A gyenge hazai innovációs teljesítmény intézményi magyarázatához. Vitaírás a nemzetközi innovációs versenyben való részvétel akadályairól (Towards an institutional explanation of the country's weak innovation performance)

Miért van a magyar gazdaság hasonlóan kritikus helyzetben, mint a rendszerváltást megelőző időkben? Miért nem sikerül az eladósodást megállítani, a gazdaságot konszolidálni, és fenntartható növekedési pályára állítani? Ennek közvetlen okát a szerzők a fejlődés féloldalasságában és a duális gazdasági szerkezetben látják. A piacgazdasági intézmények bevezetése ugyanis nem járt együtt az egész gazdaságot (vagy legalábbis annak nagy részét) átfogó, a tudásvezérelt információgazdaság felé mutató, gyors fejlődéssel. Számos indikátor azt jelzi, hogy az ország lemaradt a nemzetközi innovációs versenyben. Az innovációk elégtelensége azonban nem véletlen, nem exogén adottság, hanem a formális piaci intézmények mögött meghúzódó valós intézményi berendezkedéssel, a gazdaságban ténylegesen észlelhető magatartásmintákkal magyarázható. A piacgazdasági intézmények és jogi keretek, amelyek elvileg lehetőséget adnak az erőforrásokhoz való szabad és nyílt hozzáférésre, csak részben töltődtek meg tartalommal. Az országban még mindig meglehetősen korlátozott a sikeres belépés lehetősége a piaci és a politikai arénába, azaz a magyar társadalom - a north-i terminológiával élve - "korlátozott hozzáférésre alapozott társadalomként" írható le. Az a tény, hogy a piaci szereplők esélyei az államhoz és intézményeihez fűződő kapcsolatoktól függően nagyban különböznek egymástól, és a gazdasági szereplők rendszerszerűen használják e kapcsolatokat járadékszerzésre, lefojtja az innovációt, és újra és újra megakasztja a fejlődést. / === / Why is Hungary's economy still in a critical state similar to the one before the change of system? Why is the indebtedness not being halted, the economy consolidated or vital structural reforms performed? The authors see the direct cause in lopsided development and a dual economic structure. The introduction of market economic institutions was not followed by rapid, overall development towards a knowledge-led, information economy. Several indicators show how Hungary has fallen behind in competition for international innovation. The inadequacy is not a fortuitous, exogenous attribute, but explicable in terms of a real institutional setup underlying the formal market institutions, and of actual behaviour patterns found in the economy. Only in part has substance been gained by the institutions and legal frames of a market economy that theoretically would provide free and open access to resources. The scope for successful entry into the market or political arena remains very narrow, so that in Douglass North's terms, Hungary's is still "a society based on restricted access." Innovation is stifled and development repeatedly impeded by the fact that market players' chances differ widely depending on their connections with the state and its institutions and such connections are used regularly in rent-seeking.

A Note on The Weak Sequential Core of Dynamic TU Games

This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.

Cooperation under incomplete contracting

We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at different date-events. We unify various treatments of dynamic core concepts existing in the literature. This results in definitions of the Classical Core, the Segregated Core, the Two-stage Core, the Strong Sequential Core, and the Weak Sequential Core. Except for the Classical Core, all these concepts can be defined by requiring absence of blocking in period 0 and at any date-event in period 1. The concepts only differ with respect to the notion of blocking in period 0. To evaluate these concepts, we study three market structures in detail: strongly complete markets, incomplete markets in finance economies, and incomplete markets in settings with multiple commodities.

Nemzetgazdasági versenyképesség: elmélet, mérés, esettanulmányok = Competitiveness of National Economies: Theory, Measurement, Case Studies

Műhelytanulmányunk a nemzeti versenyképesség vállaltokon túli dimenziójával kíván foglalkozni. A felgyorsult globalizáció korának világgazdasági környezetében, ahol a nemzetköziesedett nagyvállalatok rendelkeznek az erőforrások és a közvetlen beruházások jelentős része felett és az egyes regionális piacok folyamatai gyorsan áttevődnek más régiókra, a gazdaságpolitika és tágabb értelemben az állam mozgástere és feladata megváltozott. Ez az országokra nézve azt jelenti, hogy a stabil üzleti környezet megteremtésével és az emberi erőforrás illetve a technológiai infrastruktúra, mint háttérerőforrások fejlesztésével képesek hosszútávon megalapozni a gazdasági növekedést és felzárkózást, függetlenül attól, hogy az európai gazdasági integrációs környezetben valósítják-e meg mindezt. _____ The working paper examines the dimensions of competitiveness over the corporate level. The regional positions are changing quickly and the room for manoeuvre of the economic policy in national level is narrowed for attraction of business activities in the era of quickened globalisation. The countries compete for direct investments with the level of stability in business environment, the quality of human resource, the development of technological infrastructure. The development of background factors determines the economic growth.

Post-Crisis Lessons for Open Economies

In a systemic perspective, what are the primary transmitters of global competitiveness with the proper coordination mechanism? What are the systemic impacts of the U.S. economy on world markets? Will the United States stay the main engine of world economic growth for quite some time to come, or at least in the current decade? Will and should the United States, as the single largest open economy of the world, be in some way responsible for the provision of global economic stability as a valuable public good? Was the recent crisis predictable? These are the main questions addressed, all of which are answered in a new global context, and the responses are based on some known principles of international economics and economic history.

Post Crisis Lessons for Open Economies: Are They All New?

This paper will argue that the American economy could and will absorb the recent shocks, and that in the longer run (within a matter of years), it will somehow convert the revealed weaknesses to its advantage. America has a long record of learning from its excesses to improve the working of its particular brand of capitalism, dating back to the imposition of antitrust controls on the robber barons in the late 1800s and the enhancement of investor protection after the 1929 crash. The American economy has experienced market imperfections of all kinds but it almost always has found, true, not perfect, but fairly reliable regulatory answers and has managed to adapt to change, (e. g. Dodd-Frank Act on financial stability). The U.S. has many times pioneered in the elaboration of both theoretical and policy oriented solutions for conflicts between markets and government to increase economic welfare (Bernanke, 2008, p. 425). There is no single reason why it should not turn the latest financial calamities to its advantage. At the same time, to regain confidence in capitalism as a global system, global efforts are indispensable. To identify some of the global economic conflicts that have a lot to do with U.S. markets in particular, we seek answers to global systemic questions.

Can Europe recover without credit?

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Can Europe recover without credit?

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

The integraton by trade and FDI of emerging economies: The ASEAN example

The paper investigates the role of regionalization and regional identity in the endeavours of emerging economies to connect successfully to the global world economy. It addresses the question of whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with its loose institutional integration framework, has contributed to the global integration of its very heterogenous members in the first decade of the 21st century – and, if so, what are the drivers behind this. The paper summarizes connecting theories, using a multidisciplinary approach, and uses descriptive statistical analysis to identify the achievements of the ASEAN-6 countries within global trade and foreign direct invesment (FDI) flows in the given time period. We suggest that ASEAN countries, with their efforts to initiate interconnecting regional organizations in Asia, most specifically the ASEAN+3 (APT) construction, did contribute to greater integratedness of member countries; and they have created a regional image with a common market and production base. Such achievements, however, can be in great part attributed to the micro-level activities of international and regional firms wishing to establish cross-border production networks in these countries.

The integration by trade and FDI of emerging economies: The Asian example

The paper investigates the role of regionalization and regional identity in the endeavours of emerging economies to connect successfully to the global world economy. It addresses the question of whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with its loose institutional integration framework, has contributed to the global integration of its very heterogenous members in the first decade of the 21st century – and, if so, what are the drivers behind this. The paper summarizes connecting theories, using a multidisciplinary approach, and uses descriptive statistical analysis to identify the achievements of the ASEAN-6 countries within global trade and foreign direct invesment (FDI) flows in the given time period. We suggest that ASEAN countries, with their efforts to initiate interconnecting regional organizations in Asia, most specifically the ASEAN+3 (APT) construction, did contribute to greater integratedness of member countries; and they have created a regional image with a common market and production base. Such achievements, however, can be in great part attributed to the micro-level activities of international and regional firms wishing to establish cross-border production networks in these countries.

Changes in Work from the Global Value Change Perspective The Case of Transformation Economies: Bulgaria and Hungary

The core aim of this paper is to evaluate to what extent were companies able to join to the global value chains (GVCs) through some selected company case studies.