A new epistemic model

Meier (2012) gave a "mathematical logic foundation" of the purely measurable universal type space (Heifetz and Samet, 1998). The mathematical logic foundation, however, discloses an inconsistency in the type space literature: a finitary language is used for the belief hierarchies and an infinitary language is used for the beliefs. In this paper we propose an epistemic model to fix the inconsistency above. We show that in this new model the universal knowledgebelief space exists, is complete and encompasses all belief hierarchies. Moreover, by examples we demonstrate that in this model the players can agree to disagree Aumann (1976)'s result does not hold, and Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)'s conditions are not sufficient for Nash equilibrium. However, we show that if we substitute selfevidence (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) for common knowledge, then we get at that both Aumann (1976)'s and Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)'s results hold.

Every hierarchy of beliefs is a type

When modeling game situations of incomplete information one usually considers the players’ hierarchies of beliefs, a source of all sorts of complications. Harsányi (1967-68)’s idea henceforth referred to as the ”Harsányi program” is that hierarchies of beliefs can be replaced by ”types”. The types constitute the ”type space”. In the purely measurable framework Heifetz and Samet (1998) formalize the concept of type spaces and prove the existence and the uniqueness of a universal type space. Meier (2001) shows that the purely measurable universal type space is complete, i.e., it is a consistent object. With the aim of adding the finishing touch to these results, we will prove in this paper that in the purely measurable framework every hierarchy of beliefs can be represented by a unique element of the complete universal type space.