A kvázi- és általánosított hiperbolikus diszkontálás hosszú távon (Quasi- and Generalized Hyperbolic Discounting in Long Term)

Az intertemporális döntések fontos szerepet játszanak a közgazdasági modellezésben, és azt írják le, hogy milyen átváltást alkalmazunk két különböző időpont között. A közgazdasági modellezésben az exponenciális diszkontálás a legelterjedtebb, annak ellenére, hogy az empirikus vizsgálatok alapján gyenge a magyarázó ereje. A gazdaságpszichológiában elterjedt általánosított hiperbolikus diszkontálás viszont nagyon nehezen alkalmazható közgazdasági modellezési célra. Így tudott gyorsan elterjedni a kvázi-hiperbolikus diszkontálási modell, amelyik úgy ragadja meg a főbb pszichológiai jelenségeket, hogy kezelhető marad a modellezés során. A cikkben azt állítjuk, hogy hibás az a megközelítés, hogy hosszú távú döntések esetén, főleg sorozatok esetén helyettesíthető a két hiperbolikus diszkontálás egymással. Így a hosszú távú kérdéseknél érdemes felülvizsgálni a kvázi-hiperbolikus diszkontálással kapott eredményeket, ha azok az általánosított hiperbolikus diszkontálási modellel való helyettesíthetőséget feltételezték. ____ Intertemporal choice is one of the crucial questions in economic modeling and it describes decisions which require trade-offs among outcomes occurring in different points in time. In economic modeling the exponential discounting is the most well known, however it has weak validity in empirical studies. Although according to psychologists generalized hyperbolic discounting has the strongest descriptive validity it is very complex and hard to use in economic models. In response to this challenge quasi-hyperbolic discounting was proposed. It has the most important properties of generalized hyperbolic discounting while tractability remains in analytical modeling. Therefore it is common to substitute generalized hyperbolic discounting with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. This paper argues that the substitution of these two models leads to different conclusions in long term decisions especially in the case of series; hence all the models that use quasi-hyperbolic discounting for long term decisions should be revised if they states that generalized hyperbolic discounting model would have the same conclusion.

On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games

The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) also implements the L-Nash solution.

A Harrod modell strukturális stabilitása (Structural stability of the Harrod model)

In this study it is shown that the nontrivial hyperbolic fixed point of a nonlinear dynamical system, which is formulated by means of the adaptive expectations, corresponds to the unstable equilibrium of Harrod. We prove that this nonlinear dynamical (in the sense of Harrod) model is structurally stable under suitable economic conditions. In the case of structural stability, small changes of the functions (C1-perturbations of the vector field) describing the expected and the true time variation of the capital coefficients do not influence the qualitative properties of the endogenous variables, that is, although the trajectories may slightly change, their structure is the same as that of the unperturbed one, and therefore these models are suitable for long-time predictions. In this situation the critique of Lucas or Engel is not valid. There is no topological conjugacy between the perturbed and unperturbed models; the change of the growth rate between two levels may require different times for the perturbed and unperturbed models.