Introduction of soft budget constraint as an analyzing tool into public management. The case of the Hungarian public administration reform

Public management reforms are usually underpinned by arguments that they will make the public administration system more effective and efficient. In practice, however, it is very hard to determine whether a given reform will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the public administration system in the long run. Here, I shall examine how the concept of the soft budget constraint (SBC) introduced by János Kornai (Kornai 1979, 1986; Kornai, Maskin & Roland 2003) can be applied to this problem. In the following, I shall describe the Hungarian public administration reforms implemented by the Orbán government from 2010 onward and analyze its reforms, focusing on which measures harden and which ones soften the budget constraint of the actors of the Hungarian public administration system. In the literature of economics, there is some evidence-based knowledge on how to harden/soften the budget constraint, which improves/reduces the effectiveness and hence the efficiency of the given system. By using the concept of SBC, I also hope to shed some light on the rationale behind the Hungarian government’s introduction of such a contradictory reform package. Previously, the concept of SBC was utilized narrowly in public management studies, mostly in the field of fiscal federalism. My goal is to apply the concept to a broader area of public management studies. My conclusion is that the concept of SBC can significantly contribute to public management studies by deepening our knowledge on the reasons behind the success and failure of public administration reforms.

Recent Developments in the Autonomy and Governance of Higher Education Institutions in Hungary: the Introduction of the Chancellor System

After the change of regime in 1989, Hungarian higher education started to return to its Humboldtian tradition. It was widely accepted that academic freedom could be guaranteed by high degree of institutional autonomy manifested especially in structures of self-governance and avoidance of direct state supervision/interventions. Attempts to introduce boards and other supervising bodies were successfully resisted until 2011. The new government coming into power in 2010, however, introduced new mechanisms of supervision and changed institutional governance and reduced institutional autonomy considerably. Changes in the selection of rectors, the appearance of state-appointed financial inspectors and the newly appointed Chancellors responsible for the finance, maintenance and administration of institutions are important milestones in this process. In the paper I review these developments focusing especially on the analysis of the Chancellor system.