State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

This paper investigates the impact of state subsidy on the behavior of the entrepreneur under asymmetric information. Several authors formulated concerns about state intervention as it can aggravate moral hazard in corporate financing. In the seminal paper of Holmström and Tirole (1997) a two-player moral hazard model is presented with an entrepreneur initiating a risky scalable project and a private investor (e.g. bank or venture capitalist) providing outside financing. The novelty of our research is that this basic moral hazard model is extended to the case of positive externalities and to three players by introducing the state subsidizing the project. It is shown that in the optimum, state subsidy does not harm, but improves the incentives of the entrepreneur to make efforts for the success of the project; hence in effect state intervention reduces moral hazard. Consequently, state subsidy increases social welfare which is defined as the sum of private and public net benefits. Also, the exact form of the state subsidy (ex-ante/ex-post, conditional/unconditional, refundable/nonrefundable) is irrelevant in respect of the optimal size and the total welfare effect of the project. Moreover, in case of nonrefundable subsidies state does not crowd out private investors; but on the contrary, by providing additional capital it boosts private financing. In case of refundable subsidies some crowding effects may occur depending on the subsidy form and the parameters.

Hiánygazdaság − többletgazdaság. Tanulmány a piac elméletéről – II. rész = Shortage economy - surplus economy. A study on market theory II

A főáramlat közgazdászai elismerik, hogy a szocialista rendszert a krónikus hiány jellemezte, de úgy vélik, hogy a kapitalista rendszerben - kisebb vagy nagyobb ingadozások közepette - piaci egyensúly uralkodik. Ezzel szemben a tanulmány két piaci állapotot állít egymással szembe. Az egyikben dominálnak a túlkeresleti jelenségek, bár előfordulnak túlkínálati jelenségek is, ezt nevezi a szerző hiánygazdaságnak. A másikban dominálnak a túlkínálati jelenségek, bár előfordulnak túlkeresleti jelenségek is, amit a szerző többletgazdaságnak nevez. A tanulmány II. része összefoglalja a tanulmány fő állításait. Ezek szerint a szocialista rendszer veleszületett immanens tulajdonsága a hiánygazdaság, míg a kapitalista rendszer veleszületett immanens tulajdonsága a többletgazdaság létrehozása és állandó reprodukciója. Állami beavatkozások erősíthetik vagy gyengíthetik ezeket a genetikus tulajdonságokat, de nem szüntethetik meg. A tanulmány áttekinti a többletgazdaság kedvező és kedvezőtlen hatásait. A kedvező hatások között különleges nyomatékkal emeli ki, hogy a többlet (elsősorban többletkapacitások) nélkül nem alakulhat ki a termelők, illetve az eladók rivalizálása, ami az innovációs folyamat legfontosabb hajtóereje. A többletgazdaság általános esetének vizsgálata után különböző speciális esetekkel foglalkozik a tanulmány: a gazdaság konjunkturális hullámzásával, a hadigazdasággal, a modern kapitalizmusban mutatkozó történelmi léptékű változásokkal, valamint a szocialista rendszeren belül megjelent piacorientált reformokkal és a posztszocialista átmenettel. ____ Mainstream economists recognize that the socialist system was marked by chronic shortage, but they consider that the capitalist system exhibits market equilibrium, give or take some greater or lesser fluctuations. This study, however, contrasts two market states. One is dominated by phenomena of excess demand, though instances of excess supply appear as well; this the author calls a shortage economy. The other is dominated by phenomena of excess supply, though instances of excess demand appear as well; this the author terms a surplus economy. Part II of the study starts by summing up its main propositions. Just as the shortage economy is an intrinsic, immanent trait of the socialist system, so the creation and continual reproduction of the surplus economy is an intrinsic, immanent trait of the capitalist system. Such genetic traits may be strengthened or weakened by state intervention, but not eliminated by it. The study reviews the favourable and detrimental effects of the surplus economy. Of the favourable effects, it is emphasized that without surplus there cannot develop among producers or sellers the rivalry that provides the main impetus for the innovation process. Having examined the general case of the surplus economy, the study turns to various special cases: to the trade-cycle fluctuations of the economy, the war economy, the historic changes appearing in modern capitalism, the market-oriented reforms that appear within the socialist system, and the post-socialist transition.

The risk of adverse selection and its management in the process of venture capital investment (The experience of Hungarian investors)

Venture capitalists can be regarded as financers of young, high-risk enterprises, seeking investments with a high growth potential and offering professional support above and beyond their capital investment. The aim of this study is to analyse the occurrence of information asymmetry between venture capital investors and entrepreneurs, with special regard to the problem of adverse selection. In the course of my empirical research, I conducted in-depth interviews with 10 venture capital investors. The aim of the research was to elicit their opinions about the situation regarding information asymmetry, how they deal with problems arising from adverse selection, and what measures they take to manage these within the investment process. In the interviews we also touched upon how investors evaluate state intervention, and how much they believe company managers are influenced by state support.

Bank financing of Hungarian SMEs: Getting over to credit crisis by state interventions

In this article we aimed to present and analyse the 21st century history of bank financing in the Hungarian small and medium enterprise (SME) sector in the period ranging from 2000 to 2012. The credit products offered by banks and credit unions are the most fundamental means of external financing capable of fulfilling the financing needs of a wide array of SMEs. The conditions of accessing credits and their prices exert a decisive influence on the profitability and business opportunities of SMEs. As a result of economic slowdown SMEs had to face higher interest rates, decreasing credit limits, and bank financing options that became increasingly slowly accessible alongside stricter conditions. Due to this process SMEs business performance had been falling continuously which has a destructive contribution to the national economy. In the first chapter of the article we present the dynamic development of credit financing in the Hungarian SME sector, along with the causes that triggered it, then we will continue with the negative tendencies dating from the onset of the 2008 debt crisis. In the second chapter we discuss the vicious circle, due to which the business performance of the SMEs, as well as the conditions of access to credits and their prices, have entered into a negative spiral. In the third and final chapter we make suggestions regarding the direction and means of necessary government intervention, in order to stop and reverse the negative tendencies observed in SME credit financing.