Are parliaments with more parties cheaper to bribe?

We collect data about 172 countries: their parliaments, level of corruption, perceptions of corruption of parliament and political parties. We find weak empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that corruption increases as the number of parties increases. To provide a theoretical explanation of this finding we present a simple theoretical model of parliaments formed by parties, which must decide whether to accept or reject a proposal in the presence of a briber, who is interested in having the bill passed. We compute the number of deputies the briber needs to persuade on average in parliaments with different structures described by the number of parties, the voting quota, and the allocation of seats among parties. We find that the average number of seats needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases. Restricting the minimal number of seats a party may have, we show that the average number of seats to be bribed is smaller in parliaments without small parties. Restricting the maximum number of seats a party may have, we find that under simple majority the average number of seats needed to be bribed is smaller for parliaments in which one party has majority, but under qualified majority it hardly changes.

A közvetlen külföldi befektetések és a korrupció közötti kapcsolat (The connection of Foreign Direct Investment and corruption)

A szerzők tanulmányának középpontjában a közvetlen külföldi befektetések és a korrupció kapcsolata áll. Feltételezésük az, hogy a közvetlen külföldi befektetők a kevésbé korrupt országokat kedvelik, mivel a korrupció egy további kockázati tényezőt jelent a befektetők számára, amely növelheti a befektetések költségeit. Megítélésük szerint ezt kvantitatív módszerekkel érdemes vizsgálni, így elemzésük során 79 országot vizsgálnak meg tíz évre vonatkozó átlagokkal a Gretl-program és az OLS becslőfüggvény segítségével. Több modell lefuttatása után azt az eredményt kapták, hogy a közvetlen külföldi befektetők döntéseiben a korrupció szignifikáns tényező, a két változó között negatív korrelációt figyeltek meg. / === / The study focuses on the connection of Foreign Direct Investment and corruption. The authors assume that investors prefer countries where corruption level is lower, as corruption an additional risk factor that might increase the cost of investment. They believe that the best way to prove the previous statement if they use quantitative methods, so they set up a model where 79 countries are tested for 10 years averages, with the help of the Gretl and OLS estimator. After running several models their finding was that corruption is a significant factor in the decisions of foreign investors, and there is a negative correlation between corruption and FDI.

Korrupció: mérhetőség és modellezés = In the core of our study we focus on the connection of Foreign Direct Investment and corruption.

Tanulmányunk középpontjában a közvetlen külföldi befektetések és a korrupció kapcsolata áll. Feltételezésünk az, hogy a közvetlen külföldi befektetők a kevésbé korrupt országokat kedvelik, mivel a korrupció egy további kockázati tényezőt jelent a befektetők számára, amely növelheti a befektetések költségeit. Megítélésünk szerint ezt kvantitatív módszerekkel lehet a leginkább vizsgálni, így elemzésünk során 79 országot vizsgálunk meg 10 évre vonatkozó átlagokkal a GRETL program és az OLS becslőfüggvény segítségével. Több modell lefuttatása után azt az eredményt kaptuk, hogy a közvetlen külföldi befektetők döntéseiben a korrupció szignifikáns tényező, a két változó között negatív korrelációt figyelhetünk meg. ____ We assume that investors prefer countries where corruption level is lower, as corruption an additional risk factor that might increase the cost of investment. We believe that the best way to prove the previous statement if we use quantitative methods, so we set up a model where 79 countries are tested for 10 years averages, with the help of the GRETL and OLS estimator. After running several models our finding was that corruption is a significant factor in the decisions of foreign investors, and there is a negative correlation between corruption and FDI.

The corruption risks of EU funds in Hungary

In corruption, a group of players gain an economic advantage without providing any socially beneficial services in return, therefore corruption is considered to be a form of rent-seeking. Similar to other forms of rent-seeking, corruption causes losses on a societal level, due to the less efficient allocation of resources, as well as the costs of operation and prosecution. Fighting corruption is important not just because of ethical but also economic considerations. Contributions from the European Union are making possible the use of more funds than ever, and spending the full amount of this money is a priority preference of the government. The abundance of funds and the pressure on absorption increase corruption, by the managers of the funds overplanning the amount of money to be allocated to individual tender invitations, setting generous rules on eligible costs, and specifying low rates of own contribution wherever possible. As a result, the opportunities for rent-seeking are increased, as it is worth it for beneficiaries to carry out the project even after relinquishing part of the funds they have been awarded. Thus, the abundance of funds generates a sphere of corruption in which rent-seekers may appear on various levels of the system, often even without the knowledge or approval of those on higher decisionmaking levels.

Type of actors, objects of exchange, type of original transactions in the coverage of corruption

In the following analysis we deal with only specific corruption cases within our seven-country sample for content analysis (France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and the UK). Only 5,212 relevant articles dealt with such cases within the total sample (12,742). We focus here on providing a descriptive comparative analysis of the actors, types of transactions and country specifics. The second part of the analysis describes the actors involved in the corrupt transactions, while in the third section we deal with the object of exchange in corrupt transactions. The fourth section focuses on the type of transaction which is linked to the corruption. Finally, a summary of the results of our preliminary findings is provided.

Computer Assisted Content Analysis of the print press coverarge of corruption in Hungary

Coverage of corruption in the Hungarian media was analyzed using four online news portals. Three of them, Magyar Nemzet Online (short name: MNO, web: mno.hu), Népszava (web: nepszava.hu) and Heti Világgazdaság (web: hvg.hu) are also available as newspapers but the content of these papers is different from the online form to a certain extent. The news portal Origo (web: origo.hu) has no print version.