Az egyensúlyi ráták unicitása és a bérráta pozitivitása a Neumann-modell általánosításaiban (Uniqueness of equilibrium rates and the positive value of the wage rate in generalizations from the Neumann model)

Cikkünk arról a paradox jelenségről szól, hogy a fogyasztást explicit módon megjelenítő Neumann-modell egyensúlyi megoldásaiban a munkabért meghatározó létszükségleti termékek ára esetenként nulla lehet, és emiatt a reálbér egyensúlyi értéke is nulla lesz. Ez a jelenség mindig bekövetkezik az olyan dekomponálható gazdaságok esetén, amelyekben eltérő növekedési és profitrátájú, alternatív egyensúlyi megoldások léteznek. A jelenség sokkal áttekinthetőbb formában tárgyalható a modell Leontief-eljárásra épülő egyszerűbb változatában is, amit ki is használunk. Megmutatjuk, hogy a legnagyobbnál alacsonyabb szintű növekedési tényezőjű megoldások közgazdasági szempontból értelmetlenek, és így érdektelenek. Ezzel voltaképpen egyrészt azt mutatjuk meg, hogy Neumann kiváló intuíciója jól működött, amikor ragaszkodott modellje egyértelmű megoldásához, másrészt pedig azt is, hogy ehhez nincs szükség a gazdaság dekomponálhatóságának feltételezésére. A vizsgált téma szorosan kapcsolódik az általános profitráta meghatározásának - Sraffa által modern formába öntött - Ricardo-féle elemzéséhez, illetve a neoklasszikus növekedéselmélet nevezetes bér-profit, illetve felhalmozás-fogyasztás átváltási határgörbéihez, ami jelzi a téma elméleti és elmélettörténeti érdekességét is. / === / In the Marx-Neumann version of the Neumann model introduced by Morishima, the use of commodities is split between production and consumption, and wages are determined as the cost of necessary consumption. In such a version it may occur that the equilibrium prices of all goods necessary for consumption are zero, so that the equilibrium wage rate becomes zero too. In fact such a paradoxical case will always arise when the economy is decomposable and the equilibrium not unique in terms of growth and interest rate. It can be shown that a zero equilibrium wage rate will appear in all equilibrium solutions where growth and interest rate are less than maximal. This is another proof of Neumann's genius and intuition, for he arrived at the uniqueness of equilibrium via an assumption that implied that the economy was indecomposable, a condition relaxed later by Kemeny, Morgenstern and Thompson. This situation occurs also in similar models based on Leontief technology and such versions of the Marx-Neumann model make the roots of the problem more apparent. Analysis of them also yields an interesting corollary to Ricardo's corn rate of profit: the real cause of the awkwardness is bad specification of the model: luxury commodities are introduced without there being a final demand for them, and production of them becomes a waste of resources. Bad model specification shows up as a consumption coefficient incompatible with the given technology in the more general model with joint production and technological choice. For the paradoxical situation implies the level of consumption could be raised and/or the intensity of labour diminished without lowering the equilibrium rate of the growth and interest. This entails wasteful use of resources and indicates again that the equilibrium conditions are improperly specified. It is shown that the conditions for equilibrium can and should be redefined for the Marx-Neumann model without assuming an indecomposable economy, in a way that ensures the existence of an equilibrium unique in terms of the growth and interest rate coupled with a positive value for the wage rate, so confirming Neumann's intuition. The proposed solution relates closely to findings of Bromek in a paper correcting Morishima's generalization of wage/profit and consumption/investment frontiers.

Állami támogatások és gazdasági teljesítmény. Támogatás-túladagolás a magyar gazdaságfejlesztésben? (An overdose of state aid in the Hungarian economy)

Magyarországon az elmúlt évtizedben a vállalatoknak nyújtott állami támogatás GDP-arányosan számolva az európai uniós átlag 2,7-szerese volt. A cikk megvizsgálja, hogy a támogatások hatása megjelenik-e a magyar gazdaság beruházási, foglalkoztatási, jövedelemtermelési teljesítményében és versenyképességében. Arra a következtetésre jut, hogy egyik területen sem jobb a helyzet, mint azokban az országokban, amelyekben lényegesen alacsonyabb a támogatási arány. A mikroszintű elemzések, értékelések sem támasztják alá azt a vélekedést, hogy az állami támogatások érzékelhetően javítják a gazdasági teljesítményt. A források bősége önmagában is okoz hatékonysági problémákat, mert sok program és szervezet versenyez egymással. A rossz (gyengébb hatékonysági követelményeket támasztó) programok kiszorítják a jó programokat. Ha a versenyképességet érdemben befolyásoló tényezők, például a kedvező jogi szabályozási környezet és az üzleti szolgáltatások jól működő piacai nem adottak, akkor ezek hiányát nem ellensúlyozza a támogatások magas szintje. Magyarország az idén indult hétéves programozási időszakban tovább kívánja növelni a vállalatoknak nyújtott állami támogatások mértékét, miközben nincs egyértelmű válasz arra a kérdésre, hogy milyen módon növelhető a támogatási rendszer jelenleg alacsony hatékonysága. _____ State aid given to enterprises as a proportion of Hungary�s GDP has been 2.7 times the EU average over the past decade. The article examines whether any impact of this high level of state aid can be discerned in investment, employment, income- generation performance, or competitiveness of the Hungarian economy. It seems that in none of these areas is the situation better than in countries that have a markedly lower rate of state aid. Micro-level analyses and evaluations do not support the belief that state aid appreciably improves economic performance. A wealth of resources on its own can cause problems with efficiency, as many programs and organizations compete with each other. Bad (less demanding) programs nudge out the good ones. If the factors significantly determining competitiveness, including a favourable legal and regulatory environment and well-functioning markets of business services, are not in place, a high level of state aid cannot be a proxy for them. In the seven-year programming period beginning this year, Hungary plans to further increase the amount of state aid to enterprises, while there is no clear answer as to how to improve the currently poor efficiency of the state aid system.

Economic reform, allocative effiency and terms of trade

It has widely been agreed that the distorted price system is one of the causes of inefficient ecooomic decisions in centrally planned economies. The paper investigates the possible effect of a price reform on the allocation of resources in a situation where micro-efficiency remains unchanged. Foreign trade and endogenously induced terms-of-trade changes are focal points ín the multisectoral applied general equilibrium analysis. Special attention is paid to some methodological problems connected to the representation of foreign trade in such models. The adoption of Armington's assumption leads to an export demand function and this in turn gives rise to the question of optimal export structure, different from the equilibrium one-an aspect so far neglected in the related literature. The results show, that the applied model allows for a more flexible handling of the overspecialization problem, than the linear programming models. It also becomes evident that the use of export demand functions brings unwanted terms-of-trade changes into the model, to be avoided by a suitable reformulation of the model. The analysis also suggests, that a price reform alone does not significantly increase global economic efficiency. Thus the effect of an economic reform on micro-efficiency appears to be a more crucial factor. The author raises in conclusion some rather general questions related to the foreign trade practice of small open economies.

Resource-based view and dynamic capabilities - Achieving competitive advantage through internal resources and competences

Strategy has always been important for success. Whether strategy is applied for military purposes, in large firms, or even for personal objectives, there are certain key characteristics that every successful strategy carries on: clear, objective and simple goals; deep knowledge and understanding of the competitive environment; objective understanding and exploitation of resources; and an effective plan implementation. In this paper, the author’s attention will be focused on the role of internal resources, routines and processes as the bases of sustained competitive advantage (hereafter SCA) into what is now known as the resourcebased view of the firm (RBV) and Dynamic Capabilities (DC). First, the relevance of RBV and DC approaches and the main characteristics of those are briefly mentioned. Second, RBV and DC are examined as an important piece to achieve SCA. Later on, the author deepens into some examples and the manager’s importance when using these RBV and DC approaches. Then issues related with complexity and undefined concepts in RBV and DC are briefly mentioned. Finally, conclusions and personal comments are presented.

The corruption risks of EU funds in Hungary

In corruption, a group of players gain an economic advantage without providing any socially beneficial services in return, therefore corruption is considered to be a form of rent-seeking. Similar to other forms of rent-seeking, corruption causes losses on a societal level, due to the less efficient allocation of resources, as well as the costs of operation and prosecution. Fighting corruption is important not just because of ethical but also economic considerations. Contributions from the European Union are making possible the use of more funds than ever, and spending the full amount of this money is a priority preference of the government. The abundance of funds and the pressure on absorption increase corruption, by the managers of the funds overplanning the amount of money to be allocated to individual tender invitations, setting generous rules on eligible costs, and specifying low rates of own contribution wherever possible. As a result, the opportunities for rent-seeking are increased, as it is worth it for beneficiaries to carry out the project even after relinquishing part of the funds they have been awarded. Thus, the abundance of funds generates a sphere of corruption in which rent-seekers may appear on various levels of the system, often even without the knowledge or approval of those on higher decisionmaking levels.