Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count

We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satises Arrow's "independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by xing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations ("Condorcet cycles"). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains.

The importance of institutions in expansionary fiscal consolidations. A critical assessment of non-Keynesian effects

The short-term effects of fiscal consolidation have attracted an increasing attention from both the academia and policy makers in the recent years. Authors in the literature on non- Keynesian effects usually put the emphasis on the need for the devaluation of the national currency, the accommodating reaction of the monetary authority and the favourable international economic conditions as the necessary accompanying tools of fiscal consolidation, in order to realise short-term expansionary effects. Some also add the necessity of large-scale adjustment; while others support the view that a high and increasing debt ratio or increasing government spending, by triggering an unavoidable adjustment, is the key to experiencing short-term expansionary effects. The composition of adjustment also became a crucial explanation for non-Keynesian effects. However, as the following critical assessment of the literature on expansionary fiscal consolidations will reveal, institutional conditions, such as the importance of the depth of financial intermediation and the influencing role of labour market structure, can prove to be crucial in the occurrence of the desired expansionary short-term effects.