A közép-kelet-európai bankfúziók eredményessége (The success of the bank mergers in Central Eastern Europe)

Az elmúlt években a nagy európai bankcsoportok egyre több közép-kelet-európai bankot vásároltak fel. Tanulmányunkban a bankfúziók értékteremtő hatását részvényesi szemmel elemezzük. A közép-kelet-európai régióban tevékenykedő hét legnagyobb bankcsoport 2000 és 2008 közötti akvizíciós tranzakcióit az eseményelemzés módszerével vizsgáljuk. Úgy tűnik, a részvényesek összességében értékelik a bankcsoportok akvizíciós törekvéseit: a fúziók kicsit több mint felében pozitív a kumulált abnormális hozam, és enyhén pozitív az összes esemény abnormális hozamának átlaga is. Számításaink során elsőként az egyes bankcsoportok felvásárlási stratégiáját értékeljük. A felvásárlás bejelentése körüli háromnapos időintervallumot alapul véve, a Raiffeisen és az OTP stratégiája tekinthető a legsikeresebbnek, míg az Erste felvásárlásai a legkevésbé eredményesnek. Ezt követően rávilágítunk arra, hogy eltérő befektetői szándékból ugyan, de mind a legmagasabb, mind a legalacsonyabb értékű ügyletek esetében a pozitív abnormális hozamú fúziók vannak túlsúlyban. Végezetül megállapítjuk, hogy az országhatáron átívelő ügyletek befektetői megítélése nem rosszabb az országhatáron belüli tranzakciókénál. /===/ The big European banking groups have been buying up more and more banks in Central Eastern Europe. The study analyses the value-enhancing effects of the mergers from the shareholder’s angle by examining by occurrence analysis methods the Central East European acquisition transactions of the seven biggest banking groups between 2000 and 2008. The shareholders as a whole seem to appreciate the acquisition activity of the banks: cumulative abnormal yield is positive in over half the mergers and average abnormal yield of all occurrences is mildly positive as well. The authors evaluate first the acquisition strategies of each banking group. Based on a three-day period round the acquisition announcement, Raiffeisen and OTP seem to have the most successful strategies and Erste the least successful. Light is then shed on investment intentions in each case, but mergers with a positive abnormal yield predominate among the highest and the lowest value transactions. Finally, the investor evaluation of cross-border transactions is no worse than for domestic ones.

Agency theory problems behind the fall of shopping centers

The present article assesses agency theory related problems contributing to the fall of shopping centers. The negative effects of the financial and economic downturn started in 2008 were accentuated in emerging markets like Romania. Several shopping centers were closed or sold through bankruptcy proceedings or forced execution. These failed shopping centers, 10 in number, were selected in order to assess agency theory problems contributing to the failure of shopping centers; as research method qualitative multiple cases-studies is used. Results suggest, that in all of the cases the risk adverse behavior of the External Investor- Principal, lead to risk sharing problems and subsequently to the fall of the shopping centers. In some of the cases Moral Hazard (lack of Developer-Agent’s know-how and experience) as well as Adverse Selection problems could be identified. The novelty of the topic for the shopping center industry and the empirical evidences confer a significant academic and practical value to the present article.

Post Crisis Lessons for Open Economies: Are They All New?

This paper will argue that the American economy could and will absorb the recent shocks, and that in the longer run (within a matter of years), it will somehow convert the revealed weaknesses to its advantage. America has a long record of learning from its excesses to improve the working of its particular brand of capitalism, dating back to the imposition of antitrust controls on the robber barons in the late 1800s and the enhancement of investor protection after the 1929 crash. The American economy has experienced market imperfections of all kinds but it almost always has found, true, not perfect, but fairly reliable regulatory answers and has managed to adapt to change, (e. g. Dodd-Frank Act on financial stability). The U.S. has many times pioneered in the elaboration of both theoretical and policy oriented solutions for conflicts between markets and government to increase economic welfare (Bernanke, 2008, p. 425). There is no single reason why it should not turn the latest financial calamities to its advantage. At the same time, to regain confidence in capitalism as a global system, global efforts are indispensable. To identify some of the global economic conflicts that have a lot to do with U.S. markets in particular, we seek answers to global systemic questions.

Measuring and managing liquidity risk in the Hungarian practice

The crisis that unfolded in 2007/2008 turned the attention of the financial world toward liquidity, the lack of which caused substantial losses. As a result, the need arose for the traditional financial models to be extended with liquidity. Our goal is to discover how Hungarian market players relate to liquidity. Our results are obtained through a series of semi-structured interviews, and are hoped to be a starting point for extending the existing models in an appropriate way. Our main results show that different investor groups can be identified along their approaches to liquidity, and they rarely use sophisticated models to measure and manage liquidity. We conclude that although market players would have access to complex liquidity measurement and management tools, there is a limited need for these, because the currently available models are unable to use complex liquidity information effectively.

Measuring and managing liquidity risk in the Hungarian practice

The crisis that unfolded in 2007/2008 turned the attention of the financial world toward liquidity, the lack of which caused substantial losses. As a result, the need arose for the traditional financial models to be extended with liquidity. Our goal is to discover how Hungarian market players relate to liquidity. Our results are obtained through a series of semistructured interviews, and are hoped to be a starting point for extending the existing models in an appropriate way. Our main results show that different investor groups can be identified along their approaches to liquidity, and they rarely use sophisticated models to measure and manage liquidity. We conclude that although market players would have access to complex liquidity measurement and management tools, there is a limited need for these, because the currently available models are unable to use complex liquidity information effectively.

State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.