The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

The Shapley value for airport and irrigation games

In this paper cost sharing problems are considered. We focus on problems given by rooted trees, we call these problems cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called irrigation games. A formal notion of irrigation games is introduced, and the characterization of the class of these games is provided. The well-known class of airport games Littlechild and Thompson (1977) is a subclass of irrigation games. The Shapley value Shapley (1953) is probably the most popular solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games. Dubey (1982) and Moulin and Shenker (1992) show respectively, that Shapley's Shapley (1953) and Young (1985)'s axiomatizations of the Shapley value are valid on the class of airport games. In this paper we show that Dubey (1982)'s and Moulin and Shenker (1992)'s results can be proved by applying Shapley (1953)'s and Young (1985)'s proofs, that is those results are direct consequences of Shapley (1953)'s and Young (1985)'s results. Furthermore, we extend Dubey (1982)'s and Moulin and Shenker (1992)'s results to the class of irrigation games, that is we provide two characterizations of the Shapley value for cost sharing problems given by rooted trees. We also note that for irrigation games the Shapley value is always stable, that is it is always in the core Gillies (1959).

The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

Fogalmak, módszerek. Páros összehasonlításokon alapuló rangsorolási módszerek (Ranking methods based on paired comparisons)

A páronként összehasonlított alternatívák rangsorolásának problémája egyaránt felmerül a szavazáselmélet, a statisztika, a tudománymetria, a pszichológia és a sport területén. A nemzetközi szakirodalom alapján részletesen áttekintjük a megoldási lehetőségeket, bemutatjuk a gyakorlati alkalmazások során fellépő kérdések kezelésének, a valós adatoknak megfelelő matematikai környezet felépítésének módjait. Kiemelten tárgyaljuk a páros összehasonlítási mátrix megadását, az egyes pontozási eljárásokat és azok kapcsolatát. A tanulmány elméleti szempontból vizsgálja a Perron-Frobenius tételen alapuló invariáns, fair bets, PageRank, valamint az irányított gráfok csúcsainak rangsorolásra javasolt internal slackening és pozíciós erő módszereket. A közülük történő választáshoz az axiomatikus megközelítést ajánljuk, ennek keretében bemutatjuk az invariáns és a fair bets eljárások karakterizációját, és kitérünk a módszerek vitatható tulajdonságaira. _____ The ranking of the alternatives or selecting the best one are fundamental issues of social choice theory, statistics, psychology and sport. Different solution concepts, and various mathematical models of applications are reviewed based on the international literature. We are focusing on the de¯nition of paired comparison matrix, on main scoring procedures and their relation. The paper gives a theoretical analysis of the invariant, fair bets and PageRank methods, which are founded on Perron-Frobenius theorem, as well as the internal slackening and positional power procedures used for ranking the nodes of a directed graph. An axiomatic approach is proposed for the choice of an appropriate method. Besides some known characterizations for the invariant and fair bets methods, we also discuss the violation of some properties, meaning their main weakness.

Properties of risk capital allocation methods: Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity

In finance risk capital allocation raises important questions both from theoretical and practical points of view. How to share risk of a portfolio among its subportfolios? How to reserve capital in order to hedge existing risk and how to assign this to different business units? We use an axiomatic approach to examine risk capital allocation, that is we call for fundamental properties of the methods. Our starting point is Csóka and Pintér (2011) who show by generalizing Young (1985)'s axiomatization of the Shapley value that the requirements of Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity are irreconcilable given that risk is quantified by a coherent measure of risk. In this paper we look at these requirements using analytic and simulations tools. We examine allocation methods used in practice and also ones which are theoretically interesting. Our main result is that the problem raised by Csóka and Pintér (2011) is indeed relevant in practical applications, that is it is not only a theoretical problem. We also believe that through the characterizations of the examined methods our paper can serve as a useful guide for practitioners.