Similarities and Differences in Polish and Hungarian History

In my lecture I would like to give a general introduction to a comparative approach of Polish and Hungarian history. I am convinced it could be not only an interesting, but a relevant issue as well. This approach could be touching emotionally for average Hungarian and Polish people because both nations strongly felt last centuries that they had common historical fate in East Central Europe. There is evidence which prove that Polish-Hungarian friendship is not only a modern phenomenon, but it is originated from the historical past. Historical memory calls the attention that Polish-Hungarian friendship was rooted already in the early modern history, and it was not constructed by historians, but a special relationship between the two nations was a widespread and accepted concept for the wider public in Hungary. I can cite the well-known proverb which represents it: „Pole and Hungarian – two good friends, joint fight and drinking are their ends.” In this lecture I don’t want to give a complete list of differences and similarities, but to call the attention to some interesting aspects of two nations’ common historical fate.

Are parliaments with more parties cheaper to bribe?

We collect data about 172 countries: their parliaments, level of corruption, perceptions of corruption of parliament and political parties. We find weak empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that corruption increases as the number of parties increases. To provide a theoretical explanation of this finding we present a simple theoretical model of parliaments formed by parties, which must decide whether to accept or reject a proposal in the presence of a briber, who is interested in having the bill passed. We compute the number of deputies the briber needs to persuade on average in parliaments with different structures described by the number of parties, the voting quota, and the allocation of seats among parties. We find that the average number of seats needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases. Restricting the minimal number of seats a party may have, we show that the average number of seats to be bribed is smaller in parliaments without small parties. Restricting the maximum number of seats a party may have, we find that under simple majority the average number of seats needed to be bribed is smaller for parliaments in which one party has majority, but under qualified majority it hardly changes.

Szemléletbeli dilemmák a Public-Private Partnership menedzsmentjében = Management dilemmas in Public-Private Partnership projects

A tanulmány a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) immanens logikai kihívásai közül két kiemelt kérdést elemez: az állami fél közszolgálati-közigazgatási beágyazottságából eredő dilemmákat, valamint az állami és a magánfél eltérő kulturális hátteréből eredő feszültségek jellemzőit. A PPP projektek gyakorlati megvalósítása szempontjából e két kardinális kérdés kifinomult elméleti hátterébe nyújt bepillantást. A közszolgáltatási dilemmák közül azonosítja és tárgyalja a jogszerűség vs. eredményesség, a hatékonyság vs. eredményesség, a centralizáció vs. decentralizáció, a közérdek vs. egyéni szabadságjogok védelme, valamint a kormányzat kicsinyítése vs. jogbiztonság védelme, és a vállalkozói szemlélet vs. közszolgálatiság közti egyensúlyozás kihívásait. Az állami és az üzleti fél kulturális különbözőségének központi motívumaként a döntéshozatalbeli különbséget ragadja meg, és a bizalom szerepét hangsúlyozza a működőképes modell megtalálásának lehetőségeként. = This study analyses two cardinal issues of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects’ immanent challenges: the management dilemmas of public services/governance, and the tensions between the private and public parties due to their different cultural imbeddedness. It provides theoretical insights into these two issues of practical relevance. As public service management dilemmas, it identifies the trade-offs between rights vs. effectiveness, efficiency vs. effectiveness, centralization vs. decentralization, protecting the public interest vs. individual freedom, minimizing government vs. protecting human rights, the entrepreneurial approach vs. public service ethos. The study captures the cultural difference between the public and the private parties in their different approaches to decision making, while it concludes that the role of trust is key in finding feasible solutions for PPP models.

Axiomatic Districting

In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the \optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.

Axiomatic districting

In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual votes (the "optimal gerrymandering rule"). As a corollary, we obtain that no districting rule can satisfy our axioms and treat parties symmetrically.