The Euro Area's Tightrope Walk: Debt and Competitiveness in Italy and Spain

- Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. - In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. - The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro-area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

Fiscal adjustment and economic growth in the European Union

The current world economic crisis induced countries to launch wide-scale spending programmes all over the world. Member states of the European Union have not been an exception to this trend. While deficit spending may increase the aggregate demand, it can also accelerate indebtedness and make the required spending cuts politically risky later on. However, deficit financing is not a new phenomenon in the EU; it has been widely practiced in the last couple of decades. As the crisis seems to come to an end, countries with huge deficits should adopt exit strategies now, thereby reducing deficit and debt and reintroducing fiscal discipline, a requirement laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact. Nevertheless, former adjustment processes can provide ample evidence for successful and politically viable fiscal consolidations. In certain cases, even economic activity started to accelerate as a response to the welldesigned adjustment measures. Based on the previous experiences of EU states, the aim of this paper is, therefore, to identify the conditions that may determine a fiscal consolidation to be successful in terms of a reduced debt ratio and a positive economic growth.

The importance of institutions in expansionary fiscal consolidations. A critical assessment of non-Keynesian effects

The short-term effects of fiscal consolidation have attracted an increasing attention from both the academia and policy makers in the recent years. Authors in the literature on non- Keynesian effects usually put the emphasis on the need for the devaluation of the national currency, the accommodating reaction of the monetary authority and the favourable international economic conditions as the necessary accompanying tools of fiscal consolidation, in order to realise short-term expansionary effects. Some also add the necessity of large-scale adjustment; while others support the view that a high and increasing debt ratio or increasing government spending, by triggering an unavoidable adjustment, is the key to experiencing short-term expansionary effects. The composition of adjustment also became a crucial explanation for non-Keynesian effects. However, as the following critical assessment of the literature on expansionary fiscal consolidations will reveal, institutional conditions, such as the importance of the depth of financial intermediation and the influencing role of labour market structure, can prove to be crucial in the occurrence of the desired expansionary short-term effects.

A vállalati likviditáskezelés szerepe eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelszerződésekben. Az alkun alapuló megközelítés eredményei (The role of corporate liquidity management under secured debt financing Results of the bargaining approach)

A szerző azt a kérdést vizsgálja, hogy a vállalat működése során a likvid eszközök mekkora arányát tartsa fenn. A kérdést a finanszírozás szemszögéből veti fel, mivel a hitelezés okozta korlátok jelentősen befolyásolják a likvid eszköz tartalékolásának motivációit. A cikk a vállalkozói-hitelezői információs kapcsolat háromféle esetében mutatja be az eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelek adósságszolgálatát meghatározó tényezőket. Elsőként a teljes információs viszony melletti stratégiákkal meghatározott adósságszolgálatot vizsgálja, majd a második típusú információs kapcsolatban a nem megfigyelhető vállalkozói erőfeszítéseket feltételezve adja meg az adósságszolgálat fizetésének ex ante és ex post egyensúlyát. Harmadikként, a nem igazolható vállalati adatok feltevése mellett teljes és részleges eszközfedezetre is meghatározza az optimális vállalkozói likviditási politikát, és tárgyalja az itt fennálló ellentéteket. Megmutatja, hogy részleges eszközfedezet mellett 1. újratárgyalható a hitelszerződés, és a stratégiai adósságszolgálatot nem lehet elkerülni, 2. a likviditásoptimalizálásnak nincs ex post Pareto-egyensúlyi megoldása, ugyanis a hitelszerződésben részt vevő felek alkuereje határozza meg a vállalat likviditásának szintjét. / === / This paper investigates what the liquid asset ratio for firms should be. Financing constraints significantly influence motivations for liquidity hoarding. The article shows the determinants of secured debt services for three different information cases of a lender-borrower relationship. First, it examines the strategic debt service under full information, and then, assuming non-observable entrepreneurial efforts, it gives the ex ante and ex post equilibria of the strategic debt service. The third case supposes non-verifiable firm information; this provides the optimal corporate liquidity policy and explains the contrary propositions. It shows that under not fully secured collateral, 1. the debt contract is renegotiable; the lender cannot avoid the strategic debt service, 2. there is no ex post optimal Pareto efficient solution to liquidity policy, because the corporate liquidity ratio is determined by the bargaining power of the partners in the debt contract.