Between plurality and proportionality: an analysis of vote transfer systems

The paper considers a general model of electoral systems combining district-based elections with a compensatory mechanism in order to implement any outcome between strictly majoritarian and purely proportional seat allocation. It contains vote transfer and allows for the application of three different correction formulas. Analysis in a two-party system shows that a trade-off exists for the dominant party between the expected seat share and the chance of obtaining majority. Vote transfer rules are also investigated by focusing on the possibility of manipulation. The model is applied to the 2014 Hungarian parliamentary election. Hypothetical results reveal that the vote transfer rule cannot be evaluated in itself, only together with the share of constituency seats. With an appropriate choice of the latter, the three mechanisms can be made functionally equivalent.

Social change in Central and Eastern Europe: General trends and national patterns

The paper addresses five issue areas. First it describes the plurality of trajectories in central and eastern European transformations, offering a broad typology. Then it addresses the drift between acceptance of democracy and the market, owing to growing inequalities. Third, problems of poverty and exclusion are addressed. Fourth, it is addressed if any known model of redistribution emerged in the post-transition economies. Fifth, consequences of the populist turn in European policies are being analyzed. Influences of the EU practices will be dealt with and some preliminary conclusions drawn. These suggest a strong intertwining between social and economic performance that limit theoretically conceivable – neoliberal, social democratic, postmodern or conservative - policy choices.

Kérdőjelek a közgazdaságtanban és oktatásában = Challenges in economic research and education

Ez az esszé a teljesség igénye nélkül kísérli meg áttekinteni azt, hogy mire vezetett a közgazdaságtan világméretekben megindult és a 2008-2009. évi válság lezáratlansága miatt vélhetően évtizedes szinten zajló önvizsgálata. A tudományszak egészét egyszerre jellemzi egyfajta tartalmi kiüresedés és a társtudományokkal való erőteljesebb kapcsolatkeresés, a módszertanok és az iskolák egymás mellett élése - ami egyáltalán nem békés -, valamint a gyakorlat által felvetett kérdések elméleti általánosításának igénye. A magyar közgazdaságtan hagyományos követő szerepe megmaradt, viszont a képzésben szerzett negyedszázados tapasztalatok és az új globális kihívások lényegi átalakításokat indokolnának a mai, túlságosan egységesített képzésben. _____ This essay joins the soul-searching that has developed globally among economists since the financial crisis of 2008-2009, whose still open-ended outcomes make it likely that such self-critical reassessments will continue in the years to come. Economics is marked by the parallel existence of substantive hollowing and in-creased reliance on interfaces with neighbouring disciplines. So the plurality and none-too-peaceful coexistence of schools and methodologies is likely to persist. Similarly abundant are the attempts to theorize and generalize new phenomena in policy and business practices. Hungarian economics continues to be a follower - a trend-taker rather than trend-setter - as it was in the inter-war period. Experience has been accumulating for over 25 years in introducing Western-style higher education in economics. The increase of student numbers and steep decrease in public funding thereof call for major restructuring in curricula, institutions and teaching methods and styles alike.

Neural networks would 'vote' according to Borda's Rule

Can neural networks learn to select an alternative based on a systematic aggregation of convicting individual preferences (i.e. a 'voting rule')? And if so, which voting rule best describes their behavior? We show that a prominent neural network can be trained to respect two fundamental principles of voting theory, the unanimity principle and the Pareto property. Building on this positive result, we train the neural network on profiles of ballots possessing a Condorcet winner, a unique Borda winner, and a unique plurality winner, respectively. We investigate which social outcome the trained neural network chooses, and find that among a number of popular voting rules its behavior mimics most closely the Borda rule. Indeed, the neural network chooses the Borda winner most often, no matter on which voting rule it was trained. Neural networks thus seem to give a surprisingly clear-cut answer to one of the most fundamental and controversial problems in voting theory: the determination of the most salient election method.