Közjó és demokrácia. Két közgazdaságtani elmélet a demokráciáról (Common good and democracy. Two economic theories of democracy)

A tanulmány a demokrácia két közgazdaságtani elméletét mutatja be. A demokrácia klasszikus elmélete a közjó fogalmára épült: a klasszikus politikai filozófia érvelése szerint a demokrácia intézménye a közjó megvalósulásának eszköze. Schumpeter bírálta a klasszikus elméletet: a közgazdasági szemléletet alkalmazva a közjó értelmezésére leválasztotta a demokráciáról a közjó fogalmát. Schumpeter szerint a demokrácia szubsztantív felfogása nem tartható, ezért ehelyett a demokrácia procedurális értelmezését kínálta fel. Az alkotmányos közgazdaságtan nem fogadja el sem a közjó és demokrácia fogalmainak elválasztását, sem a közjó szubsztantív értelmezését, ehelyett a közjónak és a demokráciának egyaránt procedurális értelmezését javasolja. _____ This essay deals with two economic theories of democracy. The classical doctrine of democracy was built on the concept of the common good, classical political philosophy arguing that the institution of democracy was the instrument for realizing the common good. This theory was criticized by Schumpeter, who applied the method of modern economics to analysis of the concept, which he separated from democracy, arguing that the substantive concept of democracy was untenable, and proposing to replace it with the procedural concept of democracy. Constitutional economics does not accept such separation of the concepts of democracy and the common good, but it does not accept the substantive interpretation of the common good either. Rather, it proposes a procedural concept of both the common good and of democracy.

The impact of creative organizational climate on the innovation activity of medical devices manufacturing firms in Hungary

The purpose of this study was to empirically investigate the impact of creative organizational climate on the innovation activity of medical devices manufacturing firms in Hungary. We applied a combined qualitative and quantitative research model, focusing on two firm’s case studies that are active in the above mentioned sector and differ to a substantial degree in their innovation activities. The connection between innovative climate and innovation was analyzed by comparing their organizational climate and perceptions of organizational members of innovation activities. Our findings revealed that classical models of creative organizational climate explain only partially the differences, although on the level of individual perceptions of climate and innovativeness we can find some connections. We found one factor that differentiated the two firms in terms of organizational climate in the predicted direction: the amount, quality, sincerity and depth of debates going on in the organization. The level of challenge (high involvement, commitment and challenging goals) and the time devoted to think about new ideas and innovative solutions (idea time) turned out to be contrary to the expectations based on previous research – although these results are less significant statistically. The results trigger further research into the sources of competitiveness in the Hungarian medical devices manufacturing sector.

The issue of macroeconomic closure revisited and extended

Léon Walras (1874) already had realized that his neo-classical general equilibrium model could not accommodate autonomous investment. Sen analysed the same issue in a simple, one-sector macroeconomic model of a closed economy. He showed that fixing investment in the model, built strictly on neo-classical assumptions, would make the system overdetermined, thus, one should loosen some neo-classical condition of competitive equilibrium. He analysed three not neo-classical “closure options”, which could make the model well determined in the case of fixed investment. Others later extended his list and it showed that the closure dilemma arises in the more complex computable general equilibrium (CGE) models as well, as does the choice of adjustment mechanism assumed to bring about equilibrium at the macro level. By means of numerical models, it was also illustrated that the adopted closure rule can significantly affect the results of policy simulations based on a CGE model. Despite these warnings, the issue of macro closure is often neglected in policy simulations. It is, therefore, worth revisiting the issue and demonstrating by further examples its importance, as well as pointing out that the closure problem in the CGE models extends well beyond the problem of how to incorporate autonomous investment into a CGE model. Several closure rules are discussed in this paper and their diverse outcomes are illustrated by numerical models calibrated on statistical data. First, the analyses is done in a one-sector model, similar to Sen’s, but extended into a model of an open economy. Next, the same analyses are repeated using a fully-fledged multisectoral CGE model, calibrated on the same statistical data. Comparing the results obtained by the two models it is shown that although, using the same closure option, they generate quite similar results in terms of the direction and – to a somewhat lesser extent – of the magnitude of change in the main macro variables, the predictions of the multi-sectoral CGE model are clearly more realistic and balanced.