technological progress that appears in the economic environment. The effect of obsolescence on the economic depreciation is examined in this paper in detail. The obsolescence due to technological progress has an important role in determining the best fit depreciation pattern to the durable asset and its usage. The economic depreciation is a central component of the company’s income, as well as the unit cost of the company’s output, which is an important element of the output pricing process. Thereby the obsolescence recognised by determining economic depreciation influences the company’s competitiveness on the product and capital markets.

Megtakarítások és külső finanszírozás az amerikai gazdaságban. A hitelpiaci válság háttere (1997-2007) (Savings and external financing in the American economy. The background to the credit-market crisis (1997–2007))

A tanulmány nem az aktuális hitelpiaci válság enyhítésének kérdésével foglalkozik, hanem az amerikai gazdaság elmúlt négy évtizedének általános és az utolsó tíz évének konkrét beruházási-megtakarítási és növekedési tendenciáit igyekszik feltárni. Azt vizsgálja, hogy milyen mélyebb, belföldi eredetű szerkezeti okai vannak a nemzetközivé dagadt jelzáloghitel-válságnak. A cikk a nyitott gazdaság külső finanszírozással összefüggő mérlegazonosságainak alapján arra a következtetésre jut, hogy az ingatlanpiaci visszaesés és a kibocsátás zsugorodása az Egyesült Államok gazdaságában már több mint másfél évtizede kialakult kedvezőtlen, de még tovább romló belföldi megtakarítási folyamatok következménye. A jelzálogpiac krízise és a lakásépítés drámai visszaesése a túlfogyasztásra és túlhitelezésre ösztönző pénzügyi környezet eredménye. A lakáspiaci és a hitelezési ciklusok pénzügyi innovációkkal történő megnyújtása inkább növelte, mint csökkentette a kibocsátásingadozás érzékenységét. A legfőbb hitelezők Kína, Japán, Németország inkább dolláralapú amerikai vállalati felvásárlásokkal ellensúlyozták a dollárgyengülésből elszenvedett veszteségeiket. 1997-2007 között az Amerikából külföldön befektetett dolláraktívák - javarészt a valuta leértékelődése nyomán - jelentős hozamemelkedést élveztek, és számottevően tompították a belföldön képződött jövedelmek csökkenését. A dollárleértékelődés az eszköz- (és nemcsak az áruexport) oldalon is előnyöket hozott számos nagyvállalatnak. / === / Rather than dealing with the immediate policy steps to dampen the crisis, this paper attempts to reveal the worsening savings/consumption pattern of the US economy over the last ten years. Based on the closed logic of open-economy GDP-accounting, it argues that the current crisis is deeply rooted in shrinking public and private savings trends discernible as early as 1997. The current mortgage-market crisis and deep fall in new residential housing are products of a distorted financial environment that encourages over-borrowing and over-consumption. Expansion of the credit cycle through successive financial innovations has increased, not decreased output volatility. But the main foreign lenders to the US—Japan, China and Germany—have managed to offset their losses on US securities by buying into US companies. Large US firms have also benefited from rapid dollar depreciation as USD-denominated yields on their foreign assets experienced strong run-ups. The weak dollar has also helped American firms with large assets on foreign markets. So there were strong benefits for the US, not just on the goods-export side, but on the asset side, an aspect rarely emphasized.

The 3 per cent Barcelona Target: A Critical Appraisal of the Failure of the Lisbon Strategy’s Knowledgebased Economy and Society Project

Ten years after the unanimous approval of the Lisbon Strategy at a special meeting of the European Council on 23-24 March 2000 in Lisbon, it will be inevitable for the European Council, the European Commission and the majority of the EU member states to face with its fi asco and to account for the reasons of their fundamental policy, governance and economic failures in 2010. The recent turbulence of the global economy offers some excuses for the underperformance of the main objectives of the Lisbon Strategy in the essential social and economic domains, like job creation, economic growth, and environmental sustainability. Negative growth rates, macroeconomic and fi nancial instability, the contraction of the internal and external markets of the European economy, drop in demand for capital investment, goods and services, sinking corporate revenues, depreciation of corporate assets, increasing private and public indebtedness, falling rate of employment, weakening social cohesion, widening social inequality, and so forth not only deprive the majority of the EU member states of fulfi lling the main objectives of the Lisbon Strategy but also drive them into worse social and economic conditions in many policy domains than they were in 2000.

Can Europe recover without credit?

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Can Europe recover without credit?

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.