Aid Allocation of the Emerging Central and Eastern European Donors

The paper examines the main characteristics of the (re)emerging foreign aid policies of the Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), concentrating on the allocation of their aid resources. We adopt an econometric approach, similar to the ones used in the literature for analyzing the aid allocation of the OECD DAC donors. Using this approach, we examine the various factors that influence aid allocation of the Visegrád countries, using data for the years between 2001 and 2008. Our most important conclusion is that the amount of aid a partner county gets from the four emerging donors is not influenced by the level of poverty or the previous performance (measured by the level of economic growth or the quality of institutions) of the recipients. The main determining factor seems to be geographic proximity, as countries in the Western-Balkans and the Post-Soviet region receive much more aid from the Visegrád countries than other recipients. Historical ties (pre-1989 development relations) and international obligations in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq are also found to be significant explanatory factors. This allocation is in line with the foreign political and economic interests of these new donors. While there are clear similarities between the four donors, the paper also identifies some individual country characteristics.

Aid Allocation of the Emerging Central and Eastern European Donors

The paper examines the main characteristics of the (re)emerging foreign aid policies of the Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), concentrating on the allocation of their aid resources. We adopt an econometric approach, similar to the ones used in the literature for analyzing the aid allocation of the OECD DAC donors. Using this approach, we examine the various factors that influence aid allocation of the Visegrád countries, using data for the years between 2001 and 2008. Our most important conclusion is that the amount of aid a partner county gets from the four emerging donors is not influenced by the level of poverty or the previous performance (measured by the level of economic growth or the quality of institutions) of the recipients. The main determining factor seems to be geographic proximity, as countries in the Western-Balkans and the Post-Soviet region receive much more aid from the Visegrád countries than other recipients. Historical ties (pre-1989 development relations) and international obligations in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq are also found to be significant explanatory factors. This allocation is in line with the foreign political and economic interests of these new donors. While there are clear similarities between the four donors, the paper also identifies some individual country characteristics.

On the impossibility of fair risk allocation

Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying the natural requirements of (Solution) Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games.

Tőkeallokáció nem likvid portfóliók esetén (Risk capital allocation in case of illiquid portfolios)

A kockázat jó mérése és elosztása elengedhetetlen a bankok, biztosítók, befektetési alapok és egyéb pénzügyi vállalkozások belső tőkeallokációjához vagy teljesítményértékeléséhez. A cikkben bemutatjuk, hogy a koherens kockázati mértékek axiómáit nem likvid portfóliók esetén is el lehet várni. Így mérve a kockázatot, ismertetünk a kockázatelosztásra vonatkozó két kooperatív játékelméleti cikket. Az első optimista, eszerint mindig létezik stabil, az alegységek minden koalíciója által elfogadható, általános módszer a kockázat (tőke) elosztására. A második cikk pesszimista, mert azt mondja ki, hogy ha a stabilitás mellett igazságosak is szeretnénk lenni, akkor egy lehetetlenségi tételbe ütközünk. / === / Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to fi nancial risk. We argue that the axioms of coherent measures of risk are valid for illiquid portfolios as well. Then, we present the results of two papers on allocating risk measured by a coherent measure of risk. Assume a bank has some divisions. According to the fi rst paper there is always a stable allocation of risk capital, which is not blocked by any coalition of the divisions, that is there is a core compatible allocation rule (we present some examples for risk allocation rules). The second paper considers two more natural requirements, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. Equal Treatment Property makes sure that similar divisions are treated symmetrically, that is if two divisions make the same marginal risk contribution to all the coalition of divisions not containing them, then the rule should allocate them the very same risk capital. Strong Monotonicity requires that if the risk environment changes in such a way that the marginal contribution of a division is not decreasing, then its allocated risk capital should not decrease either. However, if risk is evaluated by any coherent measure of risk, then there is no risk allocation rule satisfying Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity, we encounter an impossibility result.

On the impossibility of fair risk allocation

Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using coherent measures of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying simultaneously the natural requirements of Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games.

The Polluter Profits Principle: A Note on the Grandfathering of CO2 Emissions Rights in Lax-Cap Trading Regimes

Grandfathering is currently the main principle for the initial allocation of tradable CO2 emission rights under the European cap-and-trade scheme. Furthermore, political feasibility often requires non-restrictive emission caps. Grandfathering under lax cap is unjust, biased and brings polluters unintended windfall profits. Still, in any post-Kyoto international CO2 regime, lax caps may be critical in coaxing binding emission targets out of more countries, especially those in the less-developed world. This paper argues that there is a certain quantity of emission rights between the initial and the optimal emissions, the grandfathering of which brings polluters zero windfall profits or zero windfall losses. Our theoretical concept of zero-windfall grandfathering can be used to demonstrate the windfall profits that have emerged at company level during the first EU trading period. It might thus encourage governments to embrace auctioning, and to combine it with grandfathering as a legitimate tool in the initial allocation of emission rights in later trading regimes.

A way of explaining unemployment through a wage-setting game

We investigate a duopsonistic wage-setting game in which the rms have a limited number of workplaces. We assume that the rms have heterogeneous productivity, that there are two types of workers with dierent reservation wages and that a worker's productivity is independent of his type. We show that equilibrium unem- ployment arises in the wage-setting game under certain conditions, although the efficient allocation of workers would result in full employment.

Többéves pénzügyi keret vitája középről és a sor végéről – Magyarország és Lettország harcban a mezőgazdasági és kohéziós támogatásokért (Debate on the eu multiannual financial framework from the view of Hungary and Latvia)

Az Európai Bizottság 2011. júniusban nyilvánosságra hozott, a következő hétéves időszakot meghatározó pénzügyi keretéről szóló javaslatával elindult a tagállamok, illetve az intézmények közötti szakmai és politikai érvelés, az alkudozások sora. A két legfontosabb költségvetési tétel, a mezőgazdasági támogatások és a kohéziós források előnyös allokációja Magyarország és Lettország számára is kiemelt prioritás. A tárgyalások során Lettország érdeke az alacsony közvetlen mezőgazdasági támogatások emelése, míg Magyarország kedvező pozíciójának megtartásáért harcol. A kohéziós politikára tett Bizottsági javaslat mindkét ország számára hátrányos, így közös érdek a források összegének szinten tartása és a kedvezőtlen támogatási felső határ emelése. ______ Following the European Commission’s proposal on the next Multiannual Financial Framework was published in June 2011, tense debate started to defend national priorities. The proper allocation of the agricultural and cohesion founds is essential for both, Hungary and Latvia as well. Latvia’s objectives is to introduce fair direct payments to farmers, stipulating that the lowest payments must constitute at least 80 per cent of the average amount of the EU direct payments, while Hungary tries to defend its relatively favourable position by receiving almost the amount of the EU average. Common interest for Hungary and for Latvia in the EU budget talks is to retain cohesion financing at least at the current level and to change the unfavourable proposal on capping.

A szervezet kockázati attitűdjének jelentősége a szerződéses kapcsolatokban (Significance of the organizational risk attitude on the contractual relations)

A tanulmány azt vizsgálja, milyen befolyással van a szervezetek kockázati attitűdje az általuk kötött szerződésre, elsősorban a projektszintű kockázatok megosztására. Esettanulmányként egy PPP-projekt szerződését használja fel, amely jól szemlélteti, hogy az eltérő kockázati magatartású szervezetek egymás közötti kockázatallokációja eltér az optimálistól. A konkrét esetben a közösségi aktor kerül kockázati aspektusból hátrányos helyzetbe. A vizsgálat eredménye, hogy meghatároz néhány kulcsparamétert, melyek a felek kockázati szempontból nyertes vagy vesztes pozícióját döntő módon befolyásolják. ___________ This paper examines the influence of the risk attitude of organizations on the contracts made by them, especially on allocation of the project level risk. A PPP project contract is used as a case study, because it illustrates expressively that the risk allocation between the concerned organiza tions with different risk attitudes differs from the optimal version. In this very case the public actor's position becomes disadvantageous. Specification some of the key parameters able to determine the winner or loser position of the risk taken parties is defined as the outcome of this study.

Improved stochastic optimization of railway timetables

We present a general model to find the best allocation of a limited amount of supplements (extra minutes added to a timetable in order to reduce delays) on a set of interfering railway lines. By the best allocation, we mean the solution under which the weighted sum of expected delays is minimal. Our aim is to finely adjust an already existing and well-functioning timetable. We model this inherently stochastic optimization problem by using two-stage recourse models from stochastic programming, building upon earlier research from the literature. We present an improved formulation, allowing for an efficient solution using a standard algorithm for recourse models. We show that our model may be solved using any of the following theoretical frameworks: linear programming, stochastic programming and convex non-linear programming, and present a comparison of these approaches based on a real-life case study. Finally, we introduce stochastic dependency into the model, and present a statistical technique to estimate the model parameters from empirical data.

Economic reform, allocative effiency and terms of trade

It has widely been agreed that the distorted price system is one of the causes of inefficient ecooomic decisions in centrally planned economies. The paper investigates the possible effect of a price reform on the allocation of resources in a situation where micro-efficiency remains unchanged. Foreign trade and endogenously induced terms-of-trade changes are focal points ín the multisectoral applied general equilibrium analysis. Special attention is paid to some methodological problems connected to the representation of foreign trade in such models. The adoption of Armington's assumption leads to an export demand function and this in turn gives rise to the question of optimal export structure, different from the equilibrium one-an aspect so far neglected in the related literature. The results show, that the applied model allows for a more flexible handling of the overspecialization problem, than the linear programming models. It also becomes evident that the use of export demand functions brings unwanted terms-of-trade changes into the model, to be avoided by a suitable reformulation of the model. The analysis also suggests, that a price reform alone does not significantly increase global economic efficiency. Thus the effect of an economic reform on micro-efficiency appears to be a more crucial factor. The author raises in conclusion some rather general questions related to the foreign trade practice of small open economies.

The corruption risks of EU funds in Hungary

In corruption, a group of players gain an economic advantage without providing any socially beneficial services in return, therefore corruption is considered to be a form of rent-seeking. Similar to other forms of rent-seeking, corruption causes losses on a societal level, due to the less efficient allocation of resources, as well as the costs of operation and prosecution. Fighting corruption is important not just because of ethical but also economic considerations. Contributions from the European Union are making possible the use of more funds than ever, and spending the full amount of this money is a priority preference of the government. The abundance of funds and the pressure on absorption increase corruption, by the managers of the funds overplanning the amount of money to be allocated to individual tender invitations, setting generous rules on eligible costs, and specifying low rates of own contribution wherever possible. As a result, the opportunities for rent-seeking are increased, as it is worth it for beneficiaries to carry out the project even after relinquishing part of the funds they have been awarded. Thus, the abundance of funds generates a sphere of corruption in which rent-seekers may appear on various levels of the system, often even without the knowledge or approval of those on higher decisionmaking levels.

On Probabilistic Rationing Methods

Rationing occurs if the demand for a certain good exceeds its supply. In such situations a rationing method has to be specified in order to determine the allocation of the scarce good to the agents. Moulin (1999) introduced the notion of probabilistic rationing methods for the discrete framework. In this paper we establish a link between classical and probabilistic rationing methods. In particular, we assign to any given classical rationing method a probabilistic rationing method with minimal variance among those probabilistic rationing methods, which result in the same expected distributions as the given classical rationing method.

Are parliaments with more parties cheaper to bribe?

We collect data about 172 countries: their parliaments, level of corruption, perceptions of corruption of parliament and political parties. We find weak empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that corruption increases as the number of parties increases. To provide a theoretical explanation of this finding we present a simple theoretical model of parliaments formed by parties, which must decide whether to accept or reject a proposal in the presence of a briber, who is interested in having the bill passed. We compute the number of deputies the briber needs to persuade on average in parliaments with different structures described by the number of parties, the voting quota, and the allocation of seats among parties. We find that the average number of seats needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases. Restricting the minimal number of seats a party may have, we show that the average number of seats to be bribed is smaller in parliaments without small parties. Restricting the maximum number of seats a party may have, we find that under simple majority the average number of seats needed to be bribed is smaller for parliaments in which one party has majority, but under qualified majority it hardly changes.