4 resultados para Weighted sum
em Corvinus Research Archive - The institutional repository for the Corvinus University of Budapest
Resumo:
Probability density function (pdf) for sum of n correlated lognormal variables is deducted as a special convolution integral. Pdf for weighted sums (where weights can be any real numbers) is also presented. The result for four dimensions was checked by Monte Carlo simulation.
Resumo:
We present a general model to find the best allocation of a limited amount of supplements (extra minutes added to a timetable in order to reduce delays) on a set of interfering railway lines. By the best allocation, we mean the solution under which the weighted sum of expected delays is minimal. Our aim is to finely adjust an already existing and well-functioning timetable. We model this inherently stochastic optimization problem by using two-stage recourse models from stochastic programming, building upon earlier research from the literature. We present an improved formulation, allowing for an efficient solution using a standard algorithm for recourse models. We show that our model may be solved using any of the following theoretical frameworks: linear programming, stochastic programming and convex non-linear programming, and present a comparison of these approaches based on a real-life case study. Finally, we introduce stochastic dependency into the model, and present a statistical technique to estimate the model parameters from empirical data.
Resumo:
A hagyományos szavazási játékok speciális átruházható hasznosságú, kooperatív játékok, úgynevezett egyszerű játékok, ahol a játékosok a pártok, és az egyes koalíciók értéke 1 vagy 0 attól függően, hogy az adott koalíció elég erős-e az adott jogszabály elfogadásához, vagy sem. Ebben a cikkben bevezetjük az általánosított súlyozott szavazási játékok fogalmát, ahol a pártok mandátumainak száma a valószínűségi változó. Magyar példákon keresztül mutatjuk be az új megközelítés használhatóságát. / === / Voting games are cooperative games with transferable utility, so-called simple games, where the players are parties and the value of a coalition may be 0 or 1 depending on its ability to pass a new law. The authors introduce the concept of generalized weighted voting games where the parties' strengths are random variables. taking examples from Hungary to illustrate the use of this approach.
Resumo:
We consider linearly weighted versions of the least core and the (pre)nucleolus and investigate the reduction possibilities in their computation. We slightly extend some well-known related results and establish their counterparts by using the dual game. Our main results imply, for example, that if the core of the game is not empty, all dually inessential coalitions (which can be weakly minorized by a partition in the dual game) can be ignored when we compute the per-capita least core and the per-capita (pre)nucleolus from the dual game. This could lead to the design of polynomial time algorithms for the per-capita (and other monotone nondecreasingly weighted versions of the) least core and the (pre)nucleolus in specific classes of balanced games with polynomial many dually esential coalitions.