Az egyensúlyi ráták unicitása és a bérráta pozitivitása a Neumann-modell általánosításaiban (Uniqueness of equilibrium rates and the positive value of the wage rate in generalizations from the Neumann model)

Cikkünk arról a paradox jelenségről szól, hogy a fogyasztást explicit módon megjelenítő Neumann-modell egyensúlyi megoldásaiban a munkabért meghatározó létszükségleti termékek ára esetenként nulla lehet, és emiatt a reálbér egyensúlyi értéke is nulla lesz. Ez a jelenség mindig bekövetkezik az olyan dekomponálható gazdaságok esetén, amelyekben eltérő növekedési és profitrátájú, alternatív egyensúlyi megoldások léteznek. A jelenség sokkal áttekinthetőbb formában tárgyalható a modell Leontief-eljárásra épülő egyszerűbb változatában is, amit ki is használunk. Megmutatjuk, hogy a legnagyobbnál alacsonyabb szintű növekedési tényezőjű megoldások közgazdasági szempontból értelmetlenek, és így érdektelenek. Ezzel voltaképpen egyrészt azt mutatjuk meg, hogy Neumann kiváló intuíciója jól működött, amikor ragaszkodott modellje egyértelmű megoldásához, másrészt pedig azt is, hogy ehhez nincs szükség a gazdaság dekomponálhatóságának feltételezésére. A vizsgált téma szorosan kapcsolódik az általános profitráta meghatározásának - Sraffa által modern formába öntött - Ricardo-féle elemzéséhez, illetve a neoklasszikus növekedéselmélet nevezetes bér-profit, illetve felhalmozás-fogyasztás átváltási határgörbéihez, ami jelzi a téma elméleti és elmélettörténeti érdekességét is. / === / In the Marx-Neumann version of the Neumann model introduced by Morishima, the use of commodities is split between production and consumption, and wages are determined as the cost of necessary consumption. In such a version it may occur that the equilibrium prices of all goods necessary for consumption are zero, so that the equilibrium wage rate becomes zero too. In fact such a paradoxical case will always arise when the economy is decomposable and the equilibrium not unique in terms of growth and interest rate. It can be shown that a zero equilibrium wage rate will appear in all equilibrium solutions where growth and interest rate are less than maximal. This is another proof of Neumann's genius and intuition, for he arrived at the uniqueness of equilibrium via an assumption that implied that the economy was indecomposable, a condition relaxed later by Kemeny, Morgenstern and Thompson. This situation occurs also in similar models based on Leontief technology and such versions of the Marx-Neumann model make the roots of the problem more apparent. Analysis of them also yields an interesting corollary to Ricardo's corn rate of profit: the real cause of the awkwardness is bad specification of the model: luxury commodities are introduced without there being a final demand for them, and production of them becomes a waste of resources. Bad model specification shows up as a consumption coefficient incompatible with the given technology in the more general model with joint production and technological choice. For the paradoxical situation implies the level of consumption could be raised and/or the intensity of labour diminished without lowering the equilibrium rate of the growth and interest. This entails wasteful use of resources and indicates again that the equilibrium conditions are improperly specified. It is shown that the conditions for equilibrium can and should be redefined for the Marx-Neumann model without assuming an indecomposable economy, in a way that ensures the existence of an equilibrium unique in terms of the growth and interest rate coupled with a positive value for the wage rate, so confirming Neumann's intuition. The proposed solution relates closely to findings of Bromek in a paper correcting Morishima's generalization of wage/profit and consumption/investment frontiers.

The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.

A nettó jelenérték maximalizálása erőforrás-korlátos projektekben - egy új harmóniakereső metaheurisztika (A harmony search metaheuristic for the resourceconstrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows)

Ebben a tanulmányban a szerző egy új harmóniakereső metaheurisztikát mutat be, amely a minimális időtartamú erőforrás-korlátos ütemezések halmazán a projekt nettó jelenértékét maximalizálja. Az optimális ütemezés elméletileg két egész értékű (nulla-egy típusú) programozási feladat megoldását jelenti, ahol az első lépésben meghatározzuk a minimális időtartamú erőforrás-korlátos ütemezések időtartamát, majd a második lépésben az optimális időtartamot feltételként kezelve megoldjuk a nettó jelenérték maximalizálási problémát minimális időtartamú erőforrás-korlátos ütemezések halmazán. A probléma NP-hard jellege miatt az egzakt megoldás elfogadható idő alatt csak kisméretű projektek esetében képzelhető el. A bemutatandó metaheurisztika a Csébfalvi (2007) által a minimális időtartamú erőforrás-korlátos ütemezések időtartamának meghatározására és a tevékenységek ennek megfelelő ütemezésére kifejlesztett harmóniakereső metaheurisztika továbbfejlesztése, amely az erőforrás-felhasználási konfliktusokat elsőbbségi kapcsolatok beépítésével oldja fel. Az ajánlott metaheurisztika hatékonyságának és életképességének szemléltetésére számítási eredményeket adunk a jól ismert és népszerű PSPLIB tesztkönyvtár J30 részhalmazán futtatva. Az egzakt megoldás generálásához egy korszerű MILP-szoftvert (CPLEX) alkalmaztunk. _______________ This paper presents a harmony search metaheuristic for the resource-constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows. In the proposed approach, a resource-constrained project is characterized by its „best” schedule, where best means a makespan minimal resource constrained schedule for which the net present value (NPV) measure is maximal. Theoretically the optimal schedule searching process is formulated as a twophase mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem, which can be solved for small-scale projects in reasonable time. The applied metaheuristic is based on the "conflict repairing" version of the "Sounds of Silence" harmony search metaheuristic developed by Csébfalvi (2007) for the resource-constrained project scheduling problem (RCPSP). In order to illustrate the essence and viability of the proposed harmony search metaheuristic, we present computational results for a J30 subset from the well-known and popular PSPLIB. To generate the exact solutions a state-of-the-art MILP solver (CPLEX) was used.

On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that satisfy these axioms. However, when considering an assignment game as a communication graph game where the game is simply the assignment game and the graph is a corresponding bipartite graph buyers are connected with sellers only, we show that Myerson's component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. Moreover, these two axioms have a natural interpretation for assignment games. Component efficiency yields submarket efficiency stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the worth of that submarket, where a submarket is a set of buyers and sellers such that all buyers in this set have zero valuation for the goods offered by the sellers outside the set, and all buyers outside the set have zero valuations for the goods offered by sellers inside the set. Fairness of the graph game solution boils down to valuation fairness stating that only changing the valuation of one particular buyer for the good offered by a particular seller changes the payoffs of this buyer and seller by the same amount.

Heterogeneous labour and the determination of value

Heterogeneity of labour and its implications for the Marxian theory of value has been one of the most controversial issues in the literature of the Marxist political economy. The adoption of Marx's conjecture about a uniform rate of surplus value leads to a simultaneous determination of the values of common and labour commodities of different types and the uniform rate of surplus value. Determination of these variables can be formally represented as a parametric cigenvalue problem. Morishima's and Bródy's earlier results are analysed and given new interpretations in the light of the suggested procedure. The main questions are addressed in a more general context too. The analysis is extended to the problem of segmented labour market, as well.