Is the Netherlands sustainable as a global-scale inner-city? Intenscoping spatial sustainability

Is the Netherlands sustainable or not? The answer inherently involves addressing the issues of system boundaries, statistical units and a vision of sustainability. As an analytical answer we offer the Intenscope (IS), a two-dimensional graphical tool based on dimensionless percentages of triple rate ratios which overcomes several limitations of sustainability analyses. First, it is not sensitive to the size of statistical units so an area with twice the amount of resources of another, with double the population (and double the total consumption) would have the same triple ratio of population:biocapacity:consumption. Second, the IS is sensitive to anomalies which may originate either from the use of arbitrary statistical units (e.g. the boundaries of a city) or those which may indicate truly unsustainable practices. To judge spatial sustainability we use ecological footprint data from which we construct a plausible country plot based on the IS. Despite the relative nature of IS-analyses, the employed consumption:biocapacity ratio inherently refers to the absolute limit of sustainability: we cannot continually use more resources on a global scale than nature provides us with. The analysis introduces some associations of human preferences and attributions of settlement types which may help to elaborate sustainability policies based on voluntary action.

Psychic Punishment Costs and Deterrence

In this paper we analyze criminal deterrence in the presence of specific psychic costs of punishments. We consider a dynamic model with three players, analyzing the choices of a representative lawmaker, potential criminal and judge. In our setting the lawmaker decides whether to introduce a fixed punishment enhancement above a chosen threshold of crime level, depending on its popularity among the voters. In reaction, the judge, who is influenced by her own preferences as well as the opinion of her peer group, might change the probability of punishment, through affecting the standard of reasonable doubt. Our results suggest that large discontinuous and mandatory increases in punishment can have unintended effects that are contrary to the stated goal of such punishment enhancements. In equilibrium, when either the judge or her peer group is "anti-punishment" enough, the level of criminal activity might increase in response to the punishment enhancement. This perverse effect is less likely to occur if there is a higher number of peer groups within the "elite", so that a greater extent of self-selection by judges can occur. Our results have relevance for a number of areas outside the traditional criminal justice system as well, such as special courts (such as ecclesiastical or military courts), or the strictness and enforcement of regulations.