Négy jellegzetesség. A magyar fejlődés politikai gazdaságtani megközelítésben. 1. rész = Four characteristic features. Development in Hungary from the aspect of political economy. First Part

A két részből álló cikk a magyarországi reformfolyamat és posztszocialista átalakulás négy olyan jellegzetességét emeli ki, amelyek megszakítás nélkül, a politikai szférában bekövetkezett rendszerváltást követően is, folyamatosan jellemezték az elmúlt harminc év fejlődését: a lakosság anyagi jólétének prioritása, erős paternalista jóléti állam, a reformfolyamat és átmenet fokozatossága és a politikai nyugalom. Az 1995. március 12­én bejelentett stabilizációs program - amennyiben megvalósul - jelenthet elmozdulást ezektől a jellegzetességektől. A cikk politikai gazdaságtani megközelítésben vizsgálja, hogy miért alakult ki ez a négy jellegzetesség, miképpen hatottak azok egymásra, milyen kedvező és kedvezőtlen hatásokat fejtettek ki. Az első rész az 1956­os forradalom hatásából kiindulva politikatörténeti áttekintést ad, majd a mai jólét, biztonság és nyugalom prioritását és a társadalmi adósság felhalmozódását, végül a stabilizációs program gazdasági és politikai hatásait elemzi. / === / The article, consisting of two parts, emphasizes four characteristic features of the Hungarian reform process and the post­socialist transformation, which, uninterruptedly, characterized the development over the last thirty years, even after the systemic change in the political sphere. These were: priority of the material welfare of the population, a strong, paternalistic welfare state, the gradual progress of the reform process and the transition, as well as political calmness. The stabilization programme, announced on March 12,1995, may imply - if it materializes - a shift away from these characteristics. The article investigates, from the aspect of political economy, why the four characteristic features had developed, how they affected each other and what were their advantageous and disadvantageous impacts. Setting out from the impacts of the 1956 revolution, the first part gives an overview of political history and then analyses the priority of today's welfare, security and calm as well as the accumulation of societal debt and, finally, the economic and political impacts of the stabilization programme.

Market reform and state paternalism in Hungary: a path-dependent approach

Hungary is one of the worst-hit countries of the current financial crisis in Central and Eastern Europe. The deteriorating economic performance of the country is, however, not a recent phenomenon. A relatively high ratio of redistribution, a high and persistent public deficit and accelerated indebtedness characterised the country not just in the last couple of years but also well before the transformation, which also continued in the postsocialist years. The gradualist success of the country – which dates back to at least 1968 – in the field of liberalisation, marketisation and privatisation was accompanied by a constant overspending in the general government. The paper attempts to explore the reasons behind policymakers’ impotence to reform public finances. By providing a path-dependent explanation, it argues that both communist and postcommunist governments used the general budget as a buffer to compensate losers of economic reforms, especially microeconomic restructuring. The ever-widening circle of net benefiters of welfare provisions paid from the general budget, however, has made it simply unrealistic to implement sizeable fiscal adjustment, putting the country onto a deteriorating path of economic development.

State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.