3 resultados para launching sideline
em Corvinus Research Archive - The institutional repository for the Corvinus University of Budapest
Resumo:
Az eurpai gazdasgi integrci folyamata olyan knyszerhelyzetekben formldott a mltban, amelyek a kzgazdasgtudomnyban jl ismert lehetetlen hromsg alapjn is lerhatk. Az Eurpai Monetris Rendszer a rgztett rfolyam-mechanizmusra s nll jegybanki politikra ptett, korltozva a tkemozgsokat. A Gazdasgi s Monetris Uni ugyanakkor a tke szabad ramlsval s az rfolyamok visszavonhatatlan rgztsvel felszmolta a tagllami szint jegybanki autonmit. Az eurvezet mkdse egyszersmind arra a hromszoros tagadsra pl(t), hogy 1. nem lehetsges az eurvezetbl val kilps, 2. nem engedlyezett a kiments s 3. nem kerlhet sor llamcsdre. A 2008-ban Eurpt is elr pnzgyi s gazdasgi vlsg azonban elemi ervel mutatott r e hrmas tilts tarthatatlansgra. A gazdasgi kormnyzs krl kibontakozott vitk gy jl kzelthetk a hrom tilt szably egyidej rvnyeslse lehetetlensgnek bemutatsval, szmba vve az egyes opcik kltsgeit s lehetsges hasznait. / === / The process of economic integration in the EU has been shaped by the well-known theorem of the impossible trinity. Accordingly, the European Monetary System was built upon a mix of a fixed exchange-rate regime and an autonomous monetary policy, thereby constraining capital mobility. In launching the EMU project, the EU countries decided to fix national currencies irrevocably and maintain full capital mobility, in exchange for delegating their monetary policy upwards to a supranational level. The introduction of the Euro zone, however, has simultaneously meant denial of the following three elements: (1) exit, (2) bail-out, and (3) default. Nevertheless, the 20089 financial and economic crisis has demonstrated mercilessly that these three pillars are incompatible with each other. So the current debates on reshaping economic governance in the EU can be modelled by introducing the impossible trinity of denial, concentrating on the benefits and the costs of each option.
Resumo:
A jv kzigazgatsban az gyflbart gyflszolglat tbb olyan elektronikus csatornn is jelen lesz, amelyek csoportjt jelenleg az on-line internetkapcsolat, a mobiltelefon s az interaktv digitlis televzi, a jvben az on-line interaktv multimdia kpviseli. Az eurpai elektronikus kzigazgatsi fejldsi trend arra mutat, hogy a jvben internet, mobilinternet s/vagy intelligens kbel tv technolgit alkalmazva, egy virtulisan l gyintzvel beszlgetve juthat az gyfl informcihoz, foglalhat idpontot s indthat rdemi gyintzst. ________ In the course of futures customer friendly public administration there will be some info-communication channels which are represented today by the on-line Internet accessibility, mobile telephones, and interactive digital television and the forthcoming interactive multimedia. The European trend of the development of public administration relies on Internet mobile Internet and/or intelligent cable television technology employing virtual adminsitrators as real time partner sin obtaining office information, booking appointments or launching adminsitration workflow.
Resumo:
Az vek ta tart eurpai vlsgkezels lersa s a rszletek bemutatsa helyett a rgtnztt, politikai alapon hozott lpsek gazdasgelmleti rtelmezsre treksznk. Kutatsi alapkrdsnk a kvetkez: igaz-e mg a 70-es vek vgnek felismerse, ami szerint sem szerkezeti, sem szablyozsi eredet vlsgot nem lehet keresletlnktssel lekzdeni? Igaz-e, hogy a szuvern EU-tagllamokon bell brmi okbl hinyz bels elktelezdst nem lehet ptolni a kls fegyelmezssel? Ennek fnyben vizsgljuk a kltsgvetsi s a bankuni 2012 oktberben krvonalazott s jvhagyott tervezett is. _____ This paper attempts to provide a theoretical interpretation of new policy initiatives in the EU culminating in the launching of a fiscal and banking union in June, 2012. This step is reinforced by the new ECB strategy launched in September 2012. These measures were a result of a series of policy improvisations rather than of any secret master plan, still they add up to a new model of European integration. Our research question is if, and to what degrees the insights from the crisis of the 1970s hold. Accordingly no amount of easy money may remedy ills deriving from regulatory and structural inefficiencies. Second, we contend that no amount of external straightjacket/disciplining may replace domestic commitment of national governments in implementing structural reforms rather than fiscal adjustments on the margin.
