Production in advance versus production to order

We use a theoretical framework to compare production-in-advance type and production-to-order type environments. Carrying out our analysis in the framework of a symmetric capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game, we prove that the equilibrium prots are the same in case of production in advance and production to order. In addition, advance production results in higher prices than production to order if both games have an equilibrium in nondegenerated mixed strategies.

Patterns of dynamic changes in supply management – a triadic approach

Research has followed a network perspective of supply management from as early as the publication of Krajlic matrix. This portfolio approach is still static. Recently the triad is interpreted as the smallest unit of a network through which dynamics can be studied. Analyzing triads seems to be a promising way through which a deeper insight into the dynamics of supplier development can be gained. Using case study approach the paper investigates this dynamics with a special emphasis on coopetitive behavior. Analyzing a triadic sourcing setting operating in a make to engineer (and order) environment we show the importance of governance.

Endogenous choice of decision variables

In this paper we allow the firms to choose their prices and quantities simultaneously. Quantities are produced in advance and their common sales price is determined by the market. Firms offer their “residual capacities” at their announced prices and the corresponding demand will be served to order. If all firms have small capacities, we obtain the Bertrand solution; while if at least one firm has a sufficiently large capacity, the Cournot outcome and a model of price leadership could emerge.

Mixed duopolies with advance production

Production to order and production in advance has been compared in many frameworks. In this paper we investigate a mixed production in advance version of the capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game and determine the solution of the respective timing game. We show that a pure-strategy (subgame-perfect) Nash-equilibrium point exists for all possible orderings of moves. It is pointed out that unlike the production-to-order case, the equilibrium of the timing game lies at simultaneous moves. An analysis of the public firm's impact on social welfare is also carried out. All the results are compared to those of the production-to order version of the respective game.

Facets of operational performance in an emergency room (ER)

This paper, using detailed time measurements of patients complemented by interviews with hospital management and staff, examines three facets of an emergency room's (ER) operational performance: (1) effectiveness of the triage system in rationing patient treatment; (2) factors influencing ER's operational performance in general and the trade-offs in flow times, inventory levels (that is the number of patients waiting in the system), and resource utilization; (3) the impacts of potential process and staffing changes to improve the ER's performance. Specifically, the paper discusses four proposals for streamlining the patient flow: establishing designated tracks (fast track, diagnostic track), creating a holding area for certain type of patients, introducing a protocol that would reduce the load on physicians by allowing a registered nurse to order testing and treatment for some patients, and potentially and in the longer term, moving from non-ER specialist physicians to ER specialists. The paper's findings are based on analyzing the paths and flow times of close to two thousand patients in the emergency room of the Medical Center of Leeuwarden (MCL), The Netherlands. Using exploratory data analysis the paper presents generalizable findings about the impacts of various factors on ER's lead-time performance and shows how the proposals fit with well-documented process improvement theories. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.