Fiscal Federalism in Crisis: Lessons for Europe from the US

The euro area is facing crisis, while the US is not, though the overall fiscal situation and outlook is better in the euro area than in the US, and though the US faces serious state-level fiscal crises. A higher level of fiscal federalism would strengthen the euro area, but is not inevitable. Current fiscal reform proposals (strengthening of current rules, more policy coordination and an emergency financing mechanism) will if implemented result in some improvements. But implementation might be deficient or lack credibility, and could lead to disputes and carry a significant political risk. Introduction of a Eurobond covering up to 60 percent of member states’ GDP would bring about much greater levels of fiscal discipline than any other proposal, would create an attractive Eurobond market, and would deliver a strong message about the irreversible nature of European integration.

Fiscal adjustment and economic growth in the European Union

The current world economic crisis induced countries to launch wide-scale spending programmes all over the world. Member states of the European Union have not been an exception to this trend. While deficit spending may increase the aggregate demand, it can also accelerate indebtedness and make the required spending cuts politically risky later on. However, deficit financing is not a new phenomenon in the EU; it has been widely practiced in the last couple of decades. As the crisis seems to come to an end, countries with huge deficits should adopt exit strategies now, thereby reducing deficit and debt and reintroducing fiscal discipline, a requirement laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact. Nevertheless, former adjustment processes can provide ample evidence for successful and politically viable fiscal consolidations. In certain cases, even economic activity started to accelerate as a response to the welldesigned adjustment measures. Based on the previous experiences of EU states, the aim of this paper is, therefore, to identify the conditions that may determine a fiscal consolidation to be successful in terms of a reduced debt ratio and a positive economic growth.

Market reform and fiscal laxity in Communist and post-Communist Hungary: A path-dependent approach

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual framework in order to analyse and understand the twin developments of successful microeconomic reform on the one hand and failed macroeconomic stabilisation attempts on the other hand in Hungary. The case study also attempts to explore the reasons why Hungarian policymakers were willing to initiate reforms in the micro sphere, but were reluctant to initiate major changes in public finances both before and after the regime change of 1989/1990. Design/methodology/approach – The paper applies a path-dependent approach by carefully analysing Hungary's Communist and post-Communist economic development. The study restricts itself to a positive analysis but normative statements can also be drawn accordingly. Findings – The study demonstrates that the recent deteriorating economic performance of Hungary is not a recent phenomenon. By providing a path-dependent explanation, it argues that both Communist and post-Communist governments used the general budget as a buffer to compensate the losers of economic reforms, especially microeconomic restructuring. The gradualist success of the country – which dates back to at least 1968 – in the field of liberalisation, marketisation and privatisation was accompanied by a constant overspending in the general government. Practical implications – Hungary has been one of the worst-hit countries of the 2008/2009 financial crisis, not just in Central and Eastern Europe but in the whole world. The capacity and opportunity for strengthening international investors' confidence is, however, not without doubts. The current deterioration is deeply rooted in failed past macroeconomic management. The dissolution of fiscal laxity and state paternalism in a broader context requires, therefore, an all-encompassing reform of the general government, which may trigger serious challenges to the political regime as well. Originality/value – The study aims to show that a relatively high ratio of redistribution, a high and persistent public deficit and an accelerated indebtedness are not recent phenomena in Hungary. In fact, these trends characterised the country well before the transformation of 1989/1990, and have continued in the post-socialist years, too. To explain such a phenomenon, the study argues that in the last couple of decades the hardening of the budget constraint of firms have come at the cost of maintaining the soft budget constraint of the state.

Tanulságok a gazdasági és monetáris unió számára a 2008-as világgazdasági válság kapcsán (Lessons for the Economic and Monetary Union from the 2008 global economic crisis)

Írásunkban a 2008-ban kitört világgazdasági válságnak a Gazdasági és Monetáris Unióra gyakorolt hatásait elemezzük. Tanulmányunkban rávilágítunk a Gazdasági és Monetáris Unió két olyan problémájára, amelyek a válság után váltak igazán nyilvánvalóvá. Egyrészt a görög államcsődveszély, illetve egyes, korábban jól teljesítő országok botladozása jelzi, hogy a Monetáris Unió intézményrendszere legalábbis hiányos. A másik kérdés összefügg az előzővel, és azon országok szemszögéből érdekes, amelyek csatlakozni kívánnak a GMU-hoz: felerősödtek azok a vélemények, amelyek a csatlakozás elhalasztása mellett foglalnak állást. Tanulmányunk második részében ezt a kérdést járjuk körbe. / === / In our paper we are analyze the effects of the economic crisis of 2008 on the Economic and Monetary Union. We are focusing on two core problems of the EMU which came to surface only after the outbreak of the crisis. First, we address the fiscal problems of Greece and other member states which performed well before the crisis. These problems show that there are major institutional shortcomings in the Monetary Union. The second question is connected to the first one and concerns the new member states of the European Union and their strategies to join the Euro zone. After the crisis more and more voices in the new member states suggest postponing EMU membership.

Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European Countries

This paper studies the role of fiscal and monetary institutions in macroeconomic stability and budgetary control in central, eastern and south-eastern European countries (CESEE) in comparison with other OECD countries. CESEE countries tend to grow faster and have more volatile output than non-CESEE OECD countries, which has implications for macroeconomic management: better fiscal and monetary institutions are needed to avoid pro-cyclical policies. The paper develops a Budgetary Discipline Index to assess whether good fiscal institutions underpin good fiscal outcomes. Even though most CESEE countries have low scores, the debt/GDP ratios declined before the crisis. This was largely the consequence of a very favourable relationship between the economic growth rate and the interest rate, but such a favourable relationship is not expected in the future. Econometric estimations confirm that better monetary institutions reduce macroeconomic volatility and that countries with better budgetary procedures have better fiscal outcomes. All these factors call for improved monetary institutions, stronger fiscal rules and better budgetary procedures in CESEE countries.

Rules-based economic governance in the European Union: A reappraisal of national fiscal rules.

The economic and financial crisis of 2007/2009 has posed unexpected challenges on both the global and the regional level. Besides the US, the EU has been the most severely hit by the current economic crisis. The financial and banking crisis on the one hand and the sovereign debt crisis on the other hand have clearly shown that without a bold, constructive and systematic change of the economic governance structure of the Union, not just the sustainability of the monetary zone but also the viability of the whole European integration process can be seriously undermined. The current crisis is, however, only a symptom, which made all those contradictions overt that were already heavily embedded in the system. Right from the very beginning, the deficit and the debt rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact have proved to be controversial cornerstones in the fiscal governance framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, member states of the EU (both within and outside of the EMU) have shown an immense interest in adopting numerical constraints on the domestic level without hesitation. The main argument for the introduction of national fiscal rules was mostly to strengthen the accountability and credibility of national fiscal policy-making. The paper, however, claims that a relatively large portion of national rules were adopted only after the start of deceleration of the debt-to-GDP ratios. Accordingly, national rules were hardly the sole triggering factors of maintaining fiscal discipline; rather, they served as the key elements of a comprehensive reform package of public budgeting. It can be safely argued, therefore, that countries decide to adopt fiscal rules because they want to explicitly signal their strong commitment to fiscal discipline. In other words, it is not fiscal rules per se what matter in delivering fiscal stability but a strong political commitment.

Válságkezelés Európában: új gazdaságfilozófia felé? (Towards a New Philosophy of Crisis Management in Europe?)

Az évek óta tartó európai válságkezelés leírása és a részletek bemutatása helyett a rögtönzött, politikai alapon hozott lépések gazdaságelméleti értelmezésére törekszünk. Kutatási alapkérdésünk a következő: igaz-e még a 70-es évek végének felismerése, ami szerint sem szerkezeti, sem szabályozási eredetű válságot nem lehet keresletélénkítéssel leküzdeni? Igaz-e, hogy a szuverén EU-tagállamokon belül bármi okból hiányzó belső elköteleződést nem lehet pótolni a külső fegyelmezéssel? Ennek fényében vizsgáljuk a költségvetési és a bankunió 2012 októberében körvonalazott és jóváhagyott tervezetét is. _____ This paper attempts to provide a theoretical interpretation of new policy initiatives in the EU culminating in the launching of a fiscal and banking union in June, 2012. This step is reinforced by the new ECB strategy launched in September 2012. These measures were a result of a series of policy improvisations rather than of any secret master plan, still they add up to a new model of European integration. Our research question is if, and to what degrees the insights from the crisis of the 1970s hold. Accordingly no amount of easy money may remedy ills deriving from regulatory and structural inefficiencies. Second, we contend that no amount of external straightjacket/disciplining may replace domestic commitment of national governments in implementing structural reforms rather than fiscal adjustments on the margin.

On the new economic philosophy of crisis management in the European Union

This essay attempts to go beyond presenting the bits and pieces of still ongoing crisis management in the EU. Instead it attempts at finding the ‘red thread’ behind a series of politically improvised decisions. Our fundamental research question asks whether basic economic lessons learned in the 1970s are still valid. Namely, that a crises emanating from either structural or regulatory weaknesses cannot and should not be remedied by demand management. Our second research question is the following: Can lacking internal commitment and conviction in any member state be replaced or substituted by external pressure or formalized procedures and sanctions? Under those angles we analyze the project on establishing a fiscal and banking union in the EU, as approved by the Council in December 2012.