From eco-efficiency to eco-effectiveness: The policy-performance paradox

The internalisation level of sustainability issues varies among topics and among countries. Companies give up less internalised issues for more internalised ones. Discrepancies between legal, market and cultural internalisation lead to different escape strategies: firms develop a high level environmental management system and they have nice sustainability policy and reports. These achievements cover the fact that their total emission keeps increasing and they do not proceed in solving the most crucial global community or corporate governance problems. ‘Escaper’ firms are often qualified as ‘leading’ ones, as a current stream of research is also ‘escapist’: it puts too much emphasis on sustainability efforts as compared to sustainability performance. Genuine strategies focus on hardcore sustainability issues and absolute effects rather than on issues easily solved and having high PR effects. They allow for growth in innovative firms, if they crowd out less efficient or more polluting ones. They produce positive environmental value added when sector average eco-efficiency is used as benchmark and do not accelerate market expansion and consumerism.

More Than Words, Brand Destruction in the Online Sphere

The focus of this paper is brand destruction, however in a slightly different sense than the traditional marketing literature depicts it. The concept of brand destruction basically tends to be discussed either (1) as an accidental, counter-productive event in a campaign which leads to the ruining of the brand, or (2) an intentional act by competitors in the market, which results the same breakdown mentioned above. As this paper shows, there are other ways to consider as well, when speaking about brand destruction. An often overlooked type of brand destruction is a rather new phenomenon: destroying the brand by customers or business partners. The adequate scene for this case is the internet itself, especially different social media platforms, e. g. Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, Instagram, etc. Also popular weblogs can play an important role in brand destruction made by customers or business partners (general cases related to social media are depicted in Lipsman – Mud – Rich – Bruich, 2012). This paper presents a couple of cases in the online field and focuses basically on online communicative activities, in which a brand’s negative properties come to discussion. Both Hungarian and foreign examples are easy to find and they all demonstrate the growing power of consumers. This observation led marketing experts to start talking about the ‘smooth seizure of power by consumers’. Whilst the critic of this concept is considered to be relevant, this paper describes the elements and methods of the ‘seizure’ – from an online social point of view. The key of handling brand destruction cases efficiently lies in the role of social media users. They are not only consumers, but the opportunity for producing online contents is in their hands as well – this fact results in the idea of ‘prosumers’. Thus customers on social media platforms must be handled as a ‘critical mass’: as civic warriors with strong weapons in their armoury. No companies are allowed to feel safe, as the slightest error may well be punished by the crowd.

Spontaneous order and social norms. Hayek’s theory of socio-cultural evolution

Hayek’s theory of socio-cultural evolution is a generalization of his theory on spontaneous market order. Hayek explains both the emergence of market and social institutions serving as a social basis for that order within the framework of a unified evolutionary logic. This logic interprets the emergence and survival of spontaneous order and group-level rules of conduct as an unintended consequence of human action. In order to explain the emergence of social norms exclusively on the basis of methodological individualism, one would have to give up an exclusively evolutionary explanation of these norms. Since Hayek applies the invisible-hand explanation to the investigation of social norms, he combines the position of methodological individualism with functionalist-evolutionary arguments in his analysis. Hayek’s theory of socio-cultural evolution represents a theory in the framework of which methodological individualism and functionalism do not crowd out but complement each other.

Spontaneous order and social norms. Hayek’s theory of socio-cultural evolution

Hayek's theory of socio-cultural evolution is a generalization of his theory on spontaneous market order. Hayek explains both the emergence of market and social institutions serving as a social basis for that order within the framework of a unified evolutionary logic. This logic interprets the emergence and survival of spontaneous order and group-level rules of conduct as an unintended consequence of human action. In order to explain the emergence of social norms exclusively on the basis of methodological individualism, one would have to give up an exclusively evolutionary explanation of these norms. Since Hayek applies the invisiblehand explanation to the investigation of social norms, he combines the position of methodological individualism with functionalist-evolutionary arguments in his analysis. Hayek's theory of socio-cultural evolution represents a theory in the framework of which methodological individualism and functionalism do not crowd out but complement each other.

State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.